Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- Introduction
- 1 In the shadow of Hiroshima: the United States and Asia in the aftermath of Japanese defeat
- 2 The Korean War, the atomic bomb and Asian–American estrangement
- 3 Securing the East Asian frontier: stalemate in Korea and the Japanese peace treaty
- 4 A greater sanction: the defence of South East Asia, the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the end of the Korean War
- 5 ‘Atomic Madness’: massive retaliation and the Bravo test
- 6 The aftermath of Bravo, the Indochina crisis and the emergence of SEATO
- 7 ‘Asia for the Asians’: the first offshore islands crisis and the Bandung Conference
- 8 A nuclear strategy for SEATO and the problem of limited war in the Far East
- 9 Massive retaliation at bay: US–Japanese relations, nuclear deployment and the limited war debate
- 10 The second offshore islands crisis and the advent of flexible response
- 11 The Chinese bomb, American nuclear strategy in Asia and the escalation of the Vietnam War
- Conclusion: from massive retaliation to flexible response in Asia
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - The Korean War, the atomic bomb and Asian–American estrangement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- Introduction
- 1 In the shadow of Hiroshima: the United States and Asia in the aftermath of Japanese defeat
- 2 The Korean War, the atomic bomb and Asian–American estrangement
- 3 Securing the East Asian frontier: stalemate in Korea and the Japanese peace treaty
- 4 A greater sanction: the defence of South East Asia, the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the end of the Korean War
- 5 ‘Atomic Madness’: massive retaliation and the Bravo test
- 6 The aftermath of Bravo, the Indochina crisis and the emergence of SEATO
- 7 ‘Asia for the Asians’: the first offshore islands crisis and the Bandung Conference
- 8 A nuclear strategy for SEATO and the problem of limited war in the Far East
- 9 Massive retaliation at bay: US–Japanese relations, nuclear deployment and the limited war debate
- 10 The second offshore islands crisis and the advent of flexible response
- 11 The Chinese bomb, American nuclear strategy in Asia and the escalation of the Vietnam War
- Conclusion: from massive retaliation to flexible response in Asia
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Over the course of several days at the end of June 1950, the Truman administration took a series of momentous decisions that by committing American ground, air and naval forces to the fighting that had broken out on the Korean peninsula reversed the basic principle maintained by the JCS during and since the Second World War that American troops would not be committed to large-scale operations on the Asian mainland. The rollercoaster nature of the ensuing war, from the rapid retreat to the Pusan perimeter, to the heady days of the Inchon landings and advance to the Yalu river, followed by the deep depression when Chinese intervention seemed to spell disaster for the US and South Korean forces and the UN Command as a whole, was matched by the mood of popular opinion at home as American foreign policy in Asia became even more of an emotional and divisive issue in domestic politics. By the time the front in Korea had stabilized in the late spring of 1951, many Americans were left with the frustrating spectacle of debilitating involvement in a limited war with an implacable foe where few direct interests seemed to be engaged. Moreover, for senior figures in the Truman administration, even with the programme of wholesale rearmament launched in the summer of 1950, there was a pervasive sense that the Korean War was a draining distraction from the primary goal of bolstering the defence of Western Europe against any potential attack from a now nuclear-armed Soviet Union.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- After HiroshimaThe United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965, pp. 57 - 99Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010