Liberalism’s difficulty with difference in relation to equality is exacerbated in the context of group-based equality, and in particular in situations in which individual-regarding equality considerations come into conflict with group-regarding ones. This can be illustrated by reference to the following purely formal example. Suppose there are 200 units of a good available for distribution and two groups, A and B, respectively comprised of 100 and 50 members. In that scenario, an equal distribution to each group would lead to individual-regarding inequality as individual members of B would each receive two units whereas individual members of A would each acquire one unit. Conversely, if distribution is made through the groups but on an individual-regarding equality basis, then A and B will be awarded unequal quantities of the goods under distribution. Furthermore, because of liberalism’s commitment to individualism, in case of conflict individual-regarding equality would always trump group-regarding equality. For communitarianism, on the other hand, group-regarding equality would always prevail over individual-regarding equality when the two could not be readily reconciled.

In both cases, there would thus be a strong bias for identity at the expense of difference; in the case of liberal equality because of the built-in preference for identity discussed in Chapter 2; in that of communitarian equality because of refusal to accommodate any individual-based (or subgroup-based) deviations that would adversely impact on group identity. These biases, moreover, would be greatly magnified for minority groups. This is obvious in the case of communitarianism deployed on a national scale. For example, if a minority group language is different than the national one and the latter is deemed essential to the preservation of national identity, then the minority language will undoubtedly be subjected to unequal treatment resulting in linguistic difference being widely suppressed, or, at least, significantly constrained. On the other hand, the bias in question may be less obvious though equally operative in the case of liberal individualism. Logically, it would seem that since liberalism is biased against all group-regarding concerns, minority groups should fare no worse than majority ones. Upon further consideration, however, it becomes apparent that once one moves away from purely abstract egos in the Kantian mold, liberal individualism cannot be deployed within a polity without some, at least implicit, attachment to group identity.