It seems clear that by the winter of 1811/12, there was little doubt on all sides that the long-threatened war between France and Russia would take place in the coming summer. Both France and Russia were beginning to accumulate forces near the frontier under various pretexts. The Russians sought to release their army of the Danube by a treaty with Turkey, which took place in May 1812, and were rather more assiduous and successful than France in their courtship of Sweden to protect their western flank and St Petersburg. A Swedish–Russian offensive/defensive alliance was formed in April that year.

Through the winter the blockade of Norway was being enforced, leading to severe shortages of food and trading income. Three Swedish masters, whose ships had been chased by English cruisers, said that they were told that Saumarez’ orders were that ‘all ships of whatever nation shall be captured when approaching the Norwegian coast closer than 5 miles’ and von Rosen suggested that this might be to put pressure on the Norwegians to look favourably on union with Sweden as a way out of their distress. Denmark itself was suffering almost as much. Fenwick reported in May 1812 that:

Nonetheless, Frederick VI had sufficient control of the country to maintain its loyalty to Napoleon right through to January 1814, despite pressure from the allied powers to join them.

In reality, the Franco-Russian alliance had begun to turn sour very soon after it had been signed in 1807. At Erfurt in 1808, Alexander had slightly strengthened his position, encouraged by Talleyrand who, by then, was actively and treasonably working against Napoleon's policies simultaneously with being his special adviser in lieu of Champagny. In January 1811, the Czar had hoped to bring men from the dismembered remnants of Poland into the balance on his side, by proposing a Grand Duchy of Poland on the lines of the new Grand Duchy of Finland he had created.