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11577 results in Macroeconomics

Page 375 of 579

  • 8 - The Economic Roots of American Power

  • Steven Rosefielde, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, D. Quinn Mills, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Masters of Illusion
    Published online:
    31 July 2009
    Print publication:
    26 December 2006, pp 133-169

  • Summary

    The American economy provides the sinews of American power in the world. It's not only the world's largest economy, but also the fastest growing among the developed countries. The secret of the American economy's success is not only free enterprise and markets, which could be copied abroad, but an economic culture derived from our history – something it is very hard if not impossible to replicate abroad.

    In 1875 the great English economist Alfred Marshall visited the United States for four months, and when he returned to England said that he had been enabled by his trip to “expect the coming supremacy of the United States, to know its causes and the directions it would take.” His mission is of no less significance for us now, one hundred and thirty years later, as it was then. During all the discussions, year after year, of the decline of American power, the opposite has been happening and continues to happen.

    Like any people we find ourselves where we are because of what has happened in our past. As Americans we are prisoners of our economic success that imposes on us great responsibilities in the world. It is striking that America has not sought global power so much as it has stumbled into it all the while seeking to be left alone behind its ocean barriers. Power has emerged from the richness of our continent, the energy of our people, and the freedom of our economic and political systems.

  • 2 - Long-Term Economic Realism

  • Steven Rosefielde, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, D. Quinn Mills, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Masters of Illusion
    Published online:
    31 July 2009
    Print publication:
    26 December 2006, pp 18-34

  • Summary

    VORTEXES OF DANGER

    World issues are best viewed from the perspective of vortexes of national rivalries, rather than the conventional method focusing on country by country relationships. Conventional analysis and interpretations of international relations are of little use. Nations have interests and rivalries of long standing. Human events are the result of great currents of interest, irrationality, and the will to power. There will always be a struggle among nations and people for power; alliances are temporary and today's friend can be tomorrow's foe; and power politics among the nation's of Europe and Asia are a fact of our world. Applying an objective approach to a framework identifying vortexes where national interests are in conflict best equips a president to lead

    A useful example of a long-standing rivalry among nations that are allies has been provided by David Pryce-Jones in his description of French efforts to ally themselves closely with Arab leaders as a counterweight to Anglo-American influence elsewhere in the world. This French policy has its roots in the late eighteenth century and is a continuing theme of French foreign policy which explains much of French opposition to American-led responses to Saddam Hussein's activities, quite independent of any of the controversies of the time, 2003, about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. As the French pursue this objective in the changing atmosphere of international politics, its fate is determined by economic developments and the quality of their leadership.

  • 4 - Towers of Illusion: Dysfunctional Behaviors

  • Steven Rosefielde, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, D. Quinn Mills, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Masters of Illusion
    Published online:
    31 July 2009
    Print publication:
    26 December 2006, pp 63-81

  • Summary

    Yogi Berra is supposed to have cautioned us that it's not what we don't know that will kill us; it's what we do know that ain't right!

    The point is very well taken. Public culture encourages us to be certain of things that are not correct and this sort of false certainty can kill us all when it distorts our understanding of significant threats.

    We have seen in the previous chapter that American public culture offers us two great illusions – harmonism and convergence. Both are potentially dangerous on a large scale to our country. We will discuss in this chapter how they come to exist, are continually reinforced, and become so rigidly a part of our thinking. But this will be a difficult discussion for many of our readers. Trying to question what we believe to be true is always very challenging and often unpleasant, and so it is when we address the strongly held convictions of our public culture

    In private life people are often inconsistent, emotional, passionate, self-indulgent, involved in denial, fantasies, and delusions, and are hypocritical and moralizing about others. It's not surprising that all this is projected into public life as well, and is largely tolerated by an electorate that behaves in the same way. These dysfunctional behaviors can be traced to the false set of choices and ideas provided by our political culture – choices that stifle new ideas and stymie those who want to articulate new ideas to form a more relevant political consensus.

  • 5 - Mythomaniacs: The Sources of Our Illusions

  • Steven Rosefielde, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, D. Quinn Mills, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Masters of Illusion
    Published online:
    31 July 2009
    Print publication:
    26 December 2006, pp 82-100

  • Summary

    Mere facts are worthless except through their interpretation.

    Will Durant, The Life of Greece, pg. 615

    There is never a mere listing of facts, for they are too many and too confusing; they have no meaning without a context. What facts are chosen to be reported, and the interpretation which gives them meaning, are what public culture, the collective public mind decides. When the context is not accurate, as when it's distorted for partisan or commercial aims, then there can be no assurance that people understand what is really happening and that decisions can be made properly in response to events.

    Media stories, especially on TV, are often so shallow, so carefully selected, so contrived, so subordinated to a predetermined story line, that they're not news at all, not even infotainment (because there's almost no information in them), but are merely entertainment posing as new reporting. Commentators choose hype instead of balanced reporting because they can't pen compelling headlines when interdependencies create gray zones instead of stark black and whites.

    To justify such inferior communications, and to keep people interested, media executives and political activists create myths – stories that are compelling though not true or only partially true. In recent years, our public culture has passed into the hands of people who do this well – who are myth-builders, and many of us, avid consumers of myths in the disguise of information, have become mythomaniacs.

  • Preface

  • Steven Rosefielde, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, D. Quinn Mills, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Masters of Illusion
    Published online:
    31 July 2009
    Print publication:
    26 December 2006, pp xvii-xx

  • Summary

    The ideological conflicts of the twentieth century have faded. In this book, we find no need to deconstruct competing ideologies. Instead, certain habitual attitudes of our nation – embedded in our public culture (hodgepodge of political beliefs and nonpolitical wishful thinking) – now exercise an influence more powerful than the strongest of the ideologies of the past. The public culture is stronger because there is less opposition to it than there would be to a monolithic ideology because wishful thinking is continually reinforced by all elements of society – political, intellectual, and media. Its hold on our minds is stronger than ever was the hold of an ideology on our hearts. Hence, there is a compelling need to compare public culture to reality, and to point to the dangers of the illusions inherent in our public culture.

    America will be confronted with a cascading sequence of military-diplomatic threats in the next four decades. Some are glimpsed by our leaders, but none are adequately understood because our leaders' perceptions are impaired by wishful thinking including a childish faith in the good intentions of others and in the world becoming more and more like America. In this book, we try to slice through this fog of illusion by using various technical economic tools and analytic instruments like deconstruction. The latter has often been a Marxist method of choice, focused on exposing the hidden agenda of the capitalist class. We harness deconstruction to a different purpose.

  • United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by the European Communities) - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS217) Decision by the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006, pp 4591-4674

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Initial Proceedings

    On 27 January 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the report of the Panel in this dispute, as modified by the report of the Appellate Body.

    The findings adopted by the DSB were that the measure at issue in this case – the Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000 (hereafter “CDSOA”):

  • (a) is a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy, contrary to Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 18.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereafter the “Anti- Dumping Agreement”) and Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter the “SCM Agreement”);

  • (b) is inconsistent with certain provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement, so that the United States has failed to comply with Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereafter the “WTO Agreement”);

  • (c) pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, to the extent that it is inconsistent with provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the complaining parties under those Agreements;

    • On 13 June 2003, an arbitrator established under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU ruled that the “reasonable period of time” for the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case was 11 months from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports by the DSB. The United States was consequently awarded until 27 December 2003 to bring the CDSOA into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994, the Anti- Dumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement and the WTO Agreement.

    On 16 January 2004, the European Communities requested authorization from the DS0042, under Article 22.2 of the DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of tariff concessions and related obligations under GATT 1994 in an amount to be determined every year by reference to the amount of the offset payments made to affected domestic producers in the latest annual distribution under the CDSOA.

  • United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU (WT/DS264) Report of the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006, pp 5011-5012

  • Summary

    On 31 August 2004, the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada. At the DSB meeting of 27 September 2004, the United States confirmed its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute and stated that it would require a “reasonable period of time” in which to do so, pursuant to Article 21.3 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”).

    On 18 October 2004, Canada informed the DSB that consultations with the United States had not resulted in agreement on the reasonable period of time for implementation. Canada, therefore, requested that such period be determined by binding arbitration, in accordance with Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.

    Canada and the United States were unable to agree on an arbitrator within 10 days of the matter being referred to arbitration. On 29 October 2004, Canada requested the Director-General to appoint an arbitrator to determine a reasonable period of time for implementation, pursuant to footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. In a joint letter dated 1 November 2004, Canada and the United States indicated that in discussions that took place following Canada's request to the Director-General, they had “determined that [I] would be a mutually acceptable arbitrator.” Accordingly, Canada withdrew its request of 29 October 2004 and both parties requested the Director-General to convey to me their agreement that I act as arbitrator in this matter. I informed the parties of my acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 4 November 2004.

    Canada and the United States provided their written submissions on 19 November 2004.

    By a joint letter dated 6 December 2004, the parties informed me that they had reached agreement on the reasonable period of time for compliance in this matter. Under the circumstances, it will not be necessary for me to issue an award in this arbitration.

Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
  • Volume 9, Pages 4267-4687
  • World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. These are the WTO authorized and paginated reports in English. An essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and needed by students worldwide taking courses in international economic or trade law. DSR 2004: IX reports on the United States anti-dumping act of 1916 (original complaint by the European communities), and contains a cumulative index of published disputes.

Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
  • Volume 8, Pages 3419-4266
  • World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. These are the WTO authorized and paginated reports in English. An essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and needed by students worldwide taking courses in international economic or trade law. DSR 2004: VIII reports on sunset reviews of anti-dumping measures on oil country tubular goods from Argentina (US), and contains a cumulative index of published disputes.

  • European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU (WT/DS246) Award of the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006, pp 4313-4340

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 20 April 2004, the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (“EC – Tariff Preferences”). At the DSB meeting of 19 May 2004, the European Communities confirmed its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute and stated that it would require a “reasonable period of time” in which to do so, pursuant to Article 21.3 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”).

    On 16 July 2004, India informed the DSB that consultations with the European Communities had not resulted in agreement on the reasonable period of time for implementation. India therefore requested that such period be determined by binding arbitration, in accordance with Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.

    The European Communities and India were unable to agree on an arbitrator within 10 days of the matter being referred to arbitration. Therefore, on 26 July 2004, India requested that the Director-General appoint an arbitrator pursuant to footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The Director-General appointed me as arbitrator on 4 August 2004, after consulting the parties. I informed the parties of my acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 6 August 2004.

    The European Communities and India have agreed that this award will be deemed to be an arbitration award under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, notwithstanding the expiry of the 90-day period stipulated in Article 21.3(c). The parties have also agreed, pursuant to Article 21.4 of the DSU, that “exceptional circumstances” in this dispute justify the determination of the reasonable period of time more than 18 months after the establishment of the Panel.

    The European Communities and India provided their written submissions to me on 18 August 2004. I requested additional information from the European Communities by letter dated 24 August 2004, and the European Communities provided a written response on 1 September 2004. An oral hearing was held on 2 September 2004.

  • United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by Chile) - Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS217) Decision by the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006, pp 4511-4590

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Initial Proceedings

    On 27 January 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the report of the Panel in this dispute, as modified by the report of the Appellate Body.

    The findings adopted by the DSB were that the measure at issue in this case – the Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000 (hereafter “CDSOA”):

  • (a) is a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy, contrary to Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 18.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereafter the “Anti- Dumping Agreement”) and Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter the “SCM Agreement”);

  • (b) is inconsistent with certain provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement, so that the United States has failed to comply with Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereafter the “WTO Agreement”);

  • (c) pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, to the extent that it is inconsistent with provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the complaining parties under those Agreements;

    • On 13 June 2003, an arbitrator established under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU ruled that the “reasonable period of time” for the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case was 11 months from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports by the DSB. The United States was consequently awarded until 27 December 2003 to bring the CDSOA into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994, the Anti- Dumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement and the WTO Agreement.

    On 16 January 2004, Chile requested authorization from the DSB, under Article 22.2 of the DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements by an amount to be determined each year according to the offset payments made to affected United States producers, in the most-recent annual distribution of anti-dumping and countervailing duties collected and assessed on products from Chile under the CDSOA.

  • United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by Korea) – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS217) Decision by the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2004
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 October 2006, pp 4851-4930

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Initial Proceedings

    On 27 January 2003, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the report of the Panel in this dispute, as modified by the report of the Appellate Body.

    The findings adopted by the DSB were that the measure at issue in this case – the Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000 (hereafter “CDSOA”):

  • (a) is a non-permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy, contrary to Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 1994, Article 18.1 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereafter the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”) and Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter the “SCM Agreement”);

  • (b) is inconsistent with certain provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and SCM Agreement, so that the United States has failed to comply with Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereafter the “WTO Agreement”);

  • (c) pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, to the extent that it is inconsistent with provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the complaining parties under those Agreements;

    • On 13 June 2003, an arbitrator established under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU ruled that the “reasonable period of time” for the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case was 11 months from the date of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports by the DSB. The United States was consequently awarded until 27 December 2003 to bring the CDSOA into conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994, the Anti- Dumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement and the WTO Agreement.

    On 16 January 2004, Korea requested authorization from the DSB, under Article 22.2 of the DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of concessions or other obligations for an amount that will be determined, every year, by the amount of the offset payments made to affected domestic producers in the latest annual distribution under the CDSOA.

    Korea intends to impose an additional import duty above bound customs duties on a final list of products originating in the United States.

Page 375 of 579