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  • Cited by 155
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
July 2009
Print publication year:
2004
Online ISBN:
9780511510144

Book description

This study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.

Reviews

"Helmkes short but important work should be read by scholars working in judicial process, positive political theory, democratization, and comparative institutional analysis."
Choice

"Gretchen Helmke's book is an important contribution to an emerging body of literature examining the current and historical check-and-balance role of Latin American judiciaries and its political and institutional underpinnings."
Linn Hammergren, World Bank, Latin American Politics and Society

"This book remains a valuable contribution to the literature on two fronts. First, Helmke has conducted admirable research, both quantitative and qualitative, on the Argentine judicial system, providing a wealth of information. Second, the book's unusual methodological breadth makes it an intriguing exploration of various tools' ability to answer different social-science questions."
Deborah Norden, Whittier College

"Clearly, the study of Latin American judiciaries is essential to understanding contemporary events in Latin American society. In Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, Helmke makes a valid argument that judicial independence in Argentina is not necessarily a requirement for the implementation of the checks and balances system."
Michael R. Hall, Journal of Third World Studies

"Courts Under Constraints is rapidly becoming an integral an influential component of comparative judicial politics scholarship. Helmke's single-country comparative analysis is theoretically and empirically appealing, with important insights for politics, public law, and Latin American politics."
Druscilla Scribner, Latin American Politics and Society

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Contents

References
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