In the previous chapter I argued that the ‘no arguments’ charges directed at Derridean deconstruction are based on a misunderstanding. Derrida's work can neither be characterised as that of a sidestepping ironist free-associating in the private world of self-creation, as Rorty suggests, nor that of a frivolous sophist wandering in the indirect communications of texts, as Habermas suggests. Instead, I tried to show that Derrida's work attempts to open up a more expansive notion of reasoned argument and, more broadly, seeks to transform the forms and codes of public discourse. This, I suggested, reveals a political dimension of deconstruction: a politics of the stage that is motivated by the question of exclusion. If the account offered so far is correct, then deconstruction has, perhaps, got its foot in the door. But a number of objections still potentially block the entrance. In the first half of this chapter I shall address two key criticisms raised by critical theorists, what I call the withdrawal charge and the totalised critique charge. The former claims that deconstruction rejects the empirical realm and withdraws into a politically disabling transcendental reflection. The latter takes Derridean deconstruction to be engaged in a totalised critique of reason and wholesale sceptical subversion of systems of thought. As such, deconstruction is judged to undercut any appeal to reason and justice, leaving it unable to say anything that could contribute to politics. After showing that both criticisms are based on a misreading of Derrida, I turn to Ernesto Laclau's critical reading of deconstruction. While Laclau insists on the political usefulness of deconstruction, he nevertheless arrives at a similar conclusion to the critical theorists, arguing that, as a matter of principle, no ethico-political injunctions guide the quasi-transcendental reflections of deconstruction. In responding to Laclau's reading, I develop a detailed account of a central aspect of Derrida's work, namely, the ‘experience of undecidability’. I argue that this is key to trying to respond justly to the other as other. I leave it to the following chapter to unpack the ethico-political demands that flow from this, and the type of politics it points towards.