Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-fqc5m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T14:24:24.167Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Spies Who Do Not Deliver

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2009

Richard L. Russell
Affiliation:
National Defense University, Washington DC
Get access

Summary

The craft of human intelligence operations for the public, and even for many inside the halls of government, is shrouded in a glamorous mystique. The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) responsible for U. S. human intelligence operations traditionally parlayed that mystique into winning public and congressional support for its budget. Too often, in the face of human intelligence failures, executive and legislative branch overseers as well as the public had given the DO the benefit of the doubt and not raised serious and sustained questions about its performance in stealing secrets to reveal the plans and intentions of U. S. adversaries.

The director of national intelligence (DNI) in 2005 renamed the CIA's DO the National Clandestine Service (NCS), but that move probably is more a bureaucratic show to diffuse outside criticisms than for substantive internal reform. For all intents and purposes, the new NCS remains the old DO. The spate of recent presidential panels and congressional studies centered on the 9/11 and Iraq episodes have touched on human intelligence failures, but these studies still have not probed deeply enough into the DO's human intelligence operations. These studies, moreover, are too narrow in focus because the United States has faced a greater array of national security challenges in the past and will have many others in the future.

Examination of the CIA's human intelligence performance in a broad-er array of cases from the Cold War, post–Cold War, and 9/11 security environments reveals persistent and systemic shortcomings.

Type
Chapter
Information
Sharpening Strategic Intelligence
Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right
, pp. 95 - 118
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×