Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- John B. Hattendorf – A Transatlantic Tribute
- Introduction
- 1 Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History
- 2 Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy
- 3 Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel
- 4 Reconsidering the Guerre de Course under Louis XIV: Naval Policy and Strategic Downsizing in an Era of Fiscal Overextension
- 5 British Naval Administration and the Lower Deck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 6 British Naval Administration and the Quarterdeck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 7 The Raison d’Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times
- 8 British Defensive Strategy at Sea in the War against Napoleon
- 9 The Offensive Strategy of the Spanish Navy, 1763–1808
- 10 The Influence of Sea Power upon Three Great Global Wars, 1793–1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945: A Comparative Analysis
- 11 The Evolution of a Warship Type: The Role and Function of the Battlecruiser in Admiralty Plans on the Eve of the First World War
- 12 The Royal Navy and Grand Strategy, 1937–1941
- 13 The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944
- 14 The Capital Ship, the Royal Navy and British Strategy from the Second World War to the 1950s
- 15 ‘No Scope for Arms Control’: Strategy, Geography and Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s
- 16 Sir Julian Corbett, Naval History and the Development of Sea Power Theory
- 17 The Influence of Identity on Sea Power
- 18 Professor Spenser Wilkinson, Admiral William Sims and the Teaching of Strategy and Sea Power at the University of Oxford and the United States Naval War College, 1909–1927
- 19 Naval Intellectualism and the Imperial Japanese Navy
- 20 History and Navies: Defining a Dialogue
- 21 Teaching Navies Their History
- Afterword
- A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Reviews Authored, Co-authored, Edited or Co-edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1960–2015
- Index
- Tabula Gratulatoria
13 - The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- John B. Hattendorf – A Transatlantic Tribute
- Introduction
- 1 Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History
- 2 Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy
- 3 Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel
- 4 Reconsidering the Guerre de Course under Louis XIV: Naval Policy and Strategic Downsizing in an Era of Fiscal Overextension
- 5 British Naval Administration and the Lower Deck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 6 British Naval Administration and the Quarterdeck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 7 The Raison d’Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times
- 8 British Defensive Strategy at Sea in the War against Napoleon
- 9 The Offensive Strategy of the Spanish Navy, 1763–1808
- 10 The Influence of Sea Power upon Three Great Global Wars, 1793–1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945: A Comparative Analysis
- 11 The Evolution of a Warship Type: The Role and Function of the Battlecruiser in Admiralty Plans on the Eve of the First World War
- 12 The Royal Navy and Grand Strategy, 1937–1941
- 13 The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944
- 14 The Capital Ship, the Royal Navy and British Strategy from the Second World War to the 1950s
- 15 ‘No Scope for Arms Control’: Strategy, Geography and Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s
- 16 Sir Julian Corbett, Naval History and the Development of Sea Power Theory
- 17 The Influence of Identity on Sea Power
- 18 Professor Spenser Wilkinson, Admiral William Sims and the Teaching of Strategy and Sea Power at the University of Oxford and the United States Naval War College, 1909–1927
- 19 Naval Intellectualism and the Imperial Japanese Navy
- 20 History and Navies: Defining a Dialogue
- 21 Teaching Navies Their History
- Afterword
- A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Reviews Authored, Co-authored, Edited or Co-edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1960–2015
- Index
- Tabula Gratulatoria
Summary
The declaration of war by the Western powers on 3 September 1939 surprised Hitler. Thus, he found himself in a war with Britain and France that he had not wanted in 1939. In his ‘Directive No. 9’ of 29 November 1939, ‘Principles of warfare against the economy of the enemy’, he considered interference with the British economy as the ‘most effective means’ to defeat Britain. Hitler was prepared to adopt this strategic concept for the navy, hitting Britain where she was most vulnerable by disrupting her sea lines of communication.
However, Hitler and his Naval War Staff operated on different planes of strategic thinking: Hitler expected a short war limited to Europe and did not want to jeopardise the hope of better relations with Great Britain. The Naval War Staff, on the other hand, was convinced that the conflict with Britain would be long. It would have to be won in the Atlantic, even if that meant the entry of the United States into the war.
Because of the inaction of the Western Allies, Hitler even believed that they had only declared war to save face. After the end of the fighting in Poland, Hitler therefore made a ‘peace offer’. However, for Paris and London there could no longer be any question of negotiating with Hitler. The strategy of the Allies was guided by the wish to disrupt the concentration of German forces on the border of France. In the spring of 1940, the spread of the war to Scandinavia gave the Allies the desired secondary theatre, but no opportunity to thwart Hitler's plans for a campaign in the west.
After France had been defeated, Britain was the only nation able to fight Germany and was not prepared to deny Germany's dominance of the Continent: ‘Germany had a military position and sufficient freedom of action to make Britain's defeat inevitable, if not quick and easy. Considering the greater resources of German controlled Europe, Britain's position without outside help, was hopeless.’ However, as soon as the existence of Britain came under threat, Germany would have to reckon with the United States.
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- Strategy and the SeaEssays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf, pp. 159 - 168Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016