The onset of the Cold War was, at least in part, caused by the struggle over how to incorporate Germany into the postwar order. Despite total military defeat, the devastation of its economic base, and the loss of its political sovereignty, Germany remained a potentially important European power. If its economic and military potential could be controlled by either the United States or the Soviet Union, it might well determine which side emerged victorious in the Cold War. Today, as Europe, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the United States begin to fashion a new European order, Germany will again play a pivitol role. Indeed, many of the ideas and concerns that governed the thinking of policymakers during the postwar era, as to how to end the division of Germany and still maintain the stability and security of Europe, will reemerge as contemporary leaders try to forge a post-Cold War order on the Continent.

Two interconnected concepts shaped American foreign policy toward Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and continued to play a role until recent events led to revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and “solved” the German question in a way that most policymakers would earlier not have believed possible. These two concepts, “the containment of the Soviet Union” and “security for and from Germany,” complemented each other. Together they meant that there would be no return to “fortress America” or to the political isolation that had characterized the interwar years. They also implied that neither the neutralization of Germany, nor the creation of a power vacuum in Central Europe, would be tolerated.