IN OCTOBER 1808, towards the end of his first year in the Baltic, Vice- Admiral Sir James Saumarez visited the Swedish squadron and witnessed first-hand the devastating consequences of an ineffective victualling system. ‘On board their ships’, he informed the Admiralty, ‘I found 1500 Sick all much affected with scurvy, accompanied with dysentery, low fever, and a few Catarrhal complaints … all apparently sinking under general debility and despondency; in many instances amounting to insanity, which too frequently terminated in the unhappy sufferer committing suicide’. The situation was worse on land: ‘in their hospitals I found 3864 suffering under similar disease’, he continued. The poor health of the Swedish forces is a measure against which the efforts of the Royal Navy to supply itself through the Napoleonic Wars can be judged. Employed in the same Baltic region as the Swedish navy, how was it that the British seamen stationed there did not come to suffer from similar problems? A monthly return of sick and wounded on board the Baltic squadron at the end of 1808 found only four cases of scurvy amongst over 11,000 seamen, alongside forty-five cases of rheumatism and thirty-two cases of venereal disease. While the Royal Navy fleet remained healthy, and able to pursue its objective, the Swedish fleet lay stricken in port. This contrast in the respective fortunes of the two navies was firmly rooted on the effectiveness of their logistical systems.