Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-2l2gl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-30T23:22:00.278Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

22 - Markets with intermediated goods

from Part IX - Market intermediation

Paul Belleflamme
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Martin Peitz
Affiliation:
Universität Mannheim, Germany
Get access

Summary

In this chapter, we consider the two roles of intermediaries that concern the trade of goods and services: the role of a dealer and the role of a platform operator.

Section 22.1 focuses on the dealer role in its simplest form: the intermediary buys and resells a product, without adding any service to the transaction. Compared to a situation where buyers and sellers interact on a decentralized market, we show that the intermediary may add value for some market participants by this simple buy and resell activity. As we will argue, the intuition for this result is that intermediation allows for a valuable self-selection of types when buyers and sellers are affected by the type of their matching partner. Intermediaries can thus find profitable opportunities to operate centralized exchanges.

What is the most profitable form of centralized exchange: buying and reselling the goods or just providing buyers and sellers with an opportunity to meet? That is, does the intermediary prefer to act as a dealer or as a platform operator who only taxes trade? We show that the picture is mixed. Decentralizing pricing leads to positive and negative effects for the intermediary.

In Section 22.2, we examine matching environments. Intermediaries providing matching services can add value by internalizing two types of externalities. First, indirect network externalities are present when agents in one group value the matching services of an intermediary all the more that the participation of the other group is large, because that increases their chances of finding their match.

Type
Chapter
Information
Industrial Organization
Markets and Strategies
, pp. 613 - 646
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×