In the previous chapter I argued that while Mouffe raises some pressing questions for Habermas's deliberative theory, her critique fails to hit its mark in some important respects. Even if this were not the case, Mouffe overlooks debates between deliberative democrats and this leaves her call to abandon the deliberative approach premature. Mouffe's critique remains at the level of first-generation deliberative theory, ignoring the direct responses of second-generation deliberativists to the kind of concerns she and others have raised, and the more radical developments of fourth-generation deliberativists. While contemporary deliberativists differ in terms of the model of deliberation they favour, what they do share is a concern over restrictive conceptions of public reason and the overly demanding idealisations of impartiality and rational consensus. This has led efforts to develop a more expansive conception of public deliberation and a more minimal account of democratic legitimacy. Critically assessing these developments within deliberative theory will show that the deliberative approach is far more sensitive to dissensus and difference than critics contend, and offers a more complex conception of deliberation.

In this chapter I focus on attempts by deliberativists to offer a more expansive conception of deliberation. Much of the motivation behind this effort is aimed at avoiding what I shall call the unjust exclusion charge (hereafter UEC). As I touched on at the end of the previous chapter, friends and critics alike worry that Habermas's account models deliberation on a restrictive account of rational argumentation that unjustly excludes certain voices from public deliberation. In the previous chapter I pointed to aspects of Habermas's account that suggest his overall account of democratic politics may not be as rationalistic or individualistic as Mouffe claims. I will not repeat those points here. My strategy in this chapter is to show that even if the rationalistic charge holds against Habermas, it does not hold against the deliberative approach as such. While I return to the rationalistic charge, I shall do so not to rehearse Habermasian responses to that charge, but to critically assess the more expansive conception of deliberation that deliberativists have sought to develop in response to the UEC.