Following Shapiro and Varian (1999), I contend that the Internet does not so much change the fundamental characteristics of the general negotiation process, as the economic principles behind negotiations are still valid. Yet it does enable trading mechanisms to be implemented that were previously unknown or infeasible. This book has analyzed a broad range of negotiation protocols for electronic markets while focusing largely on auction mechanisms.

Auctions have proven to be very effcient negotiation protocols that converge to an equilibrium very quickly, which is important in situations where transactions need to occur at a rapid rate. Considering political contexts, auctions are also widely perceived as fair. In fact, they reflect the general shift of power towards the consumer, as sellers who do not offer some form of negotiation might be in danger of falling behind or being considered consumer-unfriendly. Aside from theoretical arguments, auctions have a number of practical advantages for both seller and buyer:

• An auction mechanism releases the bid taker from having to negotiate with several bidders individually, thus saving time.