The permissive law we discussed in Chapter 4 extends my external freedom to include not only freedom from someone else's necessitating choice but also freedom to have external objects of choice as my own. In this chapter we continue with Kant's ideas on the external mine and thine, showing Kant's development of the idea of possession from physical or empirical possession to intelligible possession of external objects of choice. Kant begins by distinguishing four concepts of possession, which we discuss in section 1. In section 2, we turn to Kant's question of how possession as mine is possible. Section 3 focuses on possession of external things, as opposed to possession of objects of choice in general. In particular, section 3 discusses Kant's question of how a right in rem, or an ownership right, as opposed to a right in personam, or a right against a specific person, such as under a contract, is possible.

Kant's concepts of possession

Kant states that the subjective condition of the possibility to use an external object of choice is possession. In order to use something I must possess it. Kant continues by distinguishing four different meanings of possession. Possession can be (1) holding a thing in my hand or otherwise physically occupying it. He calls this possession “empirical possession.” Possession can also be (2) having something under my control, such as by locking the doors and windows to my house when I leave it.