Less than two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which led almost automatically to the reunification of Germany, one thing is certain: The division of Europe, for forty-five years the symbol of the Cold War, has come to an end. Beyond this not much can be said. Because of the swift succession of events, the most enticing assumptions about the future very quickly lose their credibility. This has been true of recent predictions by Paul Kennedy and Francis Fukuyama. Kennedy argues that “imperial overstretch” has led to a relative decline of American power and hence to a shift in the balance of global economic power. To his way of thinking, the United States should seek to redress the balance by reducing its excessive overseas commitments, spending less on defense, and devoting more of its resources to social and educational programs and to industrial investments. In an essay published in June 1990, Fukuyama presented an even bolder assessment of the past and prescription for the future. He asserted that the demise of fascism and Marxism-Leninism had brought about “the end of history,” a growing “Common marketization” of international relations, and a diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states. Subsequent developments have not been kind to these prescriptions.

In the wake of the Gulf war and the demise of the Soviet Union, the situation appears more complicated than either Kennedy or Fukuyama anticipated.