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11577 results in Macroeconomics

Page 452 of 579

  • 2 - The Underlying Logic of Liberal Property Theory

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 27-32

  • Summary

    Theories of property are concerned with the question, what entitles a person or other unit to property-objects? And to what does property, that is, the right, entitle him or her? The right of property could conceivably come in different forms: a right to highly unequal amounts of value (income and wealth), a right to relatively equal amounts of value, or a right to strictly equal amounts. It could, further, be a composite: a right to an equalized portion of one part of total social income and a right to unequal amounts of the rest of total income. Which form is rightful?

    One can begin by examining liberal theories, the dominant approach to property in the West, and searching for their patterns of response to these questions. Liberal theories of property include the theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Austin, Hegel, Pound, Felix Cohen, the New Economic Analysis of Law, Keynes, Nozick, and Rawls, among others. Scholarly opinion divides on whether liberal theory tends to support a right to highly unequal amounts of property. Some scholars hold that significant representatives of liberal theory do not support it. In my view, most of the important liberal theories may be considered inegalitarian in the sense that they posit a right to highly unequal amounts of income and wealth or subsume such a right under a broad concept of exclusive individual dominion. There are commentators who acknowledge this but nevertheless maintain that liberal theories are still egalitarian because they reach these unequal outcomes through arguments that treat people equally every step of the way.

  • 12 - The Right to an Equal Share of Part of National Income

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 246-266

  • Summary

    LIBERAL PROPERTY OR RIGHT TO AN EQUAL SHARE OF PART OF NATIONAL INCOME?

    The dimension of community running through economic society has ramifications for the just way of distributing property. When incorporated into moral reasoning, it entails a rule of distribution quite different from the one found in liberal theories. Its distributive implications can be seen by substituting it in Kant's reasoning about property and distribution.

    “Men” in their original condition (a state of nature), Kant reflects, are faced with the dilemma that they benefit from living together but that their unregulated interactions can also do them harm. The problem can be solved, they discover, by uniting for the purpose of living under conditions of right. The union thus formed is the condition known as civil society – not to be confused with an economic community, whose existence Kant denies. The civil union's purpose is to legislate a set of laws that constitute “public right.”

    The conditions of right in Kant's theory are conditions of freedom that meet criteria of ethical freedom. By implication, the community of right is a union for the sake of living under conditions of ethically valid freedoms. It may also be characterized as a union for the joint goal of living under conditions where each person can define and pursue his or her own ends, for that is what Kant means by freedom. The moral foundation for the equal entitlement to rights stems from membership with in this sort of union.

  • 3 - Unequal Property and Its Premise in Locke's Theory

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 33-55

  • Summary

    John Locke made two major contributions to the theory of property: a justification for assigning the right of property to individuals rather than to collectivities and a justfication for a principle of unequal distribution of economic resources, goods, and money. The repudiation of Soviet communism in the late twentieth century has rendered Locke's first justification less controversial because it has led to more general agreement on assigning property to individuals rather than to states. But the reduction in the threat of Soviet communism may make his second justification more controversial, because market societies may become secure enough to contemplate the great disparities of income and wealth that prominently mark their social landscapes.

    Many opinion leaders will look to Locke's theory as an intellectual bulwark against an egalitarian distribution of economic resources, while others will abjure it for precisely that reason. Therefore, Locke's theory will continue to be an important subject of study. Scholars disagree over what makes his theory the classical liberal theory of property, yet they agree that it conveys something essential about the liberal way of looking at property. With some frequency scholars formerly viewed the theory as a justification of a right to unequal property based on individualistic assumptions, and many still do. By now, however, leading Locke specialists have overturned interpretations of Locke's theory as primarily individualistic and inegalitarian. Yet I see a basis for reasserting the previous view that individualism is the root cause of distributive inegalitarianism in Locke's theory. Demonstrating this will entail reexamination of the text and of contemporary assessments of it, and some new argumentation. According to Macpherson, Locke justifies class differentials in natural rights based on class differentials in rationality.

  • 14 - Democracy and Economic Rights

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 287-300

  • Summary

    INCLUDING CONTROVERSIAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS

    Dahl's revised theory of polyarchy (Dahl 1980) includes primary political rights in the definition of democracy but excludes economic rights as too controversial: “claims to primary social rights tend to be more debatable and uncertain in democratic theory and practice than claims to primary political rights.” Rawls's liberal conception of political justice uses much the same reasoning to exclude distributive justice from the constitutional essentials of democracy (Rawls 1993). Although agreement between Rawls and Dahl on this point lends great weight to their argument, I believe that the controversiality of economic rights does not disqualify them from being among the defining characteristics of democracy.

    The worldwide increase in the number of polyarchal democracies in recent years, from twenty-nine in 1969 to ninety in 1990, seemingly confirms that there is an emerging consensus on primary political rights. However, when polyarchies were in the minority and their rights were more debatable globally, American political scientists nevertheless included these rights in the definition of democracy. Now that economic rights are relatively more controversial than political rights, these scholars exclude economic rights as more debatable. There is an apparent inconsistency in their treatment of the implications of the controversiality of different categories of rights. If political rights could be included in 1969, when they were more controversial than at present, then economic rights should be includable despite their being more controversial than political rights. Although primary political rights may now be relatively less controversial than economic rights, they are still highly controversial.

  • 8 - Deriving Equality from Community

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 153-168

  • Summary

    The ethics of economic community entitle members to equal portions of a part of national income. The argument from community in Part III supplements the derivation of the same redistributory property right in Chapters 5 and 6, where it is derived from the ethics of dueness for economic contributions. The ethics of economic community show that membership in an economic community entitles individuals to a right to equal portions of a part of national income because they are members of a community, whereas the ethics of dueness derive this right from a class of equal economic contributions. By supplementing the derivation provided by the ethics of contributions, the ethics of economic community provide additional ethical validation for the redistributory property right.

    A principle of equal distribution is morally warranted by membership in a community, to the extent that the society consists in a community (see Chapter 8). This principle can be applied to the real world because, underlying the moral derivation of equality from community, there exists an actual dimension of community that runs throughout capital-based market systems (see Chapters 9–11). While community does not characterize every aspect of economic life – many activities are not communal but competitive and relatively independent – it is not limited to the subsystemic level, but exists systemwide. The dimension of community obtains between producers and consumers (see Chapters 9 and 10) and, moveover, between laborers and capital owners and capital managers (see Chapter 11).

    The extent of this community justifies the equal distribution of proportionate income in capital-based market systems (see Chapter 12).

  • 7 - Policy Reflections: The Effect of an Egalitarian Regime on Economic Growth

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 142-150

  • Summary

    INFERENCES FROM COMPARATIVE DATA

    While a more egalitarian distribution may be just, implementing it would be imprudent if redistribution resulted in reduced savings and economic growth. A major axiom of modern economics holds that income inequality is positively related to savings, investment, and economic growth. More equal distribution of income, the axiom cautions, would dampen savings, and it would, therefore, be unwise to undertake. But comparative analysis raises some doubts about the conventional axiom, for it shows that income equality is not necessarily related negatively to savings and growth. Prudence does not counsel against justice in income distribution.

    In the conventional reasoning, the upper strata save a higher proportion of their income than do the lower income strata, because ample income leaves more left over for saving after consumption needs have been met. For this reason, it is held that an inegalitarian regime can generate more savings than can an egalitarian regime. By building greater national savings, an inegalitarian regime can surpass the productive capacity of an egalitarian system and it can, therefore, generate more national wealth. So everybody is better off than the members of an egalitarian system. The lower strata of an egalitarian society would receive a higher proportion of the national income than they would in an inegalitarian regime, the argument goes, but their absolute income would be lower.

    An egalitarian regime could conceivably affect two types of savings, personal and corporate. Yet the redistributory property right does not regulate the proportions in which national income gets divided between investment in economic enterprises and in consumption, and it therefore does not obstruct capital formation by firms. The more substantial concern is how it would affect personal savings.

  • 6 - The Social Nature of Economic Actors and Forms of Equal Dueness

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 108-141

  • Summary

    The correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.

    John Rawls

    Consumer contributions should be taken into account by the ethics of dueness because, as the preceding chapter showed, they are factors in the creation of value and, as such, they can generate corresponding entitlements to value. When these factors are taken into account, how do they affect the principle of distribution of property? Do consumers make highly unequal or relatively equal contributions to the creation of the value of commodities? Or are they simultaneously equal in some respects and different in others? If individual consumers make entirely equal economic contributions, the ethics of dueness yields a principle of equal distribution of income. If consumers make highly unequal economic contributions, then such ethics require a principle of highly unequal distribution of income. But it is conceivable, furthermore, that each consumer makes some equal contributions and some unequal ones, on the basis of which he or she accures a compound right to an equal distribution of a portion of total social income and an unequal distribution of the rest.

    Taking consumption-side contributions into account does not produce a complete ethics of dueness, only a theory of dueness for consumption contributions. A full ethics of dueness would combine this with producer contributions. At the present stage of developing the ethics of dueness, it is particularly important to incorporate the consumption side. Economists since the 1870s have known that consumers contribute to creating the value of commodities, yet this fact has not been adequately addressed by the ethics of dueness, which is still dominated by the obsolete assumption that only productive agents create value.

  • Conclusions

  • Ross Zucker, Lander College, New York
  • Book:
    Democratic Distributive Justice
    Published online:
    02 December 2009
    Print publication:
    04 December 2000, pp 301-302

  • Summary

    This book specifies a redistributory property right as crucial to the definition of democracy. Two propositions support this conclusion: first, that democracy partly consists in rule in accord with rights, and second, that distributive justice partly consists in a right to equal shares of part of national individual income. The first proposition stands in contrast to a still strong tendency in contemporary thought to disjoin democracy and distributive justice. My analysis shows that democracy can be integrated with distributive justice in accordance with the essential notion of democracy as rule for the people. I demonstrate the second proposition through a theoretical analysis of the ethics of dueness for economic contributions and the ethics of economic community. Ethics of dueness usually leave out concrete forms of equality in individuals' contributions to the creation of economic value. Marx, for example, only considers equalities among individuals' productive contributions. By contrast, I discuss the consumer's role in price determination as a contribution to the creation of value in accordance with the general notion of dueness. In my view, concrete equalities in consumers' economically creative attributes, capacities, and contributions entitle them to an equal share of a part of national income devoted to consumption. With the ethics of economic contributions understood in this way, democracy takes the form of rule in accord with the redistributory property right.

    The conclusions of the ethics of dueness for economic contributions are reinforced by the ethics of economic community, which reach a similar view of relative distribution. Analysis of the immanent logic of community shows that membership in a community morally entitles individuals to an equal share of the ends of association.

  • Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (WT/DS56): Report of the Panel

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1998
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    23 November 2000, pp 1033-1176

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 4 October 1996, the United States requested Argentina to hold consultations pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), Article 14 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), Article 19 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 (“Customs Valuation Agreement”), and Article 7 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (“ATC”), regarding certain measures maintained by Argentina affecting imports of footwear, textiles, apparel and other items, namely, measures imposing specific duties on various footwear, textiles and apparel in excess of the bound rate of 35 per cent ad valorem provided in Argentina's Schedule LXIV; a statistical tax of three per cent ad valorem on imports of all sources other than MERCOSUR countries; and measures imposing, inter alia, labelling requirements related to affidavits of product components (WT/DS56/1).

    Pursuant to Article 4.11 DSU, Hungary requested to be joined in these consultations on 21 October 1996 (WT/DS56/2). The European Communities (“EC”) made a similar request on 25 October 1996 (WT/DS56/3). In separate communications dated 6 November 1996, Argentina accepted the request of Hungary and the request of the EC to join the consultations which the United States had requested (WT/DS56/4).

    During the consultations, a mutually agreed solution was reached between the United States and Argentina regarding Argentina's labelling requirements. However, the parties failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution on the other aspects raised during the consultations.

    On 9 January 1997, the United States requested the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to establish a panel (WT/DS56/5). The United States claimed that Argentina's measures were “inconsistent with the obligations of Argentina under Articles II, VII, VIII and X of the GATT 1994; Articles 1 through 8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994; and Article 7 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing”.

  • Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (WT/DS56): Report of the Appellate Body

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1998
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    23 November 2000, pp 1003-1032

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THE APPEAL

    Argentina appeals from certain issues of law covered and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items (the “Panel Report”). The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the United States against Argentina concerning certain measures maintained by Argentina affecting imports of textiles, apparel, footwear and other items, in particular, measures imposing specific duties on various textile, apparel or footwear items allegedly in excess of the bound rate of 35 per cent ad valorem provided in Argentina's Schedule LXIV and measures imposing a statistical tax of 3 per cent ad valorem on imports from all sources other than MERCOSUR countries. The relevant factual aspects of Argentina's import regime for textiles, apparel and footwear are described in the Panel Report, in particular, at paragraphs 2.1 to 2.21.

    Argentina approved the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations through Law No. 24.425, promulgated on 23 December 1994, and the bound rate of 35 per cent ad valorem included in its Schedule LXIV became effective on 1 January 1995. This binding was generally applicable to imports, with a number of exceptions that are not relevant in this case. In parallel, Argentina maintained a regime of Minimum Specific Import Duties (“DIEM”) as from 1993 in respect of textiles, clothing and footwear through a series of resolutions and decrees commencing with Resolution No. 811/93 of 29 July 1993 (concerning textiles and apparel) and Resolution No. 1696/93 of 28 December 1993 (concerning footwear), with subsequent extensions and modifications. The DIEM were revoked in respect of footwear on 14 February 1997 through Resolution No. 225/97 of the Argentine Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services, and the Panel decided not to review the consistency with the WTO Agreement of the DIEM with respect to footwear. In addition, Argentina imposed, from 1989 to 1994, a 3 per cent ad valorem tax which related to the collection of statistical information by the Argentine customs service regarding imports and exports. Through Presidential Decree No. 2277/94 adopted on 23 December 1994, the tax was reduced to zero per cent, but was set again at 3 per cent on 22 March 1995 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 389/95 in respect of certain import transactions.

Dispute Settlement Reports 1998
  • Volume 3, Pages 697-1176
  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    23 November 2000
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement. These are the WTO authorized and paginated reports in English: as such, they are an essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and needed by students worldwide taking courses in international economic or trade law. DSR 1998: III contains two cases. Firstly, there is the Report of the Panel on the complaint by the United States against the European Communities in the 'meat hormones' case. Secondly, there are both the Reports of the Appellate Body and Panel concerning Argentinian imports. The form of citation for this volume recommended by the WTO is DSR 1998: III.

  • European Communities - Mesures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), complaint by the United States (WT/DS26): Report of the Panel

  • Edited by World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 1998
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    23 November 2000, pp 699-1002

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 26 January 1996, the United States requested consultations with the European Communities, pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), Article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”), Article 14 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”), Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT”), regarding the Council Directive Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain Substances Having a Hormonal Action and related measures (WT/DS26/1).

    On 2 February 1997, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the DSU, Australia (WT/DS26/3) and New Zealand (WT/DS26/2), followed on 8 February by Canada (WT/DS26/4), requested to be joined in these consultations. The European Communities accepted these requests on 19 March 1996 (WT/DS26/5).

    On 27 March 1996, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand held joint consultations with the European Communities but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.

    On 25 April 1996, pursuant to Article 11 of the SPS Agreement, Article 14 of the TBT Agreement, Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article XXIII:2 of the GATT, and Article 6 of the DSU, the United States requested the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to establish a panel with standard terms of reference (WT/DS/26/6). The United States claimed that the EC measures:

    ”… adversely affect imports of meat and meat products and appear to be inconsistent with the obligations of the European Communities under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Agreement on Agriculture. The provisions of these agreements with which these measures appear to be inconsistent include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • (1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article III or Article XI;

  • (2) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Articles 2, 3 and 5;

  • STOCK RETURNS, TERM STRUCTURE, INFLATION, AND REAL ACTIVITY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

  • Fabio Canova, Gianni De Nicoló
  • Journal:
    Macroeconomic Dynamics / Volume 4 / Issue 3 / September 2000
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    05 October 2000, pp. 343-372

  • This paper analyzes the empirical interdependecies among asset returns, real activity, and inflation from multicountry and international points of view. We find that innovations in nominal stock returns are not significantly related to inflation or real activity, that the U.S. term structure of interest rates predicts both domestic and foreign inflation rates and domestic future real activity, and that innovations in inflation do not significantly affect real activity. An interpretation of the dynamics and some policy implications of the results are provided.

Page 452 of 579