Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Browse subjects
  3. Economics
  4. Macroeconomics
  5. Content listing

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

11577 results in Macroeconomics

Page 458 of 579

  • Preface and acknowledgements

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp ix-x

  • Summary

    This book has its origins in a number of joint papers written over an extensive period. The first of the relevant papers to appear was published in 1992, and since then there have been around eight further papers, all connected in one way or another to the questions of institutional design with which this book is also concerned. Traces of this earlier work can be found in various places in the text that follows, but the current book is much more than a refiguring of the earlier papers. Indeed, it is much less a refiguring than we had originally imagined it would be. Books often have a way of taking on a life of their own and this was certainly so in the present case. As we indicate in the initial chapter, the basic intention of the book changed shape as the enterprise developed. The intellectual scheme laid out originally in the paper ‘Economising on virtue’ (Constitutional Political Economy, 1995) took on a larger and larger place in our thinking and rendered much of our earlier treatment of topics like the separation of powers (Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994) and bicameralism (Public Choice, 1992) seriously incomplete. Thus, what was to have been a book on ‘devices’ became much more a book on ‘desires’ and on the connection between devices and desires.

  • 11 - The separation of powers

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 211-232

  • Summary

    The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

    (Federalist papers, 47, James Madison)

    Separations and divisions of power

    In the last three chapters we have been concerned with what might be termed the basic structure of modern representative democracy – popular elections, the idea of representation itself, and political parties as the major vehicles of representation. In this chapter and the next, we turn our attention to a rather different class of constitutional and institutional structures that have as their shared theme the idea of the separation or division of powers – the idea, that is, that structuring the political process in a manner that divides and separates political power will serve the interests of citizens. The doctrine of the separation of powers is, of course, both old and almost universally supported. But what exactly does it entail? What does the separation of powers require at the operational level, and how exactly are the benefits to citizens generated? And does the argument for the separation of powers depend upon a particular model of politics? These are the key questions we wish to engage in this chapter and the next. Our first objective, then, is to nterrogate the definition of the separation of powers in an attempt to ease out its key ingredients.

  • 1 - Introduction

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 1-14

  • Summary

    This book is an exercise in rational actor political theory or ‘public choice’ theory. (We shall use the two terms without discriminating.) However, the discussion is unusual in two respects. First, it focuses attention on a range of institutional devices that, although common enough in democratic practice and in constitutional analysis in other traditions, have been somewhat under-analysed within the rational actor tradition. Second, it adopts a more moralised conception of agent desires than rational actor analysis normally assumes. In this initial chapter, we want to say something about what the devices in question are, and speculate as to why they have been relatively ignored within the rational actor tradition. We shall then briefly discuss our picture of desires and agent motivation, and indicate how that picture differs from the standard, more determinedly egoistic one. Because devices and desires are not independent, we also want to direct attention to some aspects of their interconnectedness. Finally, we will offer some guidance to the reader on the organisation and structure of the remainder of the book.

    But before any of this, a preliminary comment on our title, and on our use of ‘devices’ and ‘desires’ is in order.

  • 8 - Voting and elections

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 129-155

  • Summary

    The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications…. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.

    (Federalist papers, 68, Alexander Hamilton)

    Introduction

    In the chapters that make up part II of this book we turn our attention to the democratic devices of our title – the institutional structures that constitute democratic politics. Of course, institutional arrangements differ between democracies, but these relatively fine-grained differences will not be our primary concern. Rather we wish to discuss the broad institutional structures that we take to lie at the heart of almost all modern conceptions of democratic politics: voting and popular elections, representative elections, political parties, and variations on the themes of separating and dividing political powers.

    Our aim in these chapters is to provide a discussion of each of these institutional devices in turn, drawing on the analysis of democratic desires provided in part I. Thus the bulk of this chapter will present an account of voting and elections that departs from the standard economic model of these topics precisely because it starts from our more moral and more expressive model of motivation and therefore allows discussion of a wider range of political mechanisms.

  • 5 - Political mechanisms

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 67-86

  • Summary

    This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty.

    (Federalist papers, 72, Alexander Hamilton)

    Introduction

    Our major reason for departing from economic orthodoxy in the matter of the motivational structure of individuals derives from a concern to extend the scope of rational actor analysis to include a range of ideas which are relatively familiar in the literature on constitutional politics and which seem to us to be central to any rounded constitutional analysis. Chief among these ideas is the concern to view constitutions in terms of the design of institutions which strike a balance between three considerations: the limitation of government powers; the expression of political opinion through processes of deliberation and representation that refine private opinions and select the most virtuous for office; and the maintenance of an environment which encourages individuals to participate in politics in an appropriate spirit. While an entirely orthodox economic analysis of constitutional design can easily recognise the first of these three elements, and can provide valuable insights into means by which power may be constrained, it seems destined to fail to provide an account of the second and third elements, since it cannot recognise the relevant categories.

  • 3 - Moral dispositions

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 34-50

  • Summary

    It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.

    (Federalist papers, 51, James Madison)

    Rationality and trust

    We have, in the foregoing chapter, suggested one reason why moral motivations might play a disproportionately significant role in democratic politics: the mechanics of democratic elections may engage expressive rather than instrumental concerns, and the expressive calculus is more likely to promote moral action. In short, the veil of insignificance reduces the price of moral action in the political arena relative to the market arena, so that we would expect more moral action in politics. We now want to turn to a different line of argument, which has the same general ambition – namely to suggest that moral motivations may be especially relevant in the setting of democratic politics. This line of argument stems from the idea that rationality might require departures from egoism: that homo economicus is self-defeating in a range of circumstances of relevance – and self-defeating in a way that is hospitable to certain accounts of morality. We will present our argument in three steps.

  • 7 - Problems of democratic politics

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 98-126

  • Summary

    In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

    (Federalist papers, 51, James Madison)

    The rational actor perspective

    In chapter 5 we offered a checklist of mechanisms by which institutional devices might bear on social outcomes. The discussion there was abstract in the sense that we were concerned to map out possibilities rather than analyse particular institutions or their role in particular settings. The next step in moving the discussion to the more specific analysis of ‘democratic devices’ – the institutions of democratic politics – is the diagnosis of the essential political problems that these institutions are intended to over-come.

    Within the public choice and rational actor political theory traditions, such diagnosis has been a central preoccupation. There are several reasons for this. One is the economist's general predilection against promoting ‘cures’ before the ‘disease’ is properly understood. As public choice scholars have insisted in the context of arguments for state intervention in the face of market failure, the simple recognition that something is wrong does not provide a licence to intervene in any old way. After all, scarcity abounds. And this means that the world will almost always fall short of any abstract ideal. Even in the best feasible state, things will be imperfect.

  • 12 - The division of power

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 233-254

  • Summary

    All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.

    (Federalist papers, 48, James Madison)

    Divisions, bicameralism and coalitions

    In the preceding chapter we defined a division of power in terms of spreading any particular power or bundle of powers across multiple agents rather than concentrating that power in the hands of a single agent. The division of power, so understood, is distinguished from the separation of powers, in that in the separation case a bundle of powers is disaggregated and the separate powers assigned to different agents. Both the division and separation of power involve multiple agents, but separation involves the additional feature that the domain of decision making by different agents is characteristically different. There are, in other words, two distinct dimensions in play here: the one dimension reflecting the number of agents who share any particular power; and the other dimension reflecting the extent to which the particular powers are disaggregated into their separate components. In the previous chapter we focused on the latter, separation dimension. Here we address the former, division dimension.

  • 4 - Economising on virtue

  • Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University, Canberra, Alan Hamlin, University of Southampton
  • Book:
    Democratic Devices and Desires
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    13 April 2000, pp 51-66

  • Summary

    The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.

    (Federalist papers, 57, James Madison)

    Motivation and morality

    In the two preceding chapters we have advanced a general model of human motivation that incorporates a desire to act morally alongside other desires, where that desire may operate either as a direct determinant of action or as a ground for the adoption of a moral disposition. We wish, in this chapter, to push the argument forward on three distinct fronts.

    Our first concern will be with the idea of economising on virtue – the idea that institutions should be designed in such a way that they do not rely on the virtue of the individuals who act under them, so that the emergence of satisfactory results arises not only through the virtue of individuals but also is supported by the force of other motives, including self-interest specifically. This idea is an old one, dating at least from St Augustine's discussion of private property as a remedium peccatorum (guard against sin) – though, as is well-known, it receives its most extensive development and application in the work of Adam Smith, David Hume, Montesquieu and the American authors of the Federalist papers.

Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
  • Volume 1
  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement. These are the authorized paginated reports in English: as such, they are an essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and will be widely consulted by students taking courses in international economic or trade law. Cases in this volume include: US - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline; European Communities - Trade Description of Scallops; and Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. The form of citation recommended by the WTO for this volume is DSR, 1996:I. Cases in this volume are reported in English. Authorised paginated French and Spanish versions are on sale directly from the WTO.

  • European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops, requests by Canada (WT/DS7), Peru (WT/DS12) and Chile (WT/DS14): Report of the Panel (Request by Canada)

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000, pp 89-92

  • Summary

    On 19 May 1995, the Government of Canada requested consultations with the European Communities (“EC”) concerning French Order NOR MERP9300051A of 22 March 1993 and its amendments, relating to the official names and permitted trade descriptions of scallops in France. This request was made pursuant to Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), Article 14.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), and Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”). In accordance with Article 4 of the DSU, the request was circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) on 24 May 1995 (WT/DS7/1).

    Pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, Chile on 31 May 1995 (WT/DS7/2), and Iceland (WT/DS7/3), Japan (WT/DS7/4) and Peru (WT/DS7/5) on 2 June 1995, requested to be joined in the consultations requested by Canada. On 23 June 1995, the EC informed the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) that it had accepted these requests (WT/DS7/6). Consultations were held in Geneva on 19 June 1995.

    Consultations failed to settle the dispute and, on 7 July 1995, Canada requested the DSB to establish a panel, at its next meeting, pursuant to Article XXIII of GATT 1994, Article 14 of the TBT Agreement and Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU (WT/DS7/7 and Corr.1). Canada requested that the panel consider and find that the French Order and subsequent amendments are:

  • (a) inconsistent with Article 2 of the TBT Agreement;

  • (b) inconsistent with Articles I and III of GATT 1994; and

  • (c) nullifying and impairing benefits accruing to Canada under the WTO Agreement.

    • On 19 July 1995, pursuant to the request made by Canada, the DSB established a panel with standard terms of reference. The terms of reference of the Panel are the following:

    “To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Canada in document WT/DS7/7, the matter referred to the DSB by Canada in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements”.

    Australia, Chile, Iceland, Japan, Peru and the United States reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.

  • Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, complaints by the European Communities (WT/DS8), Canada (WT/DS10) and the United States (WT/DS11): Report of the Panel

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000, pp 125-284

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 21 June 1995, the European Communities (“the Community”) requested consultations with Japan under Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT”) concerning the internal taxes levied by Japan on certain alcoholic beverages pursuant to the Japan's Liquor Tax Law (WT/DS8/1). On 7 July 1995, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), the United States (WT/DS8/2) and Canada (WT/DS8/3) requested to be joined in these consultations. Japan accepted these requests on 19 July 1995 (WT/DS8/4).

    On 7 July 1995, Canada requested consultations with Japan under Article XXII of GATT 1994 concerning certain Japanese liquor taxation laws (WT/DS10/1). On 17 July 1995, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, the United States (WT/DS10/2) and the Community (WT/DS10/3) requested to be joined in these consultations. Japan accepted these requests on 19 July 1995 (WT/DS10/4).

    On 7 July 1995, the United States requested consultations with Japan under Article XXIII of GATT 1994 regarding internal taxes imposed by Japan on certain alcoholic beverages pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law (WT/DS11/1).

    On 20 July 1995, the Community, Canada and the United States jointly held consultations with Japan with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter, but they were unable to reach such a resolution. On 21 July 1995, the United States and Japan consulted under Article XXIII:1, but they did not reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the matter.

    On 14 September 1995, pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the DSU, the Community requested the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to establish a panel with standard terms of reference (WT/DS8/5). The Community claimed that:

    ’a) Japan had acted inconsistently with Article III:2, first sentence, of GATT 1994 by applying a higher tax rate on the category of ‘spirits’ than on each of the two sub-categories of shochu, thereby nullifying or impairing the benefits accrued to the European Communities under GATT 1994; and that

    b) Japan has acted inconsistently with Article III:2, second sentence, of GATT 1994 by applying a higher tax rate on the category of ‘whisky/brandy’ and on the category of ‘liqueurs’ than on each of the two sub-categories of shochu, thereby nullifying or impairing the benefits accrued to the European Communities under GATT 1994.

  • European Communities – Trade Description of Scallops, requests by Canada (WT/DS7), Peru (WT/DS12) and Chile (WT/DS14): Report of the Panel (Request by Peru and Chile)

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000, pp 93-96

  • Summary

    On 18 July 1995, the Government of Peru to the WTO requested consultations with the European Communities (“EC”) concerning French Order NOR MERP9300051A of 22 March 1993 and its amendments, relating to the official names and permitted trade descriptions of scallops in France. This request was made pursuant to Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), Article 14.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), and Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”). In accordance with Article 4 of the DSU, the request was circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) on 25 July 1995 (WT/DS12/1).

    Pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, on 27 July 1995, Chile (WT/DS12/2) and Canada (WT/DS12/3) requested to be joined in the consultations initiated by Peru. On 31 July 1995, the EC informed the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) that it had accepted these requests (WT/DS12/4). Consultations were held on 10 August 1995.

    These consultations failed to settle the dispute and, on 18 September 1995, Peru requested the DSB to establish a panel, at its next meeting, pursuant to Article XXIII of GATT 1994, Article 14 of the TBT Agreement and Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU (WT/DS12/7). Peru requested that the panel consider and find that the French Order and subsequent amendments are:

  • (a) inconsistent with Articles 2 and 12 of the TBT Agreement;

  • (b) inconsistent with Articles I and III of GATT 1994; and

  • (c) nullifying and impairing benefits accruing to Peru under the WTO Agreement.

    • On 24 July 1995, the Government of Chile requested consultations with the EC concerning the same French Order referred to above in paragraph 1. This request was made pursuant to Article XXII:1 of GATT 1994, Article 14.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article 4 of the DSU. In accordance with Article 4 of the DSU, the request was circulated to Members of the WTO on 31 July 1995 (WT/DS14/1).

    Pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, Canada on 2 August 1995 (WT/DS14/2), Peru on 11 August 1995 (WT/DS14/3) and Japan on 10 August 1995 (WT/DS14/4) requested to be joined in the consultations initiated by Chile. The EC accepted these requests and consultations were held on 10 August 1995, jointly with the consultations referred to in paragraph 2.

  • Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, complaints by the European Communities (WT/DS8), Canada (WT/DS10) and the United States (WT/DS11): Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000, pp 97-124

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Japan and the United States appeal from certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (the “Panel Report”). That Panel (the “Panel”) was established to consider complaints by the European Communities, Canada and the United States against Japan relating to the Japanese Liquor Tax Law (Shuzeiho), Law No. 6 of 1953 as amended (the “Liquor Tax Law”).

    The Panel Report was circulated to the Members of the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) on 11 July 1996. It contains the following conclusions:

    (i) Shochu and vodka are like products and Japan, by taxing the latter in excess of the former, is in violation of its obligation under Article III:2, first sentence, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

    (ii) Shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs are “directly competitive or substitutable products” and Japan, by not taxing them similarly, is in violation of its obligation under Article III:2, second sentence, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

    The Panel made the following recommendations:

    The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request Japan to bring the Liquor Tax Law into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

    On 8 August 1996, Japan notified the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO of its decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”) and filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Body, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the “Working Procedures”). On 19 August 1996, Japan filed an appellant's submission. On 23 August 1996, the United States filed an appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures. The European Communities, Canada and the United States submitted appellees’ submissions pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures, on 2 September 1996. That same day, Japan submitted an appellee's submission pursuant to Rule 23(3) of the Working Procedures.

  • United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, complaints by Venezuela (WT/DS2) and Brazil (WT/DS4): Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1996
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    02 March 2000, pp 3-28

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTORY

    The United States appeals from certain conclusions on issues of law and certain legal interpretations contained in the Panel Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996 (the “Panel Report”). That Panel had been established to consider a dispute between the United States, on the one hand, and Venezuela, later joined by Brazil, on the other. The dispute related to the implementation by the United States of its domestic legislation known as the Clean Air Act of 1990 (the “CAA”) and, more specifically, to the regulation enacted by the United States’ Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) pursuant to that Act, to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported into the United States. This regulation is formally entitled “Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”, Part 80 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and is commonly referred to as the Gasoline Rule.

    Procedural Matters

    On 21 February 1996, the United States notified the Dispute Settlement Body of its decision to appeal certain conclusions on issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report pursuant to Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”) and simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Body, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (the “Working Procedures”). Thereafter, on 4 March 1996, the United States filed its Submission as Appellant. Venezuela in turn filed, on 18 March 1996, its Appellee's Submission; Brazil filed on the same day its Appellee's Submission. The third participants followed, the European Communities and Norway filing Submissions, on 18 March 1996.

    The complete record of the Panel proceedings was duly transmitted to the Appellate Body.

    The oral hearing contemplated by Rule 27 of the Working Procedures was held on 27 and 28 March 1996. At the hearing, oral arguments were made respectively by the participants and the third participants. Questions were put to them by the Members of the Appellate Body hearing the appeal. Most of these questions were answered orally, and some were responded to in writing with the responses being furnished both to the Appellate Body and the other participants and third participants.

Page 458 of 579