Though not above an occasional appeal to the “experience of fathers,” Hobbes was not a patriarchalist in his view of the family. Rather, he quite deliberately represented the family as a small Leviathan, and he used it to illustrate the principles of Hobbesian political science. In the family, as in the state, there is a mutual relationship between protection and obedience; sovereignty is undivided, based on necessity, and justified by performance; authority is absolute and derives from consent. In the state of nature, Hobbes views the family in structure and function as a small state. In commonwealth, the family sovereign relinquishes his absolute power over wife, servant, and child, but he is still entitled to obedience and honor for having raised and educated his children. The content of family education consists of the principles of Hobbesian political science, and the children thereby are properly receptive to sovereign power as they leave the family, whether for the university or for independence.

Hobbes's conception of the family is derived from the patria potestas of republican Rome, and not from common law. His use of the family is fully integrated with his political theory, and it is designed to reinforce both the theory and practice of Leviathan.

This paper is a partial systematic test of Morton A. Kaplan's “theory” of alliance behavior in balance of power international systems first proposed in his well-known System and Process in International Politics (1957). Three hypotheses are inferred from Kaplan's writings predicting that in a stable balance of power system, (a) alliances will occur randomly with respect to time; (b) the time intervals between alliances will also be randomly distributed; and (c) a decline in systemic alliance formation rates precedes system changing events, such as general war. We check these hypotheses by applying probability theory, specifically a Poisson model, to the analysis of new data on fifty-five alliances among the five major European powers during the period 1814–1914. Because our research questions are so general, our findings should not be regarded as definitive; however, the data very strongly support our hypotheses. We conclude that Kaplan's verbal model of a balance of power international system has had its credibility enhanced as a result of this paper.

Alternative theories—“social mobilization” and “urban anomie”— predict different relationships between urbanism and political involvement, i.e., that urbanism stimulates, or that urbanism alienates individuals. (Dahl has predicted a curvilinear association.) This study examines these theories using the 1968 Michigan S.R.C. election survey. Three methodological tools are employed— formulating a causal model among political psychological variables, distinguishing size of polity from size of urban area, and using path analysis—to answer three questions: the effect of urbanism, the effect of polity size, and the effect of their interaction. Overall, the results show little independent association be-tween the urban variables and involvement. Trends indicate that largeness may have slight mobilizing effects even though it also slightly reduces sense of political efficacy, and that the mobilization is a shift in involvement from local to national politics. A partial replication is obtained in the Almond and Verba data.

This article demonstrates that, despite David Easton's assertions to the contrary, economic conceptions play a crucial role in his version of systems theory. A comparison between Easton's model of the political system and the classical economic model of Adam Smith reveals that they share the notions of system, scarcity, allocation, competition, maximization, self-regulation, homeostatic equilibrium, goal-seeking, and feedback. This comparison of Smith and Easton not only illuminates the logical and unacknowledged historical foundations of Easton's framework, it also clarifies some common misconceptions concerning systems analysis (e.g., the idea that it is static or that it is tautological) and underscores a number of important limitations on the utility of Easton's model as a tool for political analysis (i.e., the model requires a given pattern of behavior, a particular cultural environment and a specifiable institutional complex for its operation).

Cross-national research is plagued by several methodological problems that threaten to distort results and hence raise questions concerning the adequacy of substantive findings. The extent and impact of three of these methodological problems—measurement, sampling, and specification errors—are assessed for a recent model of civil conflict developed by Gurr and Duvall. Concepts in their model are measured with two distinct data sets to estimate measurement error; to assess sampling error, measures are applied to a sample of black African nations which were excluded from their analysis; and new concepts are introduced to assess error in theoretical specification. Although all forms of error are found to exist in their work and to have some distorting effects on their model, it is concluded that some of the general model is accurate. However, discovery of (1) the concepts and data sets that contain the greatest error, and (2) the sources of sampling and specification error, is used to improve substantive findings about the causes of manifest political conflict.

Traditional studies of voter turnout in the United States have identified three factors which are presumed to explain most of the differences between the states in voter turnout: socio-demographic differences, electoral competitiveness, and differences in the rules under which elections are conducted. These studies have not, however, clearly distinguished the three factors largely because of their exclusive reliance on aggregate data to analyze the differences. The purpose of this paper is to 1) distinguish between individual and systemic components of turnout and 2) to attempt to partition the variation in turnout between the components. Unlike previous research, this study used both survey and aggregate data to decompose the variation in turnout among the states into first two components—individual and systemic, and then the latter into political (electoral competitiveness) and legal.

The concept “nondecision” was advanced by Bachrach and Baratz as a means of identifying certain areas of community power neglected by reputational and issue analysis approaches. While it is descriptively suggestive of certain possible areas of neglect, it has not been shaped into a useful analytic tool, and does not make any demands which cannot be met by decision-making analysis. Its terms are, in fact, somewhat confused since it fails to differentiate between nondecisions brought about by covert control, and those which may be more generally atlributable to a mobilization of bias. These together seem to comprise what Bachrach and Baratz describe as the “second face of power,” which has been neglected, they argue, because of inadequate consideration of the meaning of power and related concepts. But their own approach to these does not aid empirical analysis. It simply encourages concern for the minutiae of political action, whereas the simplified view of power adopted here suggests the advantages of a contextual approach.

Our interest in the effect of aggregate economic variables on election results began in 1970 following a conversation with an administration official that we have reported elsewhere. We doubted both the implicit theory of voting behavior and the ability of the administration to achieve rates of inflation and unemployment even close to the ranges mentioned. We take this opportunity to note that the unemployment rate was higher and the inflation rate substantially higher than the adviser's estimate, but President Nixon was reelected.

At the time, the principal econometric evidence of the effects of aggregate economic variables was a study by Kramer. Kramer found evidence of an effect of real income, but despite (or perhaps because of) the flaws in his procedure, he found no evidence of an effect of inflation or unemployment. Furthermore, then and now, most of the reported evidence pertains to congressional not presidential elections and to votes for congressmen, not seats in the Congress.

This essay criticizes the ideal of consensual decision as it appears in liberal political theory. A historical survey begins with Locke's view of consent, its criticism and extension by 19th century figures such as Godwin, Calhoun, and Mill, its reappearance in the guise of economic efficiency within the works of Wicksell or Buchanan and Tullock and as moral autonomy in Wolff's Defense of Anarchy. The paper offers a structural account of political decision making in which vulnerability to the authority of others seems inescapable and in which neither unanimity nor a universal right of consent is possible. On this telling, consensual decision is logically unattainable and misdirects constitutional theory.

Alfred Schutz created a systematic methodology for the social sciences by integrating sociological concepts derived from Max Weber with the philosophical foundation provided by Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. However, much of the rigor of Schutz's analysis of social life is vitiated by his failure to come to grips with the philosophical problem of “other minds.” Analysis and critique of Schutz's “general thesis of the alter ego” reveal the sterility of either pragmatic or dogmatic use of philosophic concepts in social science conceptualization, and the failure of his methodological system demonstrates the serious epistemological consequences of doing social scientific work without rigorous and radical philosophical foundation.