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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2009

Folke Tersman
Folke Tersman
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Stockholms Universitet
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Moral Disagreement , pp. 133 - 138
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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References

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Feldman, R. “Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role,” Journal of Philosophy 69 (1977), 379–408Google Scholar
Feldman, R. “Reliability and Justification,” Monist 68 (1985), 159–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, H. “Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role,” Journal of Philosophy 69 (1977), 379–408Google Scholar
Field, H. “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in MacDonald, G., and Wright, C. (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 55–117Google Scholar
Foot, P.Virtues and Vices. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978Google Scholar
Frankena, W. “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy,” in Melden, A. (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958, 40–81Google Scholar
F⊘llesdal, D. “The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action,” Dialectica 36 (1982), 301–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gallie, W. B. “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955–1956), 167–198CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Gibbard, A.Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990Google Scholar
Gibbard, A.Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003Google Scholar
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  • References
  • Folke Tersman, Stockholms Universitet
  • Book: Moral Disagreement
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599.008
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  • References
  • Folke Tersman, Stockholms Universitet
  • Book: Moral Disagreement
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599.008
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  • References
  • Folke Tersman, Stockholms Universitet
  • Book: Moral Disagreement
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570599.008
Available formats
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