Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Three classical theories of emotion: the feeling, behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories
- 2 A fourth classical theory: the cognitive theory
- 3 The causal–evaluative theory of emotions
- 4 The cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion
- 5 The appetitive aspect of the emotions
- 6 The objects of emotions
- 7 Physiological changes and the emotions
- 8 Emotions and feelings
- 9 Emotions and behaviour
- 10 Emotion statements
- 11 Emotions and motives
- 12 Emotions and purpose
- 13 Blaming the emotions
- 14 Looking back: a summary
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - Emotions and motives
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Three classical theories of emotion: the feeling, behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories
- 2 A fourth classical theory: the cognitive theory
- 3 The causal–evaluative theory of emotions
- 4 The cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion
- 5 The appetitive aspect of the emotions
- 6 The objects of emotions
- 7 Physiological changes and the emotions
- 8 Emotions and feelings
- 9 Emotions and behaviour
- 10 Emotion statements
- 11 Emotions and motives
- 12 Emotions and purpose
- 13 Blaming the emotions
- 14 Looking back: a summary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I want to investigate what sort of explanation is being given when someone says ‘He did x out of such and such emotion’ or ‘Such and such emotion was his motive for doing x’. I will argue for the following:
(1) The term ‘motive’ should not be limited to contexts where we expect the motivation not to fall within the standard range;
(2) The motive which is said to be behind an actual action is to be construed as a cause;
(3) The motive which is said to be behind an actual action is to be construed as entailing a desire which is a cause;
(4) However, not all actions which can be said to be done out of some motive can be said to be actions which the agent wanted to do;
(5) Emotions as motives which are said to be behind actual actions are to be construed as involving desires as causes;
(6) Emotions and motives can be reasons but not intentions or aims;
(7) Motives are not always to be construed as desires which are causes but as desires which could have been, are or could become causes;
(8) In conclusion, construing motive explanations in terms of desires makes better sense of the connection between motives and behaviour than do alternative accounts.
The use of ‘motive’
Alston and Peters use the term ‘motive’ only when it is suspected that the motivation for an action ‘does not fall within the “standard” range’.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Emotion , pp. 162 - 177Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1980