Book contents
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
- Chapter 2 Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
- Chapter 3 The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 4 Three Puzzles about Lotteries
- Chapter 5 Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
- Chapter 6 Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 7 Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
- Chapter 8 Stability and the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 9 The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
- Chapter 10 Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
- Chapter 11 The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2021
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
- Chapter 2 Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
- Chapter 3 The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 4 Three Puzzles about Lotteries
- Chapter 5 Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
- Chapter 6 Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 7 Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
- Chapter 8 Stability and the Lottery Paradox
- Chapter 9 The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
- Chapter 10 Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
- Chapter 11 The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Suppose I hold a ticket – ticket #5472, say – in a fair 10,000-ticket lottery with a single winner. Suppose the lottery has been drawn, but I’m yet to hear the result. Suppose I already believe, however, that ticket #5472 has lost, based on the fact that there is only one winning ticket and 9,999 losers. Surely, given these odds, I am justified in believing that ticket #5472 has lost. There’s nothing special, however, about the ticket that I happen to be holding; it has as good a chance of being the winner as any other ticket. As a result, if I’m justified in believing that ticket #5472 has lost, then I should be justified in believing the same thing about ticket #1, about ticket #2, about ticket #3 … right up to ticket #10,000.
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- Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational BeliefEssays on the Lottery Paradox, pp. 95 - 109Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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