As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

Administration of Insecticide Act and Naval Stores Act. Transferred to Agricultural Marketing Service from Food and Drug Administration by Order 865 of the Secretary of Agriculture of June 19, 1940, effective June 30, 1940.

Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense. On May 28, 1940, the President announced the creation of an Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, although the official nomination of members by the Council did not appear until the publication of the Federal Register for June 26. The Council consists of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor, and the act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. L. 649),authorizes it to nominate and the President to appoint an advisory commission. The members of the Commission receive no compensation, but are reimbursed for expenses.

“Returns from three more by-elections make it abundantly clear that the British people are not behind Prime Minister Chamberlain in his peace-at-any-price policies.” Thus the Nation summed up the results of the first five post-Munich byelections. The London Times, however, in an editorial on the ninth of the same series, thought “the result of the East Norfolk by-election should hearten and stiffen the Government.”

The most tantalizing problems faced by students of international relations are those which revolve around the question of motivation in national action. The rôle of ideas and attitudes in determining the behavior of nations is an obtrusive factor in every international situation. Among characteristic ideologies appearing as a growing determinant of national action is the German ideology regarding Lebensraum. Here is one of those words which have been in the German language for a very long time, but which has been popularized by the National Socialists. Literally translated, Lebensraum means “living space,” and when interpreted by anyone in Germany it is taken to indicate all that which is necessary for guaranteeing the life and development of the German people—physically, politically, and economically. It embraces all kinds of issues based upon prestige, historical, and geographical considerations. The terms “equal status” and “self-determination,” indefinite though they were, may have seemed to have definite limits; but Lebensraum goes much beyond them. It is the greatest single underlying cause of the war and the keyword of the new empire for which Hitler and his followers are struggling. The Nazis became increasingly convinced that nothing can save Germany except a genuine expansion of her Lebensraum and the unconditional return of her old colonies. This new empire must be consolidated in one compact mass in the center of Europe. First, the people of the same blood—Austrians, Sudeten-Germans—had to be incorporated; then the territory of Bohemia-Moravia, because of its geographical and strategic position, even though its inhabitants were mainly Slavs; while Slovakia had to be granted “independence” on account of “internal” disintegration.

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

A. Reorganization Plan No. III, under authority of the act of April 3, 1939 (53 Stat. L. 561), was transmitted to Congress on April 2, 1940; it will become effective 60 calendar days thereafter; a resolution disapproving the plan was adopted by the House of Representatives, but was rejected by the Senate. The changes made by this plan are as follows:

Administrator of Civil Aëronautics. The designation of the Administrator of the Civil Aëronautics Authority is changed to Administrator of Civil Aëronautics.

Legislative safeguards for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States enacted by Congress in the fall of 1939 immediately took on added significance as the sea warfare of the belligerent powers in Europe increased in intensity. The many losses of neutral as well as belligerent vessels due to unanchored mines, submarine attacks, and other activity confirmed the prevalent opinion in the United States that the withdrawal of American persons, vessels, aircraft, and cargoes from the area of combat in the waters of northern and western Europe was a wise move. The seizure by British warships of cargoes from German ports or of German origin or ownership, although carried on neutral vessels, added to the dangers to which neutral shipping was exposed.

In 1921, the House of Representatives of the Ohio General Assembly established a committee of eight members whose duty it was to scan all bills introduced for the purpose of determining whether they were frivolous or irrelevant, not introduced in good faith, or duplications of existing law. When this committee had satisfied itself on these points, bills were to be reported back to the House with recommendations of assignment to appropriate standing committees, thus relieving the speaker of this particular duty. In 1929, the rule covering the functions of this Reference Committee was amended so as to permit it to recommend changes, combine bills, and give its approval to “the form and legal effect” of bills. Other changes in 1937 and 1939 dealt with the number of members serving on the committee, and allowed the committee eight legislative days, instead of six, for disposing of bills. The rule under which the committee now functions is as follows:

“When a bill has been read the first time, it shall be referred to the Reference Committee for its consideration and report within eight legislative days after such reference. If it be apparent to said committee that any bill is of a frivolous nature, or that it was not introduced in good faith, or that it is a duplication of a House bill, or can easily be handled as an amendment to a House bill already introduced, or that it is in conflict with or a duplication of an existing statute without making proper provision for the repeal or amendment of such existing statute, said committee shall report said bill back to the House for its return to the author with a notation thereon of the reason for its return.

Out of an Irish dilemma has come one of the most striking legislative experiments in modern government. After a short life from 1922 to 1936, the first Irish upper house proved so inept as to be abolished. Then came an interval of unicameralism, and now under the constitution of 1937 another senate has been brought into existence, differing radically from the old. In the early days of her independence, Ireland was confronted with the problem of precisely how to constitute an upper house, how to differentiate it from the lower house, and whom to represent in it. Now, after a vicissitudinous history, she has embarked upon a course of advanced ideas in parliamentary practice—upon a plan which attempts to secure vocational representation.

Why has it been difficult to fit a second chamber into the structure of the Irish state? In feudal society, class cleavage produced assemblies of more than one house. Since democratization of the social order, this basis of separation, has lost significance, but the tradition persists in the bicameralism of such countries as England.

The city of Philadelphia is tapping a new source of revenue for $18,000,000 in 1940. Events leading to its adoption have their basis in the past ten years of financial distress. These events were not peculiar to Philadelphia. They may be found in one form or another as budgetary problems in many leading municipalities of the nation. Outstanding among the factors causing distress in Philadelphia was a 25 per cent decline in the assessed valuation of real property since the peak year 1931. This represented over a billion dollars of valuation and a loss of $20,000,000 in current real estate tax levy. Since current real estate has been the chief source of the city's annual income, the decline resulted in curtailment of essential city services and reduction of personnel.

For some years, curtailment of services, reduction in personnel, and the fortunate receipt of large annual sums from delinquent taxes enabled the city to survive the difficulties of the depression. However, the point was reached when these factors no longer sufficed to balance the budget. They were followed by more doubtful financial expedients, namely, overestimating of yearly receipts, floating of current deficits by means of temporary loans, and short-changing of sinking funds through excessive valuation of sinking-fund assets.

The National Archives was established in 1934 as an independent agency. The primary objectives of its staff have been described by the Archivist as, first, the concentration and preservation in the National Archives Building of non-current federal archives having permanent or long-time administrative value or historical interest; and, second, “the administration of such archives so as to facilitate their use in the business of the Government and in the service of scholarship.” Operations were begun in 1935 with a survey of federal records located in and near the District of Columbia. As it drew to a conclusion in 1939, the survey had resulted in the accumulation of reports on a total of 2,729,393 cubic feet of records.

Transfer of records to the National Archives Building was begun in December, 1935, and during the next four years more than 200,000 cubic feet of paper records were received. The materials, representing accessions from all 10 executive departments, some 30 independent agencies, four federal courts, and the United States Senate, occupied at the end of 1939 about one-fourth of the available stack space in the building. Non-current materials continue to be received daily, and although there are indications that the rate of transfer is leveling off, it will probably be some years before the century and a half of record accumulations will have been completely dealt with.

For almost six years, American commercial policy has been dominated by the trade agreements program. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was a congressional grant to an administrative agency of authority to alter the American tariff structure. Congress had recognized the desirability of relinquishing direct control over the tariff, temporarily at least, because of the widespread feeling that subordination of group welfare to individual interests was inherent in the system of congressional tariff-making. This new departure was widely acclaimed at first, but opposition soon developed. It was charged that the trade agreement method violated democratic principles, that trade agreements were negotiated in secret starchamber proceedings. As negotiation of individual agreements was announced, producers who feared for their protected position in the home market, importers who desired to see domestic tariffs reduced, and exporters who wished to see the tariff barriers of other countries reduced, all sought to influence the course of the negotiations. This paper analyzes the methods used by the trade agreements organization to deal with these interested persons. Pressure groups have insisted that their interest in the course of trade agreement negotiations rests in the fact that they possess valuable information that the trade agreements organization must have to reach the best “bargain” with the other party to the trade agreements. Evidence to support this contention will be examined. Finally, for purposes of comparison, brief reference will be made to British experience.

The classic definition of American isolation is that it is not a theory but a predicament. In all seriousness, isolation is not a theory of American foreign policy. Isolation is a theory about a theory of American foreign policy. Because this interpretation is a poor theory, misrepresentative even if taken only semi-literally, it has placed the discussion of American foreign policy in a sad predicament of obf uscation, not without its influence upon national decisions.

In relation to the two extremes of isolation and internationalism, America's present course is, in the words of Secretary Hull, a “middle course.” Washington's advice to have “as little political connection as possible,” which is definitive of early policy, is shown by its context to mean merely the avoidance of permanent alliances beyond the existing French treaty.

This paper has been prepared primarily for the purpose of suggesting certain aspects of the teaching problem in political science upon which our attention at this round table may be focused with profit. At the same time, I believe that the issues raised are of more than passing concern and should be considered as among the most important for political scientists during the coming decade. Furthermore, although this round table discussion has been limited to the basic course in political science, I believe that the time has come for appraisal of the entire undergraduate political science curriculum. Such an appraisal should concern itself with the content of our courses (which has been growing like Topsy) and the quality of teaching (which has traditionally been ignored on the ground that the professional educators are alone concerned with teaching methods).

Turning now to the specific subject of this round table, I believe that any discussion of the basic course in political science must concern itself with the following questions: (1) the objective of the course; (2) the materials most conducive to the attainment of that objective; (3) the methods most suitable in the organization and presentation of these materials; and (4) the personnel for teaching the basic course. I should like to make certain brief observations in regard to each of these questions.