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9 - Economic Rights, Human Development Effort, and Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Shareen Hertel
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
Lanse Minkler
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Economists are not “big” on human rights. This is particularly true for “positive rights,” which involve prescribing actions by governments, and even more so for economic rights broadly, that are interpreted to mean positive actions that enhance quality of life through redistribution or other collective actions. Economists, particularly those of the classical liberalism tradition, consider such “social justice” rights to be inconsistent with economic growth and, thus, should not be part of a country's constitution. To the extent that economists advocate for economic rights, it is usually to rights to engage in productive activities with minimal interference – or negative economic rights commonly referred to as economic freedom. To the extent that governments should prescribe policy, they should focus on the preconditions for markets to function efficiently; governments should not direct the actions of market participants. According to economists, economic freedom causes economic growth and wealth accumulation, which benefit all members of the society. Ample empirical evidence shows that economic freedom is a primary determinant of economic growth and development (Berggren 2003). Because there is strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction, economists tend to argue that positive economic rights should not be a priority if conditions for economic freedom exist. In fact, positive rights are considered counterproductive to the extent that they may infringe on economic freedom.

There is no doubt that economic growth is necessary for the improvement of the well-being of all members of the society.

Type
Chapter
Information
Economic Rights
Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues
, pp. 182 - 213
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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