Once we equip ourselves with a suitable version of the dispositional theory of value we can solve the various metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational puzzles that standardly arise in meta-ethics. So, at any rate, I have argued.

Even if I am right about this, however, it might be thought that another set of problems in meta-ethics remains, problems which the dispositional theory of value goes no way towards solving. These are problems about the nature of freedom and the conditions of moral responsibility. A solution to these problems, it might be said, requires some super-added theory about the nature of the moral agent, something about which the dispositional theory of value remains silent. My task in the present essay is to address this concern and to show that it is unfounded. The dispositional theory delivers an intuitive and compelling conception of freedom. It delivers, more or less in and of itself, a plausible conception of the responsible moral agent.

I begin by drawing out some assumptions we make about the belief-forming capacities of those we are prepared to engage in conversation about what is the case: people whose beliefs we are willing to use as a reality check on our own. Since it seems undeniable that at least some people do have these belief-forming capacities, and that we are therefore right to make them answer for their beliefs, it is irresistible to ask whether these sorts of capacities, and the responsibility for our beliefs that they engender, could serve as the basis for an account of freedom and responsibility in the arena of action.