Two cases which are concerned with the diversion of the waters of interstate streams were before the United States Supreme Court in the October term of 1937. One of them, Texas v. New Mexico, will be withdrawn from the Court docket when the Rio Grande compact signed by representatives of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas and a representative of the United States on March 18,1938, enters into effect. The other case, Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado, was first argued before the Supreme Court in 1935. In May, 1938, the Court granted the petition of the United States for permission to intervene. Further written briefs and oral arguments were to be considered by the Court when the fall term of 1938 opened.

A survey of the state legislation on public utilities for the period 1936-38 reveals the continuation of certain trends which were pointed out in the article published by the author in this REVIEW in June, 1936.

The period under consideration in the present article (1936–38) witnessed a marked extension of the exercise of regulatory functions by the Federal Government, and at the same time a notable strengthening of the powers and an increase in activities of the public utilities commissions in several states.

The power to incur public debts is one which may have a vital influence on all governmental services. Since borrowing is often the easy way out of a difficult financial situation, the state's credit must be jealously guarded against abuse by the unscrupulous, the inefficient, and the over-ambitious. As a result of their experiences during the nineteenth century, most of the states in this country placed constitutional restrictions upon the use of the state's credit. But despite limitations many states have contracted large debts during the past twenty years, and several of them have been embarrassed by debt problems.

Proposals for administrative reorganization continue to cause controversy. Politicians, academicians, and administrators line up for and against—with men of intelligence and experience on both sides. The temperature of the academicians sometimes rises as much in disputation as does the temperature of their lay brethren. Why such heated disagreement among scholars and scientists? The explanation is suggested by the fact that dissension in the ranks of the academicians is most pronounced when the “dogma of administrative reform” or the “science of management” (as you prefer) is discussed in the abstract. When specific proposals are discussed, differences of opinion among academicians are less extensive and less dogmatic.

The readjustment of areas and services in the local government of Maine is proceeding most rapidly through the process of deorganization in towns which cannot support the cost of local services. An act of the legislature in 1937 provides that whenever the organization of any town or plantation has been terminated, the powers, duties, and obligations relating to the affairs of the town or plantation shall be vested in the state tax assessor, until such time as the town or plantation is reorganized. A town or plantation in Maine at present comes into existence through incorporation by special act of the legislature and ceases to exist through the surrender of the corporate charter by special legislative enactment.

The first instances of the office of lieutenant-governor in the history of American political institutions are found in the governments of the colonial period, when in its most usual form the colonial government, like that of the trading company, consisted of a governor, a deputy-governor, a council, and a general assembly. The office was permanent, however, in only two colonies, i.e., Connecticut and Massachusetts. In other colonies, it existed only when there was a particular need for it. For instance, Lieutenant-Governor Pownall was sent to New Jersey in order to have a competent person “upon the spot” to act whenever the infirmities of the governor made it “painful and hazardous if not impossible” for him to attend to the affairs of his office.

What are the qualifications of the more responsible and more or less permanent professional and technical officials on our federal regulatory commissions? In seeking an answer to this question, data were collected concerning 500 federal officials drawn from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The commissioners themselves were not considered.

Where possible, the records of all staff members receiving $5,000 or more a year were examined. This could not be done on every commission, however. The Federal Trade Commission answers were confined to about 80 of the higher administrative and professional employees. In order to get a larger group, a lower salary limit was adopted for the Federal Power Commission.

Neglected by foreign critics of the Fascist régime and taken for granted by the Italian people, the bureaucracy of Italy has been eclipsed by more spectacular institutions. This “core of modern government” has been concealed by a black-shirted periphery embossed with some corporative theories. From this center, some studies of more than the mere structural features of Fascist Italy might well begin. In any case, the “peculiar Anglo-Saxon pastime of making foreign personnel studies,” as an Italian civil servant recently observed, will admit of a consideration of certain of the functional elements of the Italian bureaucracy—the hierarchical and career aspects.

In the April issue of this REVIEW, Professor William E. Mosher, of Syracuse University, ably expounded the views of those students of public administration who hold that public service is, or should be, a distinct profession. It therefore seems desirable that a member of an opposing school of thought should present the other position.

The other school believes that public service is not a distinctive occupation or profession. In the terms of the labor economist and statistician, public service is, at most, a distinctive industry. Within that industry are a host of separate and distinct occupations.

Among the problems touched upon by the President's Committee on Administrative Management is that of the role of administrative discretion in the governmental process. Both Professor Hart and Professor Cushman have contributed to the statement of, and have suggested solutions for, this problem.1 Professor Hart is concerned with the exercise of a rule-making discretion at the administrative level, and has ably defended the exercise of this type of decision-making by personnel under the control of the Executive rather than Congress. In other words, the mere fact that administrative action takes the form of general rules does not relate it functionally to the legislative department, and once the notion that rule-making is “legislation” in a separation-of-powers sense is got out of the way, the case for a complete integration of such powers under the control of the President can be pushed through to unqualified conclusion.

In introducing the subject of this paper, it is held that we have failed, on the whole, to develop the public service as a well-recognized professional calling in this country, although it is not denied that preliminary steps toward this goal have been taken here and there, and particularly during the past few years. The position is probably tenable that more progress has been made in this direction in the last decade than in any preceding period since Jackson, not excepting the decade from 1883 to 1893 when civil service commissions were first installed. Jackson's famous statement: “The duties of all public officers are, or at least should be, made so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance, and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience,” has apparently been perennially accepted by the general public.

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

Advisory Committee for Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. Authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Public Act No. 430, 75th Congress, approved February 16, 1938.

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

Air Commerce Bureau, Department of Commerce. Duties transferred to Civil Aëronautics Authority by Civil Aëronautics Act of 1938 (Public Act No. 706, 75th Congress), approved June 23, 1938.

Air Mail Bureau, Interstate Commerce Commission. Duties transferred to Civil Aëronautics Authority by Civil Aëronautics Act of 1938 (Public Act No. 706, 75th Congress), approved June 23, 1938.