The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511571947

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The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy

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Cited by 28
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This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

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Edited by Thomas Mayer, University of California, Davis

Publisher:: Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:: July 2010
Print publication year:: 1990
Online ISBN:: 9780511571947
DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571947

Subjects:: Economics, Economic Theory, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations

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This collection of essays examines the institutional framework in which monetary policy is made. The essays consider two questions: how free is the Fed to set monetary policy and to what extent do organisational problems affect the choice of that monetary policy? Topics covered include the Fed's response to movements on its goals, Congressional and presidential pressures on the Fed, the existence of political business cycles operating through monetary policy, and the extent to which monetary policy may be explained by the Fed's own interests. A final section examines the claim that the Federal Reserve follows counter-cyclical policy and evaluates its performance as a lender to banks both in normal times and as a lender of last resort.

"In summary, this volume presents a diverse and comprehensive set of hypotheses of Federal Reserve behavior that many readers will find interesting." Robert H. Rasche, Journal of Economic Literature

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The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy

This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-iv

Contents
pp v-vi

Preface
pp vii-viii

List of contributors
pp ix-x

1 - Introduction
pp 1-12

2 - Studying the Fed: toward a broader public-choice perspective
pp 13-26

3 - The Federal Reserve reaction function: a specification search
pp 27-48

4 - Corporate profitability as a determinant of restrictive monetary policy: estimates for the postwar United States
pp 49-62

5 - Federal Reserve behavior since 1980: a financial-market perspective
pp 63-80

6 - The Federal Reserve and its institutional environment: a review
pp 81-96

7 - The political economy of monetary policy
pp 97-112

8 - Political monetary cycles
pp 113-128

9 - Congress and the Fed: why the dog does not bark in the night
pp 129-148

10 - The Federal Reserve as a political power
pp 149-162

11 - Monetary policy and political economy: the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan
pp 163-178

12 - A positive analysis of the policy-making process at the Federal Reserve
pp 179-194

13 - A theory of FOMC dissent voting with evidence from the time series
pp 195-208

14 - Explaining FOMC members' votes
pp 209-226

15 - Fed behavior and X-efficiency theory: toward a general framework
pp 227-238

16 - Minimizing regret: cognitive dissonance as an explanation of FOMC behavior
pp 239-252

17 - The discount window
pp 253-266

18 - Leaning against the wind: the behavior of the money stock in recession and recovery, 1953–8
pp 267-280

19 - Bureaucratic self-interest as an obstacle to monetary reform
pp 281-296

Index
pp 297-312

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The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy

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Contents

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