Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Motivation-based virtue ethics
- Part II Divine Motivation theory
- 5 The virtues of God
- 6 The moral importance of the Incarnation
- 7 The paradoxes of perfect goodness
- 8 The problem of evil
- Conclusion to Part II
- Part III Ethical pluralism
- Bibliography
- Name index
- Subject index
Conclusion to Part II
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Motivation-based virtue ethics
- Part II Divine Motivation theory
- 5 The virtues of God
- 6 The moral importance of the Incarnation
- 7 The paradoxes of perfect goodness
- 8 The problem of evil
- Conclusion to Part II
- Part III Ethical pluralism
- Bibliography
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
Divine Motivation theory gives virtue ethics a foundation in a theological metaphysics of value. It has a number of advantages over the generic form of motivation-based virtue ethics outlined in Part I, and I would like to conclude this part of the book by comparing them. In motivation-based virtue ethics, emotions have intrinsic value or disvalue in a way that parallels the intrinsic value or disvalue of beliefs. Beliefs are good when they fit what they are about, and when they do, we call them “true.” Emotions are good when they fit what they are about, although we do not have a word for a good emotion other than “fitting” or “appropriate.” There is a direct connection between good emotions and true beliefs, because when an emotion is good, the standard proposition expressing it is true. The intentional object of the emotion has the thick property that the agent sees it as having in the state of emotion.
In addition to beliefs and emotions, there are other things with intrinsic value. I have briefly discussed pleasure and mentioned that epistemic states other than true belief probably have intrinsic value – for example, understanding. I have not ruled out the possibility that many other states of persons have intrinsic value, and there may be objects other than persons that are good intrinsically, although I have not discussed them in this book.
Intrinsicality pertains to the source of the value of a thing, not to its degree.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Divine Motivation Theory , pp. 339 - 344Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004