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12383 results in International Trade Law

Page 598 of 620

  • European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27) Decision by the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 DSU

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 December 2002, pp 2237-2288

  • Summary

    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

    Ecuador's Request for Authorization of Suspension of Concessions or Other Obligations Pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU

    On 8 November 1999, Ecuador requested authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the GATS and GATT 1994 in an amount of US$450 million.

    With respect to the withdrawal of concessions in the goods sector, Ecuador submitted that such suspension is at present not practicable or effective, and that the circumstances are serious enough to request authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations under the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement.

    As regards trade in services, Ecuador proposed to suspend the following subsector in its GATS Schedule of specific commitments:

    Wholesale Trade Services (CPC 622)

    As regards intellectual property rights, Ecuador specified that its request concerned the following categories set out in Part II of the TRIPS Agreement:

    Section 1: Copyright and related rights, Article 14 on “Protection of performers, producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations”;

    Section 3: Geographical indications;

    Section 4: Industrial designs.

    At the same time, Ecuador noted in its request under Article 22.2 that it reserved the right to suspend tariff concessions or other tariff obligations granted in the framework of the GATT 1994 in the event that these may be applied in a practicable and effective manner.

    Ecuador intends to apply the suspension of concessions or other obligations, if authorized by the DSB, against 13 of the EC member States.

    The European Communities’ Request for Arbitration Pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU

    On 19 November 1999, the European Communities requested arbitration pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU. The relevant part of that provision reads:

    “… However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration. …”

  • United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (WT/DS108): Report of the Panel

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 December 2002, pp 1675-2030

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 18 November 1997, the European Communities requested consultations with the United States under Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994, and Article 4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”) with respect to “Sections 921-927 of the Internal Revenue Code and related measures establishing special tax treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (“FSCs”)”.

    On 4 March 1998, the European Communities requested the consultations “to be extended also to include consultations under Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture” (“AA”).

    The European Communities and the United States held consultations on 17 December 1997, 10 February 1998, and 3 April 1998, but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. On 1 July 1998, the European Communities requested the establishment of a panel under Article 6 of the DSU, Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, Article 19 of the AA, and Article XXIII of GATT 1994.

    At its meeting on 22 September 1998, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) established a panel in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU with the following standard terms of reference:

    “To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the European Communities in document WT/DS108/2, the matter referred to the DSB by the European Communities in document WT/DS108/2, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.”

    Barbados, Canada, and Japan reserved their rights to participate in the panel proceedings as third parties.

    On 9 November 1998, the parties to the dispute agreed on the composition of the Panel as follows:

    Chairman: Mr. Crawford Falconer

    Members: Mr. Didier Chambovey

    Professor Seung Wha Chang

    The Panel met with the parties on 9-10 February 1999 and 16 March 1999. It met with the third parties on 10 February 1999.

    ACTUAL ASPECTS

    A FSC is a corporation created, organised, and maintained in a qualified foreign country or US possession outside the customs territory of the United States under the specific requirements of Sections 921-927 of the US Internal Revenue Code.

  • National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement

  • RAJESH PILLAI
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    17 February 2003, pp. 321-343
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • The tension between the WTO and its constituent States and the conflicting impulses of trade liberalization and domestic regulatory autonomy is well documented. This phenomenon is brought into stark relief by the perceived interference from WTO dispute settlement panels into fiscal and regulatory policy-making within States. It is clear that the GATT and GATS agreements do in fact mandate a high degree of policing by WTO panels in areas that were traditionally seen as the exclusive sovereign preserve of States.

  • Rejoinder

  • DANIEL C. ESTY
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 297-299
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • David Henderson misreads, misstates, and misunderstands my argument in The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis. He pejoratively refers to my suggestions for restoring the WTO's legitimacy as ‘radical’ no fewer than three times.

  • Environment and trade: the implications of imperfect information and political economy

  • DANIEL STURM, ALISTAIR ULPH
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 235-256
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • The last ten years have seen an upsurge in interest in the nexus of trade and environmental policies. In part this reflects the need to deal with major global pollution problems, and in part a concern that globalization may have adverse impacts on the environment. Environmentalists worry that globalization may trigger a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standards. While they would like to see upward harmonization in environmental standards, they are sceptical about the ability of supra-national agencies to achieve this. Industrialists also raise concerns about the need for a ‘level playing field’ in environmental regulations because of fears about the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness. However, developing countries question whether disputes over differences in environmental regulations simply reflect a covert form of ‘green protectionism’. In this paper we review what light recent developments in economic analysis (conceptual and empirical) can shed on these concerns. We quickly summarize conventional trade models in which government bodies have perfect information and are welfare maximizers, and show that this analysis does not provide much support for the concerns or proposed policy recommendations. We then turn to models of political economy and imperfect information to see whether they provide a better explanation for the concerns and policy recommendations.

  • On assessing the cost of TRIPS implementation

  • TRAVIS J. LYBBERT
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 309-321
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • Efforts to ensure that intellectual property rights are respected and protected world-wide have met increasing resistance by critics who see extreme imbalances in the costs and benefits of implementing stronger intellectual property protection. The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) attracts particular criticism as an enforceable multilateral embodiment of these efforts. While few disagree that developed countries stand to benefit more in the short term from TRIPS implementation than developing countries, precisely estimating associated costs and benefits is challenging. This paper comments on an approach to estimating the ‘indirect’ costs of implementing TRIPS proposed by McCalman (2001) and argues that the approach overestimates the costs born by developing countries. Specifically, this overestimation is due primarily to an inadequate representation of the TRIPS Agreement and a counterfactual assumption that countries would not have strengthened their intellectual property policies in the absence of the TRIPS Agreement.

  • The WTO core agreement, non-trade issues and institutional integrity

  • KENT JONES
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 257-276
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • WTO member countries understand the core agreement of the organization to consist of binding reciprocal market access achieved through multilateral negotiation, and supported by a system of trade policy rules and dispute settlement. Attempts to introduce social chapters into the WTO would compromise the core agreement. Specifically, authorizing the use of trade sanctions to pursue non-trade goals would diminish the value of the WTO to its members, and undermine the global trading system. WTO agreements and rules can be reconciled with environmental goals, the improvement of labor standards and the promotion of human rights through the development and strengthening of international institutions dedicated to these issues. Efforts by governments to promote new global institutions and international agreements would thereby remove political barriers to trade liberalization.

  • Tensions between the dispute settlement process and the diplomatic and treaty-making activities of the WTO

  • CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 301-308
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • The tensions between the (quasi-judicial) dispute settlement process and the (political) diplomatic and treaty-making activities have intrigued me ever since I arrived in Geneva in December 2001. In the course of the six years during which I served as a member of the Appellate Body, my original doubts have grown into concerns. They are shared by prominent and well-informed observers. They have not only become the subject of a provocative and alarming book, but also found their way into one of the world's leading newspapers. It is therefore timely to discuss these issues widely, particularly in the context of the ‘Doha development agenda’ and more specifically the negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).

  • WTO 2002: imaginary crisis, real problems

  • DAVID HENDERSON
  • Journal:
    World Trade Review / Volume 1 / Issue 3 / November 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2003, pp. 277-296
    Print publication:
    November 2002

  • This article contests the view advanced by Daniel Esty in World Trade Review, that the WTO is now facing ‘a crisis of legitimacy’, for which the remedy is to create for it ‘links with popular sovereignty’, to broaden its objectives and concerns, and to establish it as part of a stronger system of ‘global governance’. I argue that the legitimacy of an international agency derives first and foremost from its member governments; that democratic legitimacy and ‘popular sovereignty’ do not necessarily go together; that non-governmental organizations have no valid claim in their own right to participate in the activities of international agencies; that bringing these organizations into the WTO would weaken and divide it; that governments, in handling and deciding trade matters, already take account of wider issues and goals and are not uncritically committed to freer trade; that it is still appropriate to limit the concerns of the WTO to questions relating to trade and trade liberalization; that globalization has neither undermined the power and competence of national states nor given rise to a need for new forms of global governance; and that the WTO, despite its now more secure status and enlarged scope as compared with the GATT, is for good reasons neither a powerful instrument of global governance nor in course of becoming so. While the Organization has no ‘legitimacy crisis’, it faces substantial problems both old and new. Its potential for useful activity largely depends, as in the past, on the readiness of its member governments to defend and pursue the goal of freer trade.

Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
  • Volume 2, Pages 573-1185
  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    15 August 2002
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement. These are the WTO authorized and paginated reports in English. An essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and needed by students worldwide taking courses in international economic or trade law. The form of citation for this volume recommended by the WTO is DSR 2000: II.

  • Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (WT/DS121/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    15 August 2002, pp 515-564

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Argentina and the European Communities appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretation in the Panel Report, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (the “Panel Report”). The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the European Communities with respect to the application by Argentina of certain safeguard measures on imports of footwear.

    On 14 February 1997, Argentina initiated a safeguard investigation and adopted Resolution 226/97, which imposed provisional measures in the form of minimum specific duties on imports of certain footwear. On the same day, the Argentine Ministry of Economy and Public Works repealed the minimum specific duties on imports of footwear (“DIEMs”) that had been maintained by Argentina since 31 December 1993. The opening of the safeguard investigation and the implementation of a provisional safeguard measure were notified to the Committee on Safeguards by Argentina in a communication dated 21 February 1997 and, by further communication dated 5 March 1997, Argentina transmitted a copy of the provisional duty resolution to the Committee on Safeguards.

    On 25 July 1997, Argentina notified the Committee on Safeguards of the determination of serious injury made by its competent authorities, the Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior (“CNCE”). Attached to this notification was Act 338, the report of the CNCE on serious injury. Act 338 incorporates by reference the Technical Report, a summary by CNCE staff of the factual data gathered during the safeguard investigation. On 1 September 1997, Argentina notified the Committee on Safeguards of its intention to impose a definitive safeguard measure. On 12 September 1997, Argentina adopted Resolution 987/97, which imposed, effective 13 September 1997, a definitive safeguard measure in the form of minimum specific duties on certain imports of footwear. On 26 September 1997, Argentina transmitted a copy of this Resolution to the Committee on Safeguards, and Uruguay, as Pro Tempore President of the Mercado Común del Sur (“MERCOSUR”) notified the definitive safeguard measure imposed by that Resolution. On 28 April 1998, Argentina published Resolution 512/98 modifying Resolution 987/97. On 26 November 1998, Argentina published Resolution 1506/98, further modifying Resolution 987/97, and, on 7 December 1998, the Argentine Secretariat of Industry, Commerce and Mines published Resolution 837/98 implementing Resolution 1506/98. The relevant factual aspects of this dispute are set out in further detail at paragraphs 2.1-2.6 and 8.1-8.20 of the Panel Report.

  • Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (WT/DS98/AB/R, WT/DS98/R): Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    15 August 2002, pp 3-48

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Korea and the European Communities appeal from certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (“the Panel Report”). The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the European Communities relating to a definitive safeguard measure imposed by Korea on imports of certain dairy products.

    On 17 May 1996, the Korean Trade Commission initiated an investigation of injury to the domestic industry by imports of skimmed milk powder preparations. The results of this investigation were published by the Korean Trade Commission in the Investigation Report on Industrial Injury by the Office of Administration and Investigation (the “OAI Report”). On 7 March 1997, Korea published in its Government Gazette its decision to apply a definitive safeguard measure in the form of a quantitative restriction on imports of the dairy products at issue. Korea notified the initiation and results of its investigation, as well as its decision to apply a safeguard measure, to the Committee on Safeguards. On 12 August 1997, following consultations in the Committee on Safeguards, the European Communities requested consultations with Korea under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”) regarding the consistency of Korea's safeguard measure with its WTO obligations. The European Communities subsequently requested the establishment of a panel to examine the consistency of Korea's safeguard measure with its obligations under Articles 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994. The United States participated as a third party in the proceedings before the Panel. The factual aspects of this dispute are set out in greater detail in the Panel Report.

    In its Report circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (“the WTO”) on 21 June 1999, the Panel concluded that Korea's definitive safeguard measure was imposed inconsistently with its WTO obligations in that:

  • (a) Korea's serious injury determination is not consistent with the provisions of Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards;

  • (b) Korea's determination of the appropriate safeguard measure is not consistent with the provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement on Safeguards; and

  • (c) Korea's notifications to the Committee on Safeguards (G/SG/N/6/KOR/2, G/SG/N/8/KOR/1, G/SG/N/10/KOR/1, G/SG/N/10/KOR/1. Suppl) were not timely and therefore are not consistent with the provisions of Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

  • 2 - Introduction

  • Huw Beverley-Smith, King's College London
  • Book:
    The Commercial Appropriation of Personality
    Published online:
    07 July 2009
    Print publication:
    15 August 2002, pp 27-31

  • Summary

    Part II considers the extent to which economic interest in personality may be protected from the first main perspective: unfair competition. The major common law and civil law jurisdictions adopt rather different approaches to unfair competition in general, and appropriation of personality in particular. These approaches, and the relative importance of statutory and common law causes of action in protecting economic interests in intangibles, need to be grasped at the outset.

    Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property obliges signatories to provide effective protection against unfair competition which is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. Three particular aspects are expressly included: (i) creating confusion with or discrediting the establishment, the goods or the commercial activities of a competitor; (ii) making false allegations which discredit the establishment, goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor; and (iii) giving indications liable to mislead the public as to the nature, manufacturing process, characteristics, suitability for purpose or quantity of goods. Beyond these acts, case law and legislation in various jurisdictions have provided protection, to varying degrees and in various forms, against such activities as the violation of trade secrets, comparative advertising and misappropriation or free riding (such as the dilution of the value of a trade mark in the absence of confusion).

  • Chili - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, WT/DS87/R, WT/DS110/R): Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2000
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    15 August 2002, pp 281-302

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Chile appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretation developed in the Panel Report, Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. Following a request for consultations, a Panel was established on 25 March 1998 by the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) to consider a complaint by the European Communities against Chile regarding its Special Sales Tax on Spirits, as modified by the Additional Tax on Alcoholic Beverages (“Impuesto Adicional a las Bebidas Alcohólicas” or “ILA”).

    The ILA provides a transitional tax system (the “Transitional System”) for distilled spirits (“spirits”) which is applicable until 1 December 2000, and a revised tax system (the “New Chilean System”) which will be applied from 1 December 2000. The New Chilean System taxes all spirits on the basis of their alcohol content and price. Spirits with an alcohol content of 35° or less are taxed at a rate of 27 per cent ad valorem. From a rate of 27 per cent ad valorem, the tax rate increases in increments of 4 percentage points per additional degree of alcohol, until a maximum rate of 47 per cent ad valorem is reached for all spirits over 39°. The Panel found that roughly 75 per cent of the total volume of domestically produced spirits will be taxed at 27 per cent ad valorem, while over 95 per cent of the total volume of imported spirits will be taxed at 47 per cent ad valorem. A detailed description of the factual aspects of the dispute is provided at paragraphs 2.1 to 2.29 of the Panel Report.

    The Panel considered claims made by the European Communities that the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “GATT 1994”) because it accords preferential tax treatment to pisco, a distilled alcoholic beverage produced in Chile, thereby affording “protection” to domestic production in relation to certain imported alcoholic beverages. The Panel Report was circulated to the Members of the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) on 15 June 1999. The Panel reached the conclusion that “the domestic distilled alcoholic beverages produced in Chile, including pisco, and the imported products presently identified by HS classification 2208, are directly competitive or substitutable products.”

Page 598 of 620