The findings of the previous chapter contrast sharply with the conventional wisdom that courts under attack rarely challenge the government of the day. In accordance with the theory of strategic defection, the last chapter found substantial evidence of a reverse legal-political cycle in which judges under dictatorship and democracy alike defect from the government once it begins to lose power. That I was also able to rule out several competing hypotheses lent further credibility to the theory of strategic defection. To delve more deeply into the mechanisms underlying the strategic defection account and its consequences for the rule of law, this chapter develops a qualitative picture of the Argentine Court's behavior over the last two decades.

For each of the four governments, I examine further the validity of the strategic account by focusing on the Court's handling of the most important and visible issues. Overall, the case studies presented below strongly confirm the expectation that judges under threat defect in the most controversial cases of the day. They also suggest support for several additional hypotheses regarding issue convergence and concentration. I conclude by examining whether defection worked and with a brief epilogue that applies the lessons of the previous chapters to the Court's role in the midst of Argentina's recent political and economic crisis of 2001–2.