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11577 results in Macroeconomics

Page 352 of 579

  • Conclusion

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp 201-202

  • Summary

    In light of the difficulties that recent multilateral trade negotiating rounds have encountered, trade officials, sometimes with nostalgia, reflect back on the easier trade negotiations of the past. Yet, although the 1940s was a golden age of international institution building, the negotiations that led to the GATT were never easy. The path from James Meade's draft plan for an “International Commercial Union” in 1942 to the Geneva conference in 1947 was fraught with pitfalls, delays, and obstacles. The ambitious plans for an International Trade Organization were eventually abandoned. In its place remained a smaller and shorter agreement on commercial policy that had many weaknesses. Yet the GATT survived the test of time.

    The delegates entrusted with the task of rebuilding the multilateral system of world trade and payments were a rare breed. It is unusual to see some of the greatest economic minds actively participate in national delegations, and work together with the political establishment towards the institutionalization of international cooperation and the constraint of economic unilateralism. It is to Henry Cabot Lodge that the phrase “the U.N. system is designed to avoid taking us to hell, but it cannot take us to heaven” is attributed. The Bretton Woods institutions and the GATT were designed as the first steps towards the other way.

    The negotiating record amply supports the view that the GATT is very much the end product of a transatlantic negotiation.

  • Annex A: Documents Relating to the Negotiations

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp 203-284

  • Summary

    1. General Provisions for Inclusion in Trade Agreements, as revised to December 13, 1941, National Archives II, Lot File 57D-284, Box 89.

    2. A Proposal for an International Commercial Union (James Meade), July 25, 1942, Public Records Office, T 230/14.

    3. Anglo-American Discussions under Article VII: Section on Commercial Policy, November 1943, Public Records Office, BT 11/2215.

    4. Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy: Summary of Significant Provisions, U.S. State Department, October 1944, National Archives II, Lot File 57D-284, Box 24.

    5. Excerpts from “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment,” State Department Publication No. 2411, December 1945.

    6. Preparations for Preliminary International Meeting on Trade and Employment, February 6, 1946, FRUS (1946, I, 1280-1289).

    7. U.S. Delegation Report on First Preparatory Meeting for an International Conference on Trade and Employment (London), December 27, 1946, FRUS (1946, I, 1360-1366).

    8. Report on the Geneva GATT Negotiations, Memorandum from State Department to President Truman, October 17, 1947, FRUS 1947, I, 1015-1024.

    Annex A-1

    From National Archives II, Lot File 57D-284, Box 89

    General Provisions for Inclusion in Trade Agreeements

    As revised to December 19, 1941

    Preamble

    Provisions Relating to Treatment of Trade in General

    1. (1) Most-favored-nation clause

    2. (2) Internal taxes

    3. (3) Quotas in general

    4. (4) Exchange Control

    5. (5) Monopolies and government purchases

    6. (6) Customs administrative matters, advances in duties, and customs pen-alties

    Provisions Relating to Concessions

    1. (7) Duty concessions by foreign country

    2. (8) Duty concessions by the United States

    3. (9) Compensating taxes

    4. (10) Dutiable value and conversion of currencies

    5. (11) Quotas on scheduled products

    6. (12) Withdrawal or modification of concessions

    7. (13) General provision to safeguard concessions

The Genesis of the GATT
  • Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O. Sykes
  • Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008
  • This book is part of a wider project on the economic logic behind the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This volume asks: What does the historical record indicate about the aims and objectives of the framers of the GATT? Where did the provisions of the GATT come from and how did they evolve through various international meetings and drafts? To what extent does the historical record provide support for one or more of the economic rationales for the GATT? This book examines the motivations and contributions of the two main framers of the GATT, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the smaller role of other countries. The framers desired a commercial agreement on trade practices as well as negotiated reductions in trade barriers. Both were sought as a way to expand international trade to promote world prosperity, restrict the use of discriminatory policies to reduce conflict over trade, and thereby establish economic foundations for maintaining world peace.

  • 3 - The Rationales for the GATT

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp 176-200

  • Summary

    The two previous chapters examined the origins and evolution of the GATT as a text. In this brief chapter, we turn to the broad question of how the historical evidence relates to existing academic theories of why countries seek to negotiate and join multilateral trade agreements. The classical theory of international trade and commercial policy examines the benefits of trade and the impact of trade-policy measures, but not, until recently, the value of international trade agreements. This has prompted economists and political scientists to search for the deeper economic and political rationales for trade agreements such as the GATT. These theories seek to answer questions such as: Why do we have the GATT? What is the underlying objective of the agreement, and what purpose does it serve?

    The preamble (chapeau) of the GATT sets out the major purposes of the agreement, at least in the eyes of the founders:

    Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods,

    Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, .…

  • Preface

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp xi-xii

  • Summary

    This book is the first in a series sponsored by the American Law Institute (ALI) on the foundations of world trade law as found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other agreements dealing with trade in goods under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The project is entitled Principles of World Trade Law and aims at illustrating the basic principles guiding trade liberalization. The ALI appointed Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, Kyle W. Bagwell, Gene M. Grossman, Robert W. Staiger, and Alan O. Sykes as reporters. Douglas A. Irwin has been invited to act as a coauthor in this first volume.

    This book sets the stage for the subsequent volumes by exploring the circumstances that gave rise to the GATT in 1947. It examines the origin and evolution of specific provisions that comprise the GATT, as well as present government documents and negotiate drafts relating to the creation of the GATT. In the course of our research, we have accumulated many intellectual debts that we wish to acknowledge. We are grateful to Lance Liebman and Elena A. Cappella of the ALI for their support of this project. We are indebted to Todd Feldman at ALI for expert editorial assistance. Judith M. Cole and Sandrine Forgeron at ALI helped to organize a meeting at the Columbia Law School on November 8, 2007, in which we were able to receive valuable feedback on our work.

  • Introduction

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp 1-4

  • Summary

    At a conference in the Palais des Nations, in Geneva, Switzerland, representatives of 23 countries met from April to October 1947 and established two key pillars of the postwar world trading system. First, they created a legal framework for commercial policy by finalizing the text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Second, the Geneva participants negotiated numerous bilateral agreements to reduce import tariffs, the benefits of which were extended to other GATT parties through the unconditional most-favored nation (MFN) clause. As a result, this landmark meeting produced a framework for postwar commercial relations in which governments agreed to rules about the use of certain trade barriers and to negotiate tariff reductions with one another. This system of multilateral cooperation has proven to be an enduring regime under which international trade has flourished for over half a century.

    This book examines the origins of the GATT. There are many studies of the GATT from legal and economic perspectives, but relatively few that examine how the GATT emerged from the ashes of World War II. The goal of our study is to appreciate the original goals and intentions of its founders by reviewing the diplomatic history that gave rise to this remarkable agreement, and to understand why the GATT took the particular shape and form that it did, in terms of the various provisions included in or excluded from the text.

  • Annex B: Negotiating Committees and Subcommittees

  • Douglas A. Irwin, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia University, New York, Alan O. Sykes, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Genesis of the GATT
    Published online:
    12 April 2011
    Print publication:
    16 June 2008, pp 285-296

  • Summary

    London Conference

    The Preparatory Committee established the following working committees:

    1. (f) Committee I: Employment and Economic Activity;

    2. (g) Committee II: General Commercial Policy;

    3. (h) Committee III: Restrictive Business Practices;

    4. (i) Committee IV: Intergovernmental Commodity Arrangements;

    5. (j) Committee V: Administration and Organization;

    A sixth committee, the Joint Committee on Industrial Development, was established following a joint meeting of Committees I and II. During the First Session, Mr. Suetens (Belgium) was elected as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, with Mr. Augenthaler (Czechoslovakia) as first, and Mr. Alvarez (Cuba) as second vice-chairman. The Chairman of Committee II was Coombs (Australia), with Speekenbrink (Netherlands) acting as vice-chairman. Committee II established a series of Sub-committees that were requested to report their findings to the main Committee (II): the single most important of all Sub-committees established is the Technical Sub-committee, which dealt with the following issues:

    1. a. national treatment on internal taxation and regulation;

    2. b. freedom of transit;

    3. c. antidumping and countervailing duties;

    4. d. tariff valuation;

    5. e. customs formalities;

    6. f. marks of origin;

    7. g. publication and administration of trade regulations – advance notice to restrictive regulations information, statistics, and trade terminology;

    8. h. boycotts;

    9. i. general exceptions.

    Participation to the Technical Sub-committee was open to delegates for all the countries represented on the Preparatory Committee. Mr. Videla (Chile) acted as Chairman, and delegates of six different nationalities acted as rapporteurs. The choice of six rapporteurs was justified by the wish to accelerate the process. The six rapporteurs were chosen from the Belgian (Luxembourg), Canadian, French, Dutch, UK, and U.S. delegations. The U.S. rapporteur was Mr.

  • United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes by the European Communities (WT/DS108): Report of the Appellate Body

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
    Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008, pp 4721-4760

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    The United States appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the Panel Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities (the “Panel Report”). The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the European Communities regarding the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “Jobs Act”) and the United States’ compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) adopted on the basis of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (“US – FSC”) and United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities (“US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)”). Relevant aspects of the Jobs Act are described in paragraph 6 below, as well as in paragraphs 2.13 to 2.17 of the Panel Report.

    The panel in US – FSC (the “original panel”) concluded that the “FSC measure”, consisting of Sections 921 to 927 of the United States Internal Revenue Code (the “IRC”) and related measures establishing special tax treatment for foreign sales corporations (“FSC”), was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the “SCM Agreement”) and the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body upheld the original panel's finding that the FSC measure was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the SCM Agreement and modified the original panel's findings under the Agreement on Agriculture.

    On 20 March 2000, the DSB adopted the reports of the original panel and the Appellate Body. The DSB recommended that the United States bring the FSC measure into conformity with its obligations under the covered agreements and that the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement be withdrawn without delay, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, namely, “at the latest with effect from 1 October 2000”.

  • European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WT/DS269/13, WT/DS286/15) Award of the Arbitrator

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
    Published online:
    12 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008, pp 5441-5472

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 27 September 2005, the Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Reports, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts. At the meeting of the DSB held on 18 October 2005, the European Communities stated that it intended to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, and that it would need a reasonable period of time in which to do so.

    On 22 November 2005, Brazil informed the DSB that consultations with the European Communities had not resulted in an agreement on the reasonable period of time for implementation. Brazil therefore requested that such period be determined through binding arbitration, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”). Thailand similarly informed the DSB, on 9 December 2005, that it had been unable to reach agreement with the European Communities on the reasonable period of time for implementation, and requested arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.

    By joint letter of 9 December 2005, Brazil and the European Communities requested me to act as Arbitrator, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, to determine the reasonable period of time for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. Thailand and the European Communities also requested, by joint letter of 13 December 2005, that I serve as Arbitrator. As the 90-day period following adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports was to expire on 26 December 2005, the parties, in their respective letters, “confirm[ed] that the award of the arbitrator within the time period to be agreed shall be deemed to be the award of the arbitrator for the purpose of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.” I accepted the appointments on 14 December 2005 and proposed to conduct both proceedings simultaneously, undertaking to issue the Award no later than 20 February 2006. No party objected to the proposed date for circulation of the Award.

  • European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293): Table of Annexes G to I-2

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008, pp 2769-3184

  • Summary

    REPLIES BY AUSTRALIA TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL AND THE PARTIES

    QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PANEL

    For all third parties:

    With reference to pp. 27-36 of the EC first written submission, could the third parties please indicate whether the European Communities’ description of their own regulatory systems is accurate?

    From Australia's perspective, the accuracy of the European Communities’ description of the Australian regulatory system does not appear to be of any relevance to the resolution of this dispute. Australia therefore does not wish to provide any response addressing the accuracy of this description.

    For all complaining parties

    With reference to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, do the complaining parties agree with the European Communities that:

  • (a) Article 5.7 excludes the applicability of Article 5.1 and is not an exception (affirmative defence) to Article 5.1 (EC first written submission, para. 575)? In answering this question, please address the relevance of the Appellate Body reports on Japan- Apples (footnote 316), EC – Hormones (para. 104) and ECSardines (para. 275) and Japan-Agricultural Products II (paras. 86 et seq)?

    • In Australia's view, Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 5.1. Article 5.7 is not, however, an exception (affirmative defence) and the burden of proof in establishing a claim of inconsistency with Article 5.7 rests with the complaining party.

    Qualified exemption

    In Japan – Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body explained that:

    Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 2.2 not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence. An overly broad and flexible interpretation of that obligation would render Article 5.7 meaningless.

    In light of the nexus between Articles 2.2 and 5.1, Australia considers that the same reasoning can be applied to the relationship between Article 5.1 and Article 5.7: Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 5.1 requiring Members to ensure their SPS measures are based on an assessment of risk.

  • European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293): Table of Annexes I-3 to K

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
    Published online:
    12 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008, pp 3187-3788

  • Summary

    COMMENT ON REPLIES TO QUESTIONS BY DR. ANDOW

    Question 3

    On the basis of the information before the Panel, is there any scientific evidence to support the hypothesis that wide-spread cultivation of Bt crops such as biotech maize of the Bt variety adversely affects non-target organisms which may be exposed to such crops under typical agricultural practice? (See, inter alia, EC-149, EC-150, EC-151, EC-152) If so, how does this risk compare with risks to non-target organisms arising from non-biotech applications for Bt toxins (i.e., the use of Bt toxin as an insecticide in conventional and organic farming)? What risk management options are available to mitigate any resulting risks and what is their efficacy?

    Scientific evidence

    03.01. In the answer to this question, I will concentrate on Bt maize and Bt cotton. Yes. there is some scientific evidence to support the hypothesis that wide-spread cultivation of Bt crops adversely affects non-target organisms which may be exposed to such crops under typical agricultural practice. However, this evidence is insufficient to establish the hypothesis that such adverse effects are expected to occur.

    Comments by Argentina

    This statement starts mentioning that there is “some (sic) scientific evidence to support the hypothesis”…, of non-target effects on organisms, “which may be exposed”, and ends that “this evidence (sic) is insufficient to establish the hypothesis that such adverse are expected to occur”. It is clear from this wording that there is no solid evidence to support the fact that the organisms will actually be exposed in a way which may be of concern about the safety of the Bt crops mentioned.

    03.02. The review of non-target effects of Bt plants in EC-149 covered 13 laboratory studies evaluating potential hazard, and 14 field studies aimed at evaluating potential risk. Of the 13 lab studies reviewed, I conclude that five studies did not expose the test organisms properly and therefore are irrelevant hazard evaluations (an organism must be exposed to evaluate hazard). In two additional studies, four of eight test species were not properly exposed. Of the remaining, seven species were studied.

Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
  • Volume 11, Pages 4719–5084
  • World Trade Organization
  • Published online:
    22 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008
  • The Dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization (WTO) include Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as arbitration awards, in disputes concerning the rights and obligations of WTO members under the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. These are the WTO authorized and paginated reports in English. An essential addition to the library of all practising and academic trade lawyers, and needed by students worldwide taking courses in international economic or trade law. DSR 2006: XI reports on United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes by the European Communities and United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes by Canada.

  • European Communities – Selected Customs Matters (WT/DS315): Report of the Panel

  • World Trade Organization
  • Book:
    Dispute Settlement Reports 2006
    Published online:
    13 December 2017
    Print publication:
    12 June 2008, pp 3915-4390

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    On 21 September 2004, the United States requested consultations with the European Communities (EC) pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) (WT/DS315/1).

    The request referred to the alleged non-uniform manner in which the European Communities administers its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in Article X:1 of GATT 1994 pertaining to the classification and valuation of products for customs purposes and to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports.

    The request identified the following measures: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, including all annexes thereto, as amended (the “Code”); Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, including all annexes thereto, as amended (the “Commission Regulation”); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, including all annexes thereto, as amended (the “Tariff Regulation”); the Integrated Tariff of the European Communities established by virtue of Article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, including all annexes thereto, as amended (the “TARIC”); and for each of the above laws and regulations, all amendments, implementing measures and other related measures.

    The request also referred to the alleged failure of the European Communities to institute judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters.

    The United States and the European Communities held consultations on 16 November 2004 but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter. Consequently, in a communication dated 13 January 2005, the United States requested the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to establish a panel.

Page 352 of 579