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Part II - Market power

Paul Belleflamme
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Martin Peitz
Affiliation:
Universität Mannheim, Germany
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Summary

Introduction to Part II: Market power

Firms are assumed to maximize profits but the market environment limits their abilities to exploit consumers. Indeed, if we can believe the perfectly competitive paradigm, firms will end up selling at a price equal to marginal costs. In particular, if firms are price takers and small compared to the industry, they will not exert any market power.

But what happens if firms are not small compared to the industry they are operating in? This is certainly the case for heavy weights such as Coca Cola, Microsoft, Nokia, Mittal-Arcelor, Gazprom, Anheuser-Bush InBev and the like. These large firms have seized a significant share of their respective markets. They can thus hardly be described as price takers. Yet, as they face competition from a number of other firms, they cannot either be described as pure price makers, like the monopolies we studied in the previous chapter. While these large firms undeniably exert market power, so do their smaller competitors. Market power – i.e., the ability to ‘make the price’ or to sell at prices above marginal costs – is thus collectively shared in those industries in which a few firms compete with one another. Such industries are called oligopolies (from the Greek ‘oligo’, which means ‘small number’). The vast majority of industries are oligopolies.

Type
Chapter
Information
Industrial Organization
Markets and Strategies
, pp. 41 - 44
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Market power
  • Paul Belleflamme, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, Martin Peitz, Universität Mannheim, Germany
  • Book: Industrial Organization
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511757808.005
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  • Market power
  • Paul Belleflamme, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, Martin Peitz, Universität Mannheim, Germany
  • Book: Industrial Organization
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511757808.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Market power
  • Paul Belleflamme, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, Martin Peitz, Universität Mannheim, Germany
  • Book: Industrial Organization
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511757808.005
Available formats
×