The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the Business Ethics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers given to the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is in stagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses for our students once they graduate to the corporate world.

In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses in Business Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy.

I am foregoing the discussant’s critical role in favor of a short examination of how one sociologist’s imagination is tantalized and irritated by some of the ideas and interconnections of Professor Messick’s paper. The question is, when it comes to ingroups and outgroups, why does race matter? Why does sex or gender matter? I will briefly make four points about sociobiology, favoritism toward the ingroup, hostility toward the outgroup, and finally, the conflict theorist’s favorite topic — resource allocation.

If one disregards the several petty, and often blatantly unfair, complaints voiced by Dr. Ellen Klein, she raises an issue that is worth considering: Who is qualified to teach business ethics? Her answer is plain and straightforward: only philosophers need apply.

In attacking utilitarianism Bernard Williams1 likes to consider the case of the man who has a choice of saving his wife or a stranger from drowning. Williams takes it as clear, and a problem for consequentialism, that the man has a moral obligation to save his wife. The relationship is a good thing without reference to consequences that one might suppose it requires if it is to be valuable.

David Messick suggests a consequentialist view of certain relationships—for example, those that create a limited altruism—that have survival value. Some kin relationships are like that; and insofar as they are, there is something to be said for them from a utilitarian point of view. Messick does not rest there, as his primary concern is fairness, but he does seem to hold that there is a utilitarian basis for valuing families and family ties. One need not be a sociobiologist to learn something about practical morality from the facts Messick adduces.

There can be ethical understanding of organizational policy issues and that is important. However, there can be policy understanding about what the organization should do without understanding of individual level responsibility. There can be cognitive understanding of both policy and individual level ethics responsibilities and that is important. However, there can be cognitive understanding without affective, emotive concern. Intellectual understanding without affective concern can lead to understanding without motivation. There can be cognitive understanding and affective concern and that is important, but not enough. There can be cognitive understanding and affective concern without effective political method. An action-learning approach to organizational ethics can join cognitive understanding of policy and individual level issues with both affective concern and effective political method. Joining of cognitive understanding, affective concern, and effective political method can stimulate and enable ethical character.