The Problematic Nexus Between Unity and Plurality

At a very basic level, pluralism is inevitable. So long as the “I” remains distinct from the “Thou,” the self from the other, perspectives must remain, in some meaningful sense, plural. The implications from this observation, however, are far from obvious. On the one hand, it follows from the fact that the relationship between self and other – be they two individuals, rival tribes or nations, or contending ideologies aspiring to universality such as liberal capitalism and Marxist communism – is irreducible, and that therefore pluralism can go “all the way down.” On the other hand, the fact of pluralism in this barest of all manifestations does not appear to carry any palpable normative implications. Does the fact that one is always confronted with a plurality of perspectives entail any moral, political, or legal “ought”? Arguably, not. Indeed, one can cogently argue that the differences between self and other are normatively irrelevant and that what counts is that they are both selves entitled to equal dignity. In that case, normative pluralism would be unjustified. Or, conversely, one can insist that overlooking the differences between self and other could only lead to injustice and subordination as one would inevitably end up favoring some over others, thus making normative pluralism the only legitimate alternative.

Viewing the matter from a normative perspective, pluralism – at least the fact of pluralism – must be taken into account when one encounters and interacts with a stranger. This is vividly illustrated by reference to the advent of the independent market for the exchange of goods. As Max Weber puts it, “the market was originally a consociation of persons who are not members of the same group and who are, therefore, ‘enemies’” (Weber 1968: 672). Because market transactions are among strangers, they cannot come within the purview of any one of the respective communal norms of those who have traveled away from home to exchange goods. I cannot impose my own customs and mores on a stranger with whom I wish to exchange goods, and I cannot subject that stranger to the authorities within my own community, should something go wrong with the proposed exchange we are about to carry out. To fairly account for the plurality of unshared communal normative commitments spread among all the strangers involved, market transactions must therefore be subjected to norms that transcend those not shared by all those who have come to market. And, the normative regime laid out by modern contract law presumably fills that need and supposedly allows for market exchanges that are fair and efficient (Rosenfeld 1985: 811–14).