In the Introduction, I set out five main questions to be considered in this study:

• 1 How far did Saumarez create the policy of restraint, as opposed to offensive use of his fleet, or was he simply implementing orders from London?

• 2 Was the decision not to attack the Russian fleet at Rogervik a sign of weakness and indecision, or of mature judgement and political understanding?

• 3 Why were his initial suspicions of Swedish constancy replaced by confidence that their actions would remain friendly even under a French marshal and in a state of war?

• 4 Were there other vice-admirals at the time who might have been equally successful and what difference might another Commander-in-Chief have made?

• 5 Did the situation produce the man or vice versa and did he have political weight that made it easier for him to take an independent line?

The answers that I have put forward should be evident from the chapters that have gone before. But it may be helpful to look at the questions in turn and set out the conclusions that I suggest may be drawn.

1 How far was the policy of restraint that of Saumarez rather than London?

There is little doubt that the Duke of Portland's government in the spring of 1808 had little idea of how it should deal with the problems it had created in the Baltic by the pre-emptive strike on Copenhagen the previous autumn. The influence of the peace-loving Fox within the Ministry of All the Talents had been replaced in 1807 by the Pittite views of Canning ‘who moved quickly to signal that the change of ministers was matched by a change of policy’. Subsidies to allies were again to be used as a weapon and the war continued. But the long delay in the departure of Saumarez and his fleet as he waited for instructions, and the lack of a clear purpose behind the sending of the country's only reserve of 10,000 experienced troops to Gothenburg under Sir John Moore are indications of a reaction to circumstances rather than a coherent policy. The Moore expedition ended in a fiasco, having wasted two months of Saumarez’ campaigning time for what he had been told were his main tasks.