THE NAPOLEONIC WAR became a conflict between rival economies. Napoleon's assault on British mercantile trade, the life-blood of its financial system, threatened the relationship between the state and the City that underlay British naval and political might. In response, the last ten years of this war saw a global projection of naval power. Fleets were sent to North America, the Caribbean, the East Indies, the Cape of Good Hope and the Brazils to protect British trade routes. The principal naval effort though remained in European waters. No sooner had Bonaparte started an economic conflict than it was escalated by the British, announcing their own blockade on the Napoleonic empire. This contest would not be decided by a naval battle, but by a broader conception of seapower. Fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea were charged not only with trade protection, but also attacking and undermining Napoleon's Continental System. This effort required a constant and rigorous application of naval force around the European coastline. Fleets were required to remain on station the year round, marshalling trade, escorting ships and attacking enemy shipping. This rested on a victualling system that could support naval forces long enough to maintain British strategic objectives.

The provisioning service was but one part of the British war machine: however, it was a crucial one. If the Victualling Board or Transport Board failed, the Royal Navy could not hope to execute its strategic and operational designs.