In this chapter I want to investigate the connection between an emotion and its object. As we shall see, what this connection amounts to will depend very much on what sense of the highly ambiguous term ‘object’ is being employed. So, in detail I want to argue that:

1. (1) Emotions have a formal object;

2. (2) Emotions have a particular object;

3. (3) Particular objects can be either material or intentional;

4. (4) Particular objects can be either illusory or non-illusory;

5. (5) The formal object sets limits on the possible particular objects of emotions.

The formal object of emotions

Let us start by once again considering the case of fear. It seems that, generally speaking, one can make no sense of a fear that is not conceptually related to some danger or presumed danger for the reason that one says that a person is in a fearful state rather than some other state only if one believes that he feels he is in danger. It is no good saying ‘I'm afraid’ and then adding ‘But I don't think I'm in danger’ if one wants to be taken seriously. Yet one can say, logically, and seriously, ‘I'm afraid but I don't know of what.’ But, as I suggested earlier, even in such latter cases of so-called objectless emotions, we might still claim that there is a content to the fear. Generally speaking, then, there is a content to all fear, which could be generalised as ‘the dangerous’.