# Notes and Comments

## Campaigning and Advertising: An Evaluation of the Components of Constituency Activism at Recent British General Elections

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It is becoming increasingly accepted among analysts of British voting behaviour that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, local campaigning matters. The widespread view, largely propagated by David Butler and his co-workers on the Nuffield election studies, has been that campaigning in the constituencies by party activists and their candidates has no influence on the outcome: the distribution of votes across the parties in each constituency is a function of the national campaign only.[1] This view was initially challenged by studies of canvassing in the 1970s, and extended during the 1980s by studies of campaign spending in the constituencies; further support was provided by work in the late 1980s and early 1990s on party canvassing activity. This note takes the challenge forward with an analysis of the impact of different aspects of constituency campaigning.

The initial challenges to the conventional wisdom were based on experiments with the impact of canvassing on election results,[2] and followed by analyses of the reported expenditure by parties on the campaigns in each constituency.[3] The amount that can be

[1] See, for example, D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1983* (London: Macmillan, 1984). This view has been slightly adjusted recently – see D. Kavanagh, *Modern Election Campaigning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) – but nevertheless remains the 'conventional wisdom'.

[2] See J. M. Bochel and D. Denver, 'Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (1972), 239–44.

[3] The first study was by A. H. Taylor, 'The Effect of Party Organization: Correlation Between Campaign Expenditure and Voting in the 1970 Election', *Political Studies*, 20 (1972), 329–31. Denver and Hands analysed the impact of campaign expenditure on turnout – D. Denver and G. Hands, 'Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1974), 17–35, and 'Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s', *British Journal of Political Science*, 15 (1985), 281–8 – but the first detailed analyses of spending and its impact on party fortunes were reported by R. J. Johnston: 'The Electoral Geography of an Election Campaign: Scotland in October 1974', *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 93 (1977), 98–108; 'Campaign Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Elections in England', *Political Studies*, 27 (1979), 114–19; and 'Campaign Spending and Votes: A Reconsideration', *Public Choice*, 33 (1979), 97–106. For a full review of that literature, see R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Where's the Difference? Decomposing the Impact of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britain', *Electoral Studies*, 16 (1997), 165–74.

spent is limited by law,[4] and although many party organizations probably manage their expenditure so that more is spent than reported, nevertheless the pattern of reported spending is consistent with expectations derived from rational choice theory. According to this, parties should spend more (a) defending the seats that they already hold, especially those which they hold by relatively small majorities, and (b) challenging in seats where they have a chance of winning. Those hypotheses are sustained by analyses of spending patterns over more than fifty years.[5]

Given that parties raise and spend more money where it is most likely to have an impact,[6] the subsequent expectation is that the more that a party spends on mobilizing voters in a constituency, the more votes it should win there. This hypothesis has also been upheld in all analyses: in particular, the more that challengers spend, the better their performance, *ceteris paribus*.[7]

Most reported constituency campaign spending (more than 80 per cent) is on advertising of various forms, specifically on printing leaflets and posters designed to bring the party and its candidate to the voters' attention. (We use the term 'advertising' to refer to all expenditure.) This may stimulate a direct link between spending on advertising and voting: the greater a candidate's exposure to the electorate the greater the number of votes garnered.[8] Alternatively, advertising *per se* may not be particularly efficacious, but the amount spent on it in a constituency provides a good indicator of the amount of canvassing and related activity undertaken by a party there. The more that it raises locally (most constituency parties in Britain get little, if any, financial assistance from their central organization), then the better organized the local party is likely to be, and the greater the number of activists it can mobilize to undertake canvasses of voters and other activities designed to enhance turnout in support of their candidate.

The later work on local campaigns supports the latter argument. In their study of local Labour parties at the 1987 general election, for example, Seyd and Whiteley developed an index of local activism in 479 constituencies based on three measures of party member activity – displaying posters, delivering leaflets and canvassing voters.[9] These data were used to explore the relationships between activism and spending: analyses showed that constituencies with high levels of activism, and where, in addition, relatively large percentages of voters reported having been canvassed by Labour, tended also to be those where relatively high levels of spending were reported.[10]

A study of local campaigns at the 1992 general election produced similar findings. Based on a survey of agents – the candidates' campaign managers – in all three main

[4]  R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Great Britain: Twentieth Century Parties Operating under Nineteenth Century Regulations', in A. B. Gunlicks, ed., *Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western Europe*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 123–54.

[5]  R. J. Johnston, *Money and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Election Results* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

[6]  See C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'Paying Their Way: Local Associations, the Constituency Quota Scheme, and Conservative Party Finance', *Political Studies*, 44 (1996), 921–35.

[7]  See Johnston and Pattie, 'Great Britain',

[8]  R. J. Johnston, 'Political Advertising and the Geography of Voting in England at the 1983 General Election', *International Journal of Advertising*, 4 (1985), 1–10.

[9]  P. Seyd and P. Whiteley, *Labour's Grass Roots: The Politics of Party Membership* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), esp. p. 182.

[10]  C. J. Pattie, P. Whiteley, R. J. Johnston and P. Seyd, 'Measuring Local Political Effects: Labour Party Campaigning at the 1987 General Election', *Political Studies*, 42 (1994), 469–79.

parties, Denver and Hands devised an index of campaign activity covering seven topics: pre-campaign organization; number of workers involved in campaigning; proportion of the constituency canvassed; volume of literature distributed; use of computers; and 'knocking-up' and other activities on polling day designed to ensure that all identified supporters attended the polling booth. Their index (derived from a principal components analysis of those data) was correlated with both party membership figures and the amounts spent by the parties on those campaigns, finding that the stronger the local campaign the greater the amount spent.[11] As a consequence of this finding, Denver and Hands used campaign spending among other indicators to 'fill the holes' in their dataset where no data had been obtained from agents, as a readily-available surrogate measure of campaign activity;[12] Whiteley and Seyd used it in a similar way in their later studies of Conservative party local campaigns.[13]

The implication drawn from these studies is that data on campaign spending, on which full information is collected and published after each election,[14] form a valid, readily-available and universal surrogate measure of constituency campaign activity at British general elections. What remains untested, however, is whether spending itself has any independent impact on the result or whether it is no more than a good surrogate measure of canvassing activity. Do parties which spend more than expected on advertising (given their other campaigning activity) reap an additional benefit from that: does advertising pay?

THE APPROACH

To answer this question we use the reported spending data and the campaign activism variables produced by Seyd and Whiteley and Denver and Hands respectively. As a first step, we regressed the amount spent by a party in a constituency (expressed as a percentage of the maximum allowed there)[15] against the relevant activism variable. From this we computed the residual level of spending (the amount actually spent less the amount predicted): a positive residual indicates more spending than expected given the amount of campaign activity reported by the party for that constituency, whereas a negative residual indicates less spending than expected.[16]

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[11] D. T. Denver and G. Hands 'Measuring the Intensity and Effectiveness of Constituency Campaigning in the 1992 General Election', in D. Denver, P. Norris, D. Broughton and C. Rallings, eds, *British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1993* (Hemel Hempstead, Herts: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 229–42.

[12] For example, D. Denver and G. Hands, 'Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency Campaigning in Britain', *Electoral Studies*, 16 (1997), 175–94. For fuller details of their method, see D. T. Denver and G. Hands, *Modern Constituency Electioneering: Local Campaigning in the 1992 General Election* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

[13] P. Whiteley and P. Seyd, 'The Influence of Local Campaigning on the Conservative Vote in the 1992 General Election', *British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1994* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 92–109; P. Seyd, P. Whiteley and J. J. Richardson, *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).

[14] The legal requirement is set out in the Representation of the People Act, 1989, Chapter 28, Section 6.

[15] The amount which can be spent varies according to (a) whether the constituency is categorized as 'borough' (i.e. urban) or 'county' (i.e. relatively rural) and (b) the number of electors on the electoral roll (see Johnston and Pattie, 'Great Britain'). Parties can spend more per elector in county than in borough constituencies.

[16] This approach follows a similar one, though addressing a different topic, in C. J. Pattie, E. A. Fieldhouse and R. J. Johnston, 'Winning the Local Vote: The Effectiveness of Constituency Campaign Spending in Great Britain, 1983–1992', *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 969–86; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Value of Making an Extra Effort: Campaign Spending and Electoral Outcomes in Recent British General Elections – a Decomposition Approach', *Environment and Planning A*, 28 (1996), 1943–8.

At the second step we regressed the election outcome in those constituencies (using a dependent variable described below) against both the activism variable and the spending residual. If the former is significantly related to the outcome, this indicates that the general process of campaigning has an impact on the outcome in a constituency (with spending, to the extent that it is correlated with activism measures, providing a useful surrogate for that activity). If the spending residual is also significantly related to the outcome, then spending has an independent impact – in addition to the impact of the general volume of campaign activity, advertising pays.

Our dependent variables in these analyses are the ratios between the percentages of the votes cast at the election won by two of the parties. As we have argued elsewhere,[17] the main goal of constituency campaigns at British general elections is not converting voters to a particular party's cause (though any conversions are, of course, welcome!), but rather on identifying a party's likely supporters and then ensuring, as far as is practicable, that they cast a vote.[18] The goal is to maximize turnout of one's own supporters, and so alter the ratio between the party's vote and that of a competitor. By using the same ratio at the previous general election as an independent variable in the model, the analyses focus on the amount of change generated by campaign activity (the activism variable) and spending (the residual value), holding constant the average system-wide swing between the two parties.

We have analysed the constituencies held by the different parties separately, in line with our arguments developed elsewhere.[19] Incumbent parties tend to spend close to the maximum in all constituencies, with little variation; challenger parties vary much more in the amounts spent, which should be more clearly reflected in the electoral outcome.[20]

### LABOUR SPENDING IN 1987

Tables 1 and 2 give results from the analyses of Labour spending at the 1987 general election, in those constituencies for which Seyd and Whiteley had data on campaign activity by the Labour party. (Because they studied the Labour party only, we could not disaggregate the spending components for other parties and so concentrate here only on Labour campaign activity and spending.) Five of the six coefficients are statistically significant in Conservative-held seats (Table 1) indicating that both campaign activity in general and additional spending on advertising in particular influenced the outcome. Thus the more active the Labour challenge in a constituency (the variable LCA), the smaller the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes in 1987, holding constant the ratio in 1983; furthermore, if the challenger spent more than predicted (LSR), this further reduced the ratio. Where Labour campaigned strongly against a Conservative incumbent, and spent above average for such a constituency on advertising, it reaped an electoral benefit.

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[17] R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections', *Party Politics*, 1 (1995), 261–74; Johnston and Pattie, 'Where's the Difference?'

[18] Increasingly, this 'grass-roots activity' complements other means of campaigning and canvassing, such as direct mailings from party headquarters.

[19] Johnston and Pattie, 'Where's the Difference?'

[20] Johnston and Pattie, 'The Value of Making an Extra Effort'.

TABLE 1     *The Impact of Canvassing and Advertising on the Results in Conservative-Held Seats, 1987*

|  | Coefficient | S.E. | *t* |
|---|---|---|---|
| **C : L87 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | 1.07 | 0.13 | 7.94 |
| C:L83 | 0.66 | 0.02 | 29.79 |
| LCA | − 0.003 | 0.000 | − 3.72 |
| LSR | − 0.013 | 0.002 | − 5.89 |
| $R^2$ | 0.89 |  |  |
| **C : A87 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | − 0.38 | 0.13 | − 2.91 |
| C:A83 | 1.29 | 0.06 | 24.49 |
| LCA | 0.002 | 0.000 | 3.82 |
| LSR | 0.010 | 0.001 | 8.91 |
| $R^2$ | 0.61 |  |  |
| **L : A87 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | − 0.09 | 0.04 | − 1.66 |
| L:A83 | 1.41 | 0.05 | 26.93 |
| LCA | 0.003 | 0.002 | 1.66 |
| LSR | 0.003 | 0.001 | 2.97 |
| $R^2$ | 0.86 |  |  |
| *N* | 302 |  |  |

*Key to variables*: C : L83 and C:L87, ratio of Conservative to Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1983 and 1987 respectively. C : A83 and C : A87 and L : A83 and L : A87 are the same ratios for Conservative : Alliance and Labour : Alliance percentages. LCA, Labour campaign activity; LSR, residual Labour spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a percentage of the legal maximum.)

Labour advertising, though not its general canvassing activity, also influenced the ratio of Labour to Alliance votes (the L : A ratio): the more Labour spent on advertising (LSR), the better its performance over the Alliance, relative to the outcome in 1983. Finally, the greater the amount of Labour activism and the more it spent on advertising, the better the Conservative performance relative to that of the Alliance (i.e. the C : A ratio). The implication is that the more that Labour campaigned in a Tory-held seat, the greater the shift from the Alliance to the Conservatives, presumably because potential 'third-party voters' preferred to return a Conservative MP than split the anti-Labour vote with the possibility of the Tories losing the seat to Labour.[21]

The results for Labour-held seats are less impressive, which is entirely consistent with our other work on the impact of spending: challengers benefit much more than incumbents (Table 2). Nevertheless, the more active the Labour defence of its seats the smaller the Conservative : Labour ratio in 1987 relative to 1983.

[21] Campaign spending has been related to tactical voting in other analyses: see E. A. Fieldhouse, C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'Tactical Voting and Party Constituency Campaigning at the 1992 General Election in England', *British Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1996), 403–18.

TABLE 2     *The Impact of Canvassing and Advertising on the Results in Labour-Held Seats, 1987*

| | Coefficient | S.E. | *t* |
|---|---|---|---|
| **C : L87 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | − 0.02 | 0.03 | − 0.05 |
| C : L83 | 0.92 | 0.05 | 20.74 |
| LCA | − 0.004 | 0.000 | − 2.08 |
| LSR | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.69 |
| $R^2$ | 0.75 | | |
| **L : A87 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | 0.72 | 0.33 | 2.19 |
| L : A83 | 1.20 | 0.11 | 11.20 |
| LCA | − 0.000 | 0.002 | − 0.32 |
| LSR | − 0.015 | 0.005 | − 2.79 |
| $R^2$ | 0.47 | | |
| **C : A87 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | 0.45 | 0.14 | 3.27 |
| C : A83 | 0.92 | 0.07 | 12.34 |
| LCA | − 0.005 | 0.007 | − 0.65 |
| LSR | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.71 |
| $R^2$ | 0.49 | | |
| *N* | 158 | | |

*Key to variables*: C : L83 and C : L87, ratio of Conservative to Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1983 and 1987 respectively. C : A83 and C : A87 and L : A83 and L : A87 are the same ratios for Conservative : Alliance and Labour : Alliance percentages. LCA, Labour campaign activity; LSR, residual Labour spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a percentage of the legal maximum.)

SPENDING IN 1992

Whereas the Seyd–Whiteley data only allowed us to estimate Labour spending in 1987, the Denver–Hands data refer to all parties. The number of constituencies for which they had data on campaign activity for all three parties was relatively small, however, and no analyses were possible for Liberal Democrat-held (i.e. Alliance in 1987) constituencies; the relatively small *N*s may account for the poorer performance of these models compared to those reported above, especially in Labour-held seats.[22]

There is no evidence that the strength of the Labour campaign had any influence on the outcome of its contests with the incumbent party in Conservative-held seats (Table 3). Interestingly, however, in those constituencies where the Conservatives spent more than predicted, presumably on a strong advertising campaign, this produced an increase in the Conservative : Labour ratio, relative to the general change since 1987; extra advertising brought rewards for the incumbents.[23] Liberal Democrat activism also

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[22] Denver and Hands used campaign spending as a surrogate measure of campaign activity for parties in constituencies for which they obtained no data from the candidates' agents. These constituencies have been excluded from the present analyses, as to include them would involve a degree of circular reasoning – spending would be predicted by a measure derived from spending!

[23] This is consistent with the findings in Johnston and Pattie, 'The Value of Making an Extra Effort'.

TABLE 3    *The Impact of Canvassing and Advertising on the Results in Conservative-Held Seats, 1992*

|  | Coefficient | S.E. | $t$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| **C : L92 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.59 |
| C : L87 | 0.77 | 0.05 | 15.13 |
| CCA | 0.119 | 0.103 | 1.15 |
| CSR | 0.016 | 0.008 | 1.98 |
| LCA | $-0.80$ | 0.106 | $-0.76$ |
| LSR | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.82 |
| LDCA | 0.215 | 0.092 | 2.33 |
| LDSR | $-0.004$ | 0.004 | $-0.29$ |
| $R^2$ | 0.92 | | |
| **C : LD92 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | 0.49 | 0.32 | 1.52 |
| C : LD87 | 1.11 | 0.15 | 7.63 |
| CCA | $-0.165$ | 0.104 | $-1.58$ |
| CSR | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.33 |
| LCA | 0.249 | 0.079 | 3.16 |
| LSR | 0.007 | 0.004 | 1.75 |
| LDCA | $-0.413$ | 0.118 | $-3.49$ |
| LDSR | $-0.011$ | 0.004 | $-2.46$ |
| $R^2$ | 0.80 | | |
| **L : LD92 ratio** | | | |
| Constant | 0.21 | 0.19 | 1.10 |
| L : LD87 | 1.55 | 0.15 | 9.93 |
| CCA | $-0.059$ | 0.093 | $-0.63$ |
| CSR | 0.000 | 0.008 | $-0.03$ |
| LCA | 0.258 | 0.102 | 2.53 |
| LSR | 0.004 | 0.004 | 1.02 |
| LDCA | $-0.263$ | 0.096 | $-2.73$ |
| LDSR | $-0.009$ | 0.004 | $-2.06$ |
| $R^2$ | 0.92 | | |
| $N$ | 74 | | |

*Key to variables*: C : L87 and C : L92, ratio of Conservative to Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1987 and 1992 respectively. C : LD87 and C : LD92 and L : LD87 and L : LD92 are the same ratios for Conservative : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) and Labour : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) percentages. LCA, Labour campaigning activity; LSR, residual Labour spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a percentage of the legal maximum.) CCA, CSR, LDCA and LDSR are the same values for Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

led to an improvement in the C : L ratio: campaigning by the third party apparently stimulated reduced voter willingness to support Labour.[24]

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[24]  We have repeated the analysis for Conservative and Labour canvassing and spending variables only, using the 115 Conservative-held constituencies for which Denver and Hands had data for both Conservative and Labour canvassing activity. This shows that both LSR and CSR were significantly related to C : L87, in the expected direction. Additional expenditure by the Conservatives on advertising was able to counter the impact of Labour canvassing.

TABLE 4    *The Impact of Canvassing and Advertising on the Results in Labour-Seats, 1992*

|  | Coefficient | S.E. | t |
|---|---|---|---|
| **C : L92 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.20 | 0.05 | 3.64 |
| C : L87 | 0.69 | 0.07 | 9.48 |
| CCA | 0.053 | 0.025 | 2.14 |
| CRS | 0.002 | 0.000 | 2.64 |
| LCA | − 0.055 | 0.016 | − 3.36 |
| LSR | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.41 |
| LDCA | 0.032 | 0.025 | 1.27 |
| LDSR | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.42 |
| $R^2$ | 0.94 |  |  |
| **L : LD92 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | − 1.76 | 0.98 | − 1.79 |
| L : LD87 | 1.33 | 0.26 | 5.15 |
| CCA | − 0.480 | 0.390 | − 1.23 |
| CSR | − 0.050 | 0.019 | − 2.61 |
| LCA | 0.501 | 0.366 | 1.37 |
| LSR | 0.046 | 0.032 | 1.45 |
| LDCA | − 1.969 | 0.572 | − 3.44 |
| LDSR | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.65 |
| $R^2$ | 0.73 |  |  |
| **C : LD92 ratio** |  |  |  |
| Constant | − 0.14 | 0.47 | − 0.30 |
| C : LD87 | 0.95 | 0.21 | 4.61 |
| CCA | 0.060 | 0.223 | 0.27 |
| CSR | − 0.014 | 0.009 | − 1.47 |
| LCA | 0.211 | 0.167 | 1.26 |
| LSR | 0.023 | 0.015 | 1.58 |
| LDCA | − 0.771 | 0.265 | − 2.91 |
| LDSR | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.20 |
| $R^2$ | 0.66 |  |  |
| N | 29 |  |  |

Key to variables: C : L87 and C : L92, ratio of Conservative to Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1987 and 1992 respectively. C : LD87 and C : LD92 and L : LD87 and L : LD92 are the same ratios for Conservative : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) and Labour : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) percentages. LCA, Labour campaigning activity; LSR, residual Labour spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a percentage of the legal maximum.) CCA, CSR, LDCA and LDSR are the same values for Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

With regard to the Conservative : Liberal Democrat (C : LD) ratio in Conservative-held seats, the challenger's campaign was clearly efficacious; both the amount of Liberal Democrat activism and the amount which the party spent over-and-above the predicted level are significantly, and negatively, related to the ratio. The more that the Liberal Democrats campaigned and the more they spent on advertising, relative to the size of

that campaign, the better their performance proportionate to the Conservatives and compared to their performance at the previous general election. Furthermore, Conservative activity and expenditure in response apparently could not counter this impact; the challengers were able to promote their cause but the incumbents could not respond. Liberal Democrat canvassing and expenditure also benefited the party in its contests with Labour candidates in Conservative-held seats (the L : LD ratio). In addition, however, Labour campaign activity was able to offset this, to the same extent (the two regression coefficients have the same value of 0.026).

Turning to Labour-held seats, the first equation reported in Table 4 shows that the greater the Conservative challenger's campaigning activity and relative advertising expenditure, the better its performance in contests with Labour incumbents, although in this case it was significantly countered by incumbent activism (given the relative size of the coefficients, $-0.053$ and $-0.055$ respectively, additional Labour spending more than compensated for a similar volume of additional Conservative spending).[25] Similarly in the other two equations, the more active the Liberal Democrats were in the local campaign the more votes they were able to gain relative to each of the other parties, with neither apparently able to respond.

In general, these findings provide less support for the overall hypotheses being tested regarding campaign activity in general and expenditure on advertising in particular than do those in the previous section. This may reflect on differences in the dates of the elections studied, in the relative efficacy of the two indices of activism,[26] and the number of constituencies in the analyses. Further research is clearly needed to extend the growing body of evidence that local campaign activity, of a variety of types, has a crucial impact on election outcomes.

SUMMARY

Constituency campaigning matters. An increasing volume of studies shows that the more activists a party has on the streets and doorsteps at a general election in the United Kingdom, the better its electoral performance, *ceteris paribus*, and also that the more a party spends on advertising, the better its performance. In this brief note we have extended that conclusion by separating out two components of the search for votes in constituencies: general campaigning and advertising. We have shown that, in general and in line with other research, incumbent-party campaigning is less effective than that by challenger parties. We have also shown that in some cases, money spent on advertising in addition to that predicted from a party's general level of activism in a constituency has been effective. Advertising a party's candidate pays.

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[25] A similar analysis of C : L92 to that reported in the previous footnote for the forty-five Labour-held constituencies for which Denver and Hands had activism data for both Conservative and Labour parties also produced significant coefficients for LSR and CSR, in the expected directions.

[26] Denver and Hands's index is based on a larger number of measures, for example, which together may account for more of the variation in expenditure levels than does Seyd and Whiteley's index.