Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T20:03:06.729Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Strategic Intelligence and American Statecraft

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2009

Richard L. Russell
Affiliation:
National Defense University, Washington DC
Get access

Summary

The u. s. intelligence community suffered from two of the greatest intelligence debacles in its sixty-year history with the 11 September 2001 (“9/11”) al-Qaeda attacks and the assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the run-up to the war launched in 2003 against Saddam Hussein's regime. Although the intelligence community is made up of some sixteen intelligence agencies with varying responsibilities and functions, the lion's share of the burden of these failures falls squarely on the shoulders of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which had been the lead agency for providing strategic intelligence to the president in his role as commander in chief.

Taxpayers now pay about $44 billion per year on intelligence to support the president of the United States in defending U. S. interests. This is a steep increase from the 1998 intelligence community budget of some $27 billion. The U. S. intelligence community budget, moreover, is a sum that dwarfs the entire defense expenditures of most countries. All of the sixteen intelligence organizations that comprise the intelligence community have about 100,000 people working for them. Although the CIA consumes only a small portion of the total intelligence community budget, it still has a workforce of some 17,000 people, by the account of former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet.

Yet that large annual investment and sizable manpower did not spare the United States its two most devastating intelligence failures since the inception of the U. S. intelligence community in 1947.

Type
Chapter
Information
Sharpening Strategic Intelligence
Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right
, pp. 1 - 28
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×