INTRODUCTION

In school and through the media we have learned about all sorts of exotic practices, such as cannibalism among the Papuans of New Guinea, head shrinking among the Jivaro of Ecuador, infanticide among the Yanomamö, and senilicide among the Netsilik Eskimos. And we are all familiar with the intense debates that occur within Western societies, regarding capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, and so on. The evidence that suggests that there is extensive moral disagreement seems overwhelming.

This partly accounts for the popularity of arguments that appeal to moral disagreement. Philosophical debates seldom can be adjudicated with reference to hard and well-established empirical facts. So when an opportunity appears to arise, it is difficult to resist the temptation.

What we must resist, however, is a simplistic view of the step from the empirical evidence to the philosophical conclusion. Disagreements occur also in areas where people are less enthusiastic about antirealism, such as in the sciences. So there has to be something peculiar about moral disagreement in order for it to serve its argumentative role. According to one idea, the contrast consists in the (alleged) fact that many moral disagreements cannot be resolved through rational argumentation. But even if there is evidence for moral diversity in general, it might be wondered if there is any evidence for this special claim as well. To address that issue is the main aim of the present chapter.