INTRODUCTION

As defined in Chapter 2, a principal aspect in which presidential regimes are distinct from parliamentary, premier-presidential, and various hybrid regime types is in the separate origin and survival of executive and assembly. Recall that a requirement for presidentialism is that the chief executive be elected by popular vote. However, in a number of regimes that have generally been considered presidential or hybrid systems, the chief executive has been constituted according to various means, which sometimes modify and sometimes preclude the criterion of popular election. In this chapter, we shall examine in detail various means of constituting chief executive power in presidential and hybrid systems, reviewing a number of case studies to illustrate the possible variations. We undertake this exercise for two main reasons. First, we demonstrate that there are any number of ways to constitute executive power in regimes that are neither presidential nor premier-presidential, nor parliamentary. Second, and more important, the cases highlight the impact that various rules guiding the origin of the executive have on the incentives that drive political behavior. As we shall see, the nature of the party system and of coalition building, as well as the means of replacing the chief executive, all depend largely on the constitutional means by which the executive originates.