Factor analysis, a statistical technique of growing popularity in political science, has recently found application in the June, 1966 issue of this Review in an attempt to identify U.N. voting blocs. The hand is that of Professor Bruce M. Russett, the author of a number of outstanding contributions toward the systematic and quantitative study of international relations. The following paragraphs are designed to be cautionary in nature, not destructive, and endeavor to suggest: 1) that factor analysis has questionable value as a tool for the study of complex phenomena; 2) that even if acceptable as a tool, it has peculiar faults when applied to U.N. bloc voting; and 3) that even if acceptable as a tool for the study of bloc voting in the U.N., an application somewhat different from the one chosen by Professor Russett might have been more profitable. In the process it will be argued that the procedures of the sort profferred by Professor Arend Lijphart for determining U.N. voting blocs are preferable.

1. If appealing in its seeming promise to make order of disorder and sense of nonsense, factor analysis proves to be exasperating in practice. For while it is true, that, as Professor Russett has noted elsewhere, “the method is completely objective” in the sense that the decision as to which variables are to “load” on which factors is made entirely by the impartial machinery, the criteria which the machinery applies in arriving at this decision are manipulated by the operator—and depending on these criteria, the outcome can vary widely. Thus factor analysis can generate not one, but a number—in fact an infinite number—of solutions to the same problem. In choosing among these solutions the one most likely to represent truth (if that is what one is interested in), the analyst is commonly urged to select the solution which makes the most “sense”—in other words to embrace the objective solution which is most subjectively appealing. Therefore, one can get out of factor analysis almost whatever one wants to get.

The attainment of universal suffrage over various forms of voting restrictions has been one of the major accomplishments in the development of modern democratic institutions. Struggles for the vote have had to overcome restrictions based on factors such as sex, race and tenure of property. While gaps in the exercise of the franchise still remain, formal restrictions on voting in the United States have been largely removed.

However, an important question, largely uninvestigated, concerns the “costs” of the universal franchise in terms of the quality of government and its impact upon policy decisions. Do the disadvantages of universal suffrage offset advantages said to be gained, particularly in Western nations, such as increased legitimization of decisions and stability of regimes? Many of the past and present opponents of the extension of voting have argued that the poor results to be expected from the impact of universal suffrage far outweigh the advantages. Clearly, the problem of “costs” is important, for it is a crucial element in the argument over democracy and the vote.

“Political scientists … are … ex-post-facto entrail watchers … after-the-event sooth-sayers,” said the late Lucius Beebe. Similarly, much of the general public has long felt that social scientists are not scientists at all but deal in intuition and vague, unfounded generalizations, or are “proposition mongers,” a threat to policymakers.

These notions, together with the fact that social scientists work in sensitive, moral-charged subjects which frequently cause strong public reaction, are partly responsible for the relatively small support the Federal Government has given to research and scholarship in the social sciences.

In 1965 basic research of all types funded by the Federal Government amounted to $1.69 billion, of which the social sciences received only $37 million, or 2.2 per cent. The estimated obligations for 1966 and 1967 were about the same, 2.5 per cent and 2.8 per cent. Nor is there much difference when Federal support for applied research is considered. For 1965, Federal social science expenditures for applied research amounted to only 2.8 per cent of the $3.16 billion the Federal Government spent for all types of applied research, and for 1966 and 1967, estimated expenditures, are only 3.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent.