Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- 1 The Forgotten Theatre: Britain, Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea
- 2 ‘To keep a fleet above a fortnight’: The Evolution of Naval Logistics during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 The Challenges of the Baltic Sea
- 4 The Administration of Power Projection
- 5 The First Year in the Baltic, 1808
- 6 The Escalation of Seapower, 1809
- 7 The Navy, Reform and the British State
- 8 Logistics and Seapower, 1810–1812
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- 1 The Forgotten Theatre: Britain, Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea
- 2 ‘To keep a fleet above a fortnight’: The Evolution of Naval Logistics during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 The Challenges of the Baltic Sea
- 4 The Administration of Power Projection
- 5 The First Year in the Baltic, 1808
- 6 The Escalation of Seapower, 1809
- 7 The Navy, Reform and the British State
- 8 Logistics and Seapower, 1810–1812
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
VICTORY AT THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR in 1805 secured an unprecedented mastery of the seas for Britain but did little to halt the continental hegemony of Napoleon. Under his leadership, the French empire continued to expand, ultimately stretching from Spain to the Danube. By 1808, virtually all of mainland Europe was in a state of enforced hostility to Britain. Political antagonism became economic hostility, as Napoleon set up the Continental System, a continental blockade aimed at removing British economic power from Europe. Unable to defeat Britain at sea, he resorted to economic warfare. The Berlin Decree of 1806 and the Milan Decrees of 1807 prohibited all trade with Britain, banned all British goods and declared that any captured would be ‘fair prize’ and confiscated. If not a new direction in the war, it represented a change in emphasis. Napoleon envisaged Britain's defeat not as an invasion and a march on London, but in bringing it to its knees by crippling it economically and thus financially. The British responded with a series of Orders in Council, which declared all ports under French control to be under blockade, meaning they could only trade with Britain's acquiescence. The ten years that followed Nelson's greatest victory saw the Royal Navy's role become more subtle, though no less important. Dominant at sea after 1805, it had no need, and little opportunity, to fight decisive battles.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Transformation of British Naval StrategySeapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808–1812, pp. 1 - 12Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2012