Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- Introduction
- 1 In the shadow of Hiroshima: the United States and Asia in the aftermath of Japanese defeat
- 2 The Korean War, the atomic bomb and Asian–American estrangement
- 3 Securing the East Asian frontier: stalemate in Korea and the Japanese peace treaty
- 4 A greater sanction: the defence of South East Asia, the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the end of the Korean War
- 5 ‘Atomic Madness’: massive retaliation and the Bravo test
- 6 The aftermath of Bravo, the Indochina crisis and the emergence of SEATO
- 7 ‘Asia for the Asians’: the first offshore islands crisis and the Bandung Conference
- 8 A nuclear strategy for SEATO and the problem of limited war in the Far East
- 9 Massive retaliation at bay: US–Japanese relations, nuclear deployment and the limited war debate
- 10 The second offshore islands crisis and the advent of flexible response
- 11 The Chinese bomb, American nuclear strategy in Asia and the escalation of the Vietnam War
- Conclusion: from massive retaliation to flexible response in Asia
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - A greater sanction: the defence of South East Asia, the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the end of the Korean War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of acronyms
- Introduction
- 1 In the shadow of Hiroshima: the United States and Asia in the aftermath of Japanese defeat
- 2 The Korean War, the atomic bomb and Asian–American estrangement
- 3 Securing the East Asian frontier: stalemate in Korea and the Japanese peace treaty
- 4 A greater sanction: the defence of South East Asia, the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the end of the Korean War
- 5 ‘Atomic Madness’: massive retaliation and the Bravo test
- 6 The aftermath of Bravo, the Indochina crisis and the emergence of SEATO
- 7 ‘Asia for the Asians’: the first offshore islands crisis and the Bandung Conference
- 8 A nuclear strategy for SEATO and the problem of limited war in the Far East
- 9 Massive retaliation at bay: US–Japanese relations, nuclear deployment and the limited war debate
- 10 The second offshore islands crisis and the advent of flexible response
- 11 The Chinese bomb, American nuclear strategy in Asia and the escalation of the Vietnam War
- Conclusion: from massive retaliation to flexible response in Asia
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
By early 1952 it had become a central tenet of the Truman administration's Far Eastern policies that China was an aggressive and expansionist power, whose ambitions for regional dominance, encouraged by a Soviet Union content to see American manpower and resources consumed by the inconclusive fighting in Korea, posed a dangerous threat to key American interests. These interests had become enlarged to embrace the rehabilitation and strengthening of Japan, a formal ally once the security treaty came into operation in April 1952, and which through its military-industrial potential was perceived as the principal prize in East Asia. In January 1952, Acheson had avowed to British officials that ‘the heart of the matter in the Far East was to build up sufficient strength so as to hold Japan on the side of the West’, and pointed out the ‘great shift in the world power situation if Japan with its military virtues and industrial capacity went over to the Communist side. While the chances of keeping Japan on the side of the West were not overwhelming, everything had to be done toward this end.’ This primary goal entailed also assuring the security and stability of South East Asia, whose valuable markets and raw materials were important in their own terms to keep out of Communist hands, but also because access to them was seen as crucial to Japanese economic growth and prosperity.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- After HiroshimaThe United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965, pp. 131 - 161Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010