(1) Rather than the unambiguously desirable ones brought about by Smith's ‘invisible hand’!

(2) Cf. Hall, Peter and Taylor, Rosemary, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, XLIV (1996): 952–973.Google Scholar

(3) Cf. the telling title of a collection edited by Barry, Brian and Hardin, Russel, Rational Man in Irrational Society? (London: Sage, 1982).Google Scholar

(4) We might note, however, that in a world of international regimes and security alliances, democracy is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the prevention of international war. The Gulf War had demonstrated that even dictators can be stopped from attacking and occupying neighbors.

(5) It used to be argued by the ‘structuralist’ school of democratic theorists that an advanced economy is a determinant or prerequisite of democracy, and that in turn democracy will enhance the potential for growth and prosperity. Neither side of this feedback model is supported by much of the current evidence.

(6) Cf. Beetham, David, Defining and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994)Google Scholar and Diamond, Larry, Is the Third Wave Over?, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996), No. 3: 20–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(7) Cf. O'Donnell, Guillermo, Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy, 5 (1995), No. 1: 55–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(8) Cf. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1996).Google Scholar

(9) As some have argued, to the point of making democracy pointless. Cf. Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, La fin de la démocratie (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).Google Scholar

(10) It is worth noting in passing that one item, a seventh M, is missing from this list. The moral ideas and principles governing particular national communities have largely proved to be resistant to ‘globalizing’ processes of diffusion and convergence.

(11) At any rate, from the mineral-rich Congo province of Katanga in the early 1960s to the rise of Catalan demands for independence in the 1980s to the independence of the Baltic States, as well as of Croatia and Slovenia in the post-Soviet early 1990s, it was consistently the richest regional sub-units of estalished states that have had strong motives to defect from the encompassing unit.

(12) Cf. Streeck, Wolgang and Schmitter, Philippe C., Community, Market, State — and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, European Sociological Review, 1 (1985), No. 2, 119–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(13) Streeck and Schmitter, op. cit. 119f.

(14) Cf. Etzioni, Amitai, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar for a similar conceptualization of modes of coordination through social norms, coercive power and material incentives. Also, Schuppert, Gunnar Folke, Assoziative Demokratie. Zum Platz des organisierten Menschen in der Demokratietheorie, in Klein, Ansgar, Schmalz-Bruns, Rainer (eds), Politische Beteiligung und Bürgerengagement in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997), 114–152.Google Scholar

(15) Cf. Miller, David, Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979).Google Scholar

(16) The standard cases of such undercutting and mutual displacement are, on the one hand, the ‘dependent state’ whose regulatory and governing capacity is reduced by national and international monetary markets and investors’ decisions and, on the other, the ‘overregulated’ economy. Cf. also the notion of a ‘depletion of the moral heritage’ by political and economic modernization in Hirsch, Fred, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(17) Stretton, Hugh and Orchard, Lion, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government (London: Saint Martin's, 1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(18) Cf. World Bank, The state in a changing world. World development report 1997 (New York: Oxford UP, 1997).Google Scholar

(19) For instance, it can be easily demonstrated that the system of tertiary education in Germany, an almost entirely statist system, serves the professional upper middle class and their offspring much better than it does any other stratum in German society. In contrast, private university systems might easily be regulated in ways that give greater weight to considerations of social equality.

(20) Cf. Holmes, Stephen and Sunstein, Cass R., The Costs of Rights. Why Liberty depends on Taxes (New York: Norton, 1999).Google Scholar

(21) Cf. Kaufman, Robert, The Politics of State Reform: A Review of Theoretical Approaches and idem, The Next Challenges for Latin America, Working Papers No. 98 and No. 108 (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1997).Google Scholar

(22) Cf. Lane, Robert E., The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance and Frank, Robert H., The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, The Economic Journal, 107 (1997): 1815–1831 and 1832–1847.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(23) Lindblom, Charles E., The Market as Prison, Journal of Politics, vol 44 (1982): 324–336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(24) Cf. the ‘satanic mill’ argument in Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston: Beacon, 1944).Google Scholar

(25) Arguably, there is also the reverse paradox of a ‘high level trap’, with ‘big’ welfare states (such as the Netherlands) defying downward revisions and behaving stubbornly path-dependent.

(26) Hirschman, Albert O., The Passions and the Interests, Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1977).Google Scholar

(27) This is a view of how markets operate that is widely to be encountered in post-socialist economies with their sudden and conspicuous emergence of the nouveaux riches.

(28) This is nicely illustrated by a story that was being told in the context of the economic transition in Poland. Suppose the price of coal doubles during a cold winter. In response, people will economize on heating and work harder (which in itself keeps them warm) in order to earn the necessary additional income to buy coal. Now suppose the price of coal increases by the factor of five. What will be the response? People give up and stay in bed.

(29) It is this experience of escaping the control of power holders that young entrants to the labor market enjoy when for the first time ‘earning their own money’ and thus escaping the control of parents, or that clients of newly privatized telephone companies enjoy when given the chance to put together their own service package, rather than being forced to pay for what the former state monopoly would offer as the single standard package. It must be noted, however, that the experience of such enthusiastic feelings of liberation may be more of a transition phenomenon than something attached to the steady state of market routines. Nevertheless, the desire of both states and communities to extend authoritarian or paternalistic control over individuals can only be checked by keeping the exit option of markets permanently open.

(30) Heller, Agnès, Biopolitics. The Politics of the Body, Race and Nature (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).Google Scholar

(31) Cf. Offe, Claus, ‘Homogeneity’ and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity through Group Rights, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6 (1998), No. 2: 113–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(32) Tendler, Judith, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1997).Google Scholar

(33) Cf. Marwell, Gerald and Oliver, Pamela, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: a Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(34) Streeck and Schmitter, loc. cit.

(35) Putnam, Robert A., Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993).Google Scholar

(36) de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, 2 vol. (New York: Schocken, 1961).Google Scholar