This book has taken a broader approach to the study of war than conventional military histories, both in studying the interaction of technology, economics and strategy, and in emphasising that war is a single process. Arms cannot be used effectively unless backed by adequate economic resources. Air, land, sea and economic warfare are mutually reinforcing. Seen in this broader perspective, British grand strategy was extraordinarily ambitious and adaptable, involving defence of world-wide interests. When British economic resources were inadequate to sustain its armed forces, the resources of the United States were harnessed for the purpose.

Arms

Edgerton has suggested that the British elite believed that relative strength in science and technology could compensate for lack of economic resources. From his perspective, the chain of causality ran from strategy to technology, with Britain being the first naval power, the first aeronautical power and one of the first nuclear powers. It is possible to argue that the march of science left British policymakers with little choice but to be technically up to date. For example, even naval officers who did not share Fisher's enthusiasm for submarines agreed that the Royal Navy could not neglect them once they had been developed abroad. The Wright brothers hawked their aircraft round the great powers as soon as it had been invented. Nuclear physics was not confined to one nation. From this perspective, expenditure on increasingly expensive research and development, and weapons systems, was inevitable.