Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Browse subjects
  3. Economics
  4. Industrial economics
  5. Content listing

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

4204 results in Industrial economics

Page 43 of 211

Modern Economic Regulation
  • An Introduction to Theory and Practice
  • Christopher Decker
  • Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    30 October 2014
  • Drawing from the most recent work on economic regulation, this book introduces readers to the main principles and examines how economic regulation is applied in four key public utility industries - electricity, gas, water and telecommunications. Written for students and practitioners with little prior knowledge of economic regulation, this is an accessible, non-technical entry point to the subject area, exploring the fundamental questions: Why do we regulate? What are alternatives to regulation? Which institutions are involved in regulation? What have been the impacts of regulation? Readers will gain a clear understanding of the basic principles that apply to all regulated sectors, as well as the regulatory choices that reflect the specific economic and physical characteristics of different industries. Case studies demonstrate connections between regulatory theory and practice, and extensive references provide readers with resources for more in-depth study.

  • Cases and legislation

  • Christopher Decker, University of Oxford
  • Book:
    Modern Economic Regulation
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    30 October 2014, pp 415-418

  • Summary

    Cases

  • Case C-280/08Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European Communities [2010] ECR 2010 I-09555

  • Case C-424/07European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR 2009 I-11431

  • Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v. Commission [2009] ECR 2009 I-02369

  • Case T-271/03Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2008] ECR 2008 II-477

  • Case C-18/88Régie des télégraphes et des téléphones v. GB-Inno-BM SA [1991] ECR I-05941

  • Cases 6/73 and 7/73Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 223

    • EC Regulations and Directives

  • Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 October 2013 establishing a network code on capacity allocation mechanism on gas transmission systems (Regulation 984/2013)

  • Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply (Regulation 994/2010)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Directive 2009/140/EC)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (Directive 2009/73/EC)

  • Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks (Regulation EC 715/2009)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC)

  • Council Directive of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply (Directive 2004/67/EC)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (Directive 2003/54/EC)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (Directive 2003/55/EC)

  • Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (‘Universal Service Directive’) (Directive 2002/22/EC)

  • 5 - Forms of price regulation

  • from Part II
  • Christopher Decker, University of Oxford
  • Book:
    Modern Economic Regulation
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    30 October 2014, pp 103-140

  • Summary

    Chapter 4 set out some of the key principles for the regulation of core network activities which, in theory, allow a regulator to determine an optimal set of prices that will maximise economic welfare, while allowing the regulated firm to break even. These principles are derived under a set of strong assumptions and, in particular, much of the analysis assumes that: the regulator has full information regarding costs, demand and the behaviour of the regulated firm; the regulator has various tools at its disposal to address any revenue shortfall, such as the use of subsidies or multi-part pricing; and that, in the multi-period context, the regulator is able to commit to its previous decisions. In practice, many of these assumptions do not hold, and this raises difficulties for the application by regulators of the principles outlined in Chapter 4.

    The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the methods by which price regulation is applied in practice. In this respect, it is assumed that regulation is applied in an effort to constrain and influence the pricing behaviour and other conduct of firms in the public utility industries. A number of different forms of price regulation are examined, ranging from traditional rate of return regulation to various forms of performance-based incentive regulation, such as price cap regulation and other so-called ‘hybrids’ involving earnings or revenue sharing mechanisms. Regulators in practice have used all of these approaches, although the precise way in which they have been applied has varied. In this chapter, the general properties of each type of price regulation are described, including the incentive features of each approach. The perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with each approach are discussed and, finally, consideration is given to the economic settings in which each specific approach is likely to be most suitable. This chapter is intended to provide a frame of reference for the consideration of the more specific techniques and methods that have been adopted in the public utility industries described in Chapters 8–11.

  • 7 - The institutions of regulation

  • from Part III
  • Christopher Decker, University of Oxford
  • Book:
    Modern Economic Regulation
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    30 October 2014, pp 189-222

  • Summary

    In the chapters so far we have discussed the different rationales for public utility regulation, considered possible alternatives to regulation, and then examined some of the economic principles and approaches that may be relevant for the regulation of public utilities. In this chapter, and those that follow, our attention turns to the practice of public utility regulation. Specifically, this chapter describes the institutions that apply economic regulation, while Chapters 8–11 examine how regulation is applied in four specific public utility industries.

    With the exception of the USA, there has been a significant shift in how economic regulation is delivered in the public utility industries in many jurisdictions over the past three decades. In general, this has been a shift away from regulation by government department toward regulation by independent, or quasi-independent, regulatory authorities (typically, but not always, accompanied by the corporatisation or privatisation of the relevant utility). A 2006 World Bank publication recorded that almost 200 new infrastructure regulators had been established in the period 1996–2006.

Page 43 of 211