To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Due to the common instability caused by political and security issues, Lebanese hospitals have experienced acts of terrorism multiple times. The most recent Beirut Explosion even forced several hospitals to cease operations for the first time in decades—but studies show the preparedness levels for such attacks in similar countries are low.
The aim of this study is to explore the experience of Lebanese hospitals with terrorist attacks.
This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders to assess their experience with terrorist bombings. Data was analyzed using the thematic analysis method.
The researchers found that Lebanese hospitals vary greatly in their structures and procedures. Those differences are a function of 3 contextual factors: location, culture, and accreditation status. Hospitals found near ‘dangerous zones’ were more likely to be aware and to have better response to such events. A severe lack of communication, unity of command, and collaboration between stakeholders has made the process fragmented.
The researchers recommend a larger role for the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in this process, and the creation of a platform where Lebanese organizations can share their experiences to improve preparedness and resilience of the Lebanese healthcare system in the face of terrorism.
The book opens with a puzzle: What would compel members of one group to stand in solidarity with an outgroup in their fight for justice and equality, even when that act carries great personal risk and material sacrifice? We think a central piece of this puzzle is what we call group empathy: the ability and motivation to take another group’s perspective, feel emotionally connected to their struggles, and care about their welfare even when the individual’s interests, or those of his or her group, are at risk. We continue the discussion of this puzzle in two contemporary threat contexts: terrorism and immigration. Specifically, we ask why African Americans – who perceive a greater risk of terrorism on average – are less willing to support punitive homeland security policies that profile Arabs. Or, why are Latinos more supportive of foreign aid and more welcoming of refugees even if this means greater competition for jobs and social welfare? Once again, we think the answer lies in group empathy. We review the empirical studies used to test our theoretical expectations, followed by an outline of the book that provides a brief summary of each chapter.
What causes some people to stand in solidarity with those from other races, religions, or nationalities, even when that solidarity does not seem to benefit the individual or their group? Seeing Us in Them examines outgroup empathy as a powerful predisposition in politics that pushes individuals to see past social divisions and work together in complex, multicultural societies. It also reveals racial/ethnic intergroup differences in this predisposition, rooted in early patterns of socialization and collective memory. Outgroup empathy explains why African Americans vehemently oppose the border wall and profiling of Arabs, why Latinos are welcoming of Syrian refugees and support humanitarian assistance, why some white Americans march in support of Black Lives Matter through a pandemic, and even why many British citizens oppose Brexit. Outgroup empathy is not naïve; rather it is a rational and necessary force that helps build trust and maintain stable democratic norms of compromise and reciprocity.
Current threats might include in particular the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism as well as international crime, policing the oceans, the antics of cybergeeks, securing energy sources, climate change, economic challenges, and the protection of allies. Singly or in groups, these problems and issues scarcely justify the maintenance of a large military force in being, and complacency is, in general, a more fitting response than agitated, and particularly militarized, alarm. Proliferation has been of little practical consequence, and alarmed efforts to prevent it have proved to be very costly and may hamper the forging of a permanent normalization in Korea. Counterterrorism policy has been driven primarily by public opinion, not by an apt analysis of the threat. Cybergeeks may be able to commit sabotage, steal intelligence, or spread propaganda, but any military disruptions are likely to be minor and call more for a small army of counter-cybergeeks than for a large military. One possible use of American military forces in the future would be to deploy them under international authority to police destructive civil wars or to depose vicious regimes. However, this would not require a large number of troops and is unlikely to become routine.
In the wake of the Cold War, the formerly Communist countries in East Europe, with Western support and urging, took up capitalism and democracy with considerable alacrity. With the demise of the Soviet Union, there was a quest to identify new threats in the succeeding decade. Most of these, however, were already out there during the Cold War: proliferation, terrorism, drugs, oil dependence, and economic and environment “challenges.” A new opportunity brought forward by the ending of the Cold War was that former enemies could work together to police the world. Disciplined policing forces were effective in pacifying thug-dominated conflicts and in removing thuggish regimes in Panama, Somalia (at least at first), Rwanda, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. And the Gulf War of 1991 chiefly showed how easy it is to run over an enemy that had little strategy, tactics, defenses, morale, or leadership. However, the deaths of tens of thousands in the war and in its immediate aftermath might have been avoided through negotiation. These ventures were mostly ad hoc, and it is much too grand to consider them to constitute exercises in “liberal hegemony” or a “liberal world order.”
The devastating events of 9/11 triggered the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the UN Security Council, a contentious development which was much debated and was widely seen as presaging a new type of activity by the Security Council – legislating for all UN member states. And yet, in the counter-terrorism sphere at least, the Council’s legislative activity in the years following 9/11 was relatively modest. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, that activity has been far exceeded by the Council’s response to the emergence of ISIL in 2014. This more recent activity is of interest beyond the confines of counter-terrorism, but has received far less scrutiny to date. This article will remedy this gap, revisiting, in light of the recent activity, the relative merits and disadvantages of making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions. It makes two main contentions. The first is that – due to some factors which were anticipated in the early 2000s and many which were not – Security Council resolutions on terrorism constitute a distinctive category of international law-making and pose serious challenges for the application of organizing principles and processes of general international law. The second is that, for these reasons as well as doubts as to the necessity and efficacy of recent action, making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions should be the exception rather than the norm.
China is ranked 42nd on the Global Terrorism Index (2019), a scoring system of terrorist activities. While China has a relatively low terrorism risk, events globally have wide-ranging repercussions for future attacks, putting first responders and emergency health workers at risk. This study aims to provide the epidemiological context for the past decade detailing the unique injury types responders are likely to encounter and to develop training programs utilizing these data.
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was searched for all attacks in China between the years 2008-2018. Attacks met inclusion criteria if they fulfilled the terrorism-related criteria as set by the GTD’s Codebook. Ambiguous events, as defined by the GTD’s Codebook, were excluded. English language grey literature was searched to ensure no events meeting these criteria were missed. A focused search of online English language newspaper articles was also performed for any terrorist events between 2008-2018.
One-hundred and eight terrorist events occurred in the study time period. Of the 108 incidents, forty-seven (43.5%) involved Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (E/B/D) only, with an average fatality count of 2.9 and injury count of 7.5 per event. Twenty-seven (25.0%) used bladed or blunt weapons in melees with an average fatality count of 9.7 and an injury count of 8.8 per event. Five (4.6%) involved incendiary weapons with an average fatality count of 2.4 and an injury count of 7.2 per event. Two used only chemical weapons (1.8%) with no recorded deaths and an injury count of 27.0 per event. Two events had unknown weapon types (1.8%) with one recorded death and no injury count. One event used a firearm (0.9%) and led to one death and no injuries. One event used a vehicle (0.9%), which also led to one death and no recorded injuries. Twenty-three attacks used a mix of weapons (21.2%) with an average fatality count of 17.1 and an injury count of 12.0 per event.
One-hundred and eight terrorist attacks were recorded between 2008-2018 on Chinese soil using well-understood modalities. This resulted in a total of 809 recorded fatalities with 956 non-fatal injuries. The most commonly chosen methodology was E/B/D, followed by melees and the use of bladed weapons. Three events individually recorded a combined casualty toll of over 100 people.
Health care organizations have been challenged by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic for some time, while in January 2020, it was not immediately suspected that it would take such a global expansion. In the past, other studies have already pointed out that health care systems, and more specifically hospitals, can be a so-called “soft target” for terrorist attacks. This report has now examined whether this is also the case in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
During the lockdown, hospitals turned out to be the only remaining soft targets for attacks, given that the other classic targets were closed during the lockdown. On the other hand, other important factors have limited the risk of such attacks in hospitals. The main delaying and relative risk-reducing factors were the access control on temperature and wearing a mask, no visits allowed, limited consultations, and investigations.
But even then, health care systems and hospitals were prone to (cyber)terrorism, as shown by other COVID-19-related institutions, such as pharmaceuticals involved in developing vaccines and health care facilities involved in swab testing and contact tracing. Counter-terrorism medicine (CTM) and social behavioral science can reduce the likelihood and impact of terrorism, but cannot prevent (state-driven) cyberterrorism and actions of lone wolves and extremist factions.
Australia is ranked 71st on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI; 2019), a scoring system of terrorist activities. While it has a relatively low terrorist risk, events globally have wide-ranging repercussions putting first responders and emergency health workers at risk. Counter-Terrorism Medicine (CTM) is rapidly emerging as a sub-specialty needed to address these threats on the front line. This study aims to provide the epidemiological context for the past decade, detailing the unique injury types responders are likely to encounter, and to develop training programs utilizing these data.
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) was searched for all attacks in Australia from the years 2009-2019. Attacks met inclusion criteria if they fulfilled the following terrorism-related criteria as set by the GTD. Ambiguous events were excluded when there was uncertainty as to whether the incident met all of the criteria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident. The grey literature was reviewed, and each event was cross-matched with reputable international and national newspaper sources online to confirm or add details regarding weapon type used, and whenever available, details of victim and perpetrator fatalities and injuries.
Thirty-seven terrorist events occurred in the study time period. Of the thirty-seven incidents, twenty-six (70.2%) involved incendiary weapons, five (13.5%) involved firearms, four (10.8%) involved melee (bladed weapon/knife) attacks, two (5.4%) were explosive/bombing/dynamite attacks, and one (2.7%) was a mixed attack using both incendiary and melee weapons. All except one firearms-related incident (four out of five) resulted in either a fatality or injury or both. Every melee incident resulted in either a fatality or injury or both.
In the decade from 2009 to 2019, terrorist attacks on Australian soil have been manageable, small-scale incidents with well-understood modalities. Eleven fatalities and fourteen injuries were sustained as a result of terrorist events during that period. Incendiary weapons were the most commonly chosen methodology, followed by firearms, bladed weapons, and explosive/bombings/dynamite attacks.
Does exposure to cyber terrorism prompt calls for retaliatory military strikes? By what psychological mechanism does it do so? Through a series of controlled, randomized experiments, this study exposed respondents (n = 2,028) to television news reports depicting cyber and conventional terror attacks against critical infrastructures in the United States, United Kingdom and Israel. The findings indicate that only lethal cyber terrorism triggers strong support for retaliation. Findings also confirm that anger bridges exposure to cyber terrorism and retaliation, rather than psychological mechanisms such as threat perception or anxiety as other studies propose. These findings extend to the cyber realm a recent trend that views anger as a primary mechanism linking exposure to terrorism with militant preferences. With cyber terrorism a mounting international concern, this study demonstrates how exposure to this threat can generate strong public support for retaliatory policies, depending on the lethality of the attack.
This chapter looks at the Brotherhood’s post-2013 history up until 2018 – a period that saw a growing confrontation between a new class of second-rank apparatchiks in Egypt and the traditional leaders abroad. It highlights the key debates that shaped the internal political climate during that time, and how geopolitical events occurring in the larger Middle East and North Africa region affected the Brotherhood’s organizational evolution. The chapter further reveals how, within the context of an aggravating security crackdown in Egypt, the leaders of the respective coalitions set up different committees and offices, which led to growing organizational splits that further weakened an already subdued Society. Based on over forty Oral History interviews with Brotherhood leaders, rank-and-file members and youth members, conducted during a combined six months of fieldwork in Istanbul, Doha, London, Berlin and Geneva between 2015 and 2019, a close reading of the narratives that were propagated on different Brotherhood-affiliated websites, and an overview of relevant policy analyses and legal documents, the chapter shows how the leadership struggles having marred the Brotherhood’s internal political life before the Egyptian uprising of 2011 exacerbated the organization’s gradual fragmentation in the post-2013 period.
The academic and popular fixation on Raphael Lemkin confuses biography with historical explanation of the genocide concept. An actual intellectual history of genocide needs to attend to his context rather than rely on his misleading autobiography, Totally Unofficial. His conception of humanity as comprising distinct nationalities did not originate in the liberal cosmopolitanism he postulated upon arriving in the USA, but in a lifelong Zionist commitment to Jewish statehood in Palestine. Similarly, Lemkin couched his appeal to end genocide not in terms of abstract human rights, let alone crimes against humanity, but in relation to an ideal of world civilization whose constituent parts were national, religious, and racial groups. His fixation on such groups and “small nations” led him to ignore the category of “the civilian” and other forms of civilian destruction, such as interwar debate about aerial bombing on cities. In doing so, he contributed to the depoliticization of the language of transgression.
Autocracies are widely assumed to have a counterterrorism advantage because they can censor media and are insulated from public opinion, thereby depriving terrorists of both their audience and political leverage. However, institutionalized autocracies such as China draw legitimacy from public approval and feature partially free media environments, meaning that their information strategies must be much more sophisticated than simple censorship. To better understand the strategic considerations that govern decisions about transparency in this context, this article explores the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) treatment of domestic terrorist incidents in the official party mouthpiece – the People's Daily. Drawing on original, comprehensive datasets of all known Uyghur terrorist violence in China and the official coverage of that violence, the findings demonstrate that the CCP promptly acknowledges terrorist violence only when both domestic and international conditions are favorable. The authors attribute this pattern to the entrenched prioritization of short-term social stability over longer-term legitimacy.
There are numerous political crises in Africa, albeit one needs to stress that they do not touch all African states. This chapter discusses four types of crises: secessions, coups, electoral violence, and terrorism. Despite their different shape, they all can potentially challenge or even undermine state institutions, dwarf the economy, and pose a threat to the population. Despite them being the children of the weakness of states, there is, however, also evidence showing that secessions, coups, and electoral violence might lead to more legitimate governments and advance democratization in the long run. Such news is missing with regard to terrorism.
The intellectual history of just war thinking should be understood as unfolding in three traditions: the Augustinian, the Westphalian, and the Liberal. The Augustinian tradition of just war thinking rested on the idea that natural law exists and should guide human social and political order to fulfill natural human moral aspirations; that sovereignty means responsibility for the common good; and that justice should guide states to use force to defend the common good. In the Westphalian tradition, sovereignty evolved from defense of the common good to defense of international borders, and just cause shrank to encompass only territorial self-defense. In the embryonic Liberal tradition, concepts like human rights and accountable governance do the work that natural law and justice did in the Augustinian tradition: external standards outside and above the state used to judge the state’s legitimacy. The Liberal just war tradition allows war to vindicate the rights of individuals suffering under a humanitarian emergency, insists on respecting individual rights in how war is fought, and understands the vindication of individual rights a crucial part of ending wars justly.
When is war just? What does justice require? If we lack a commonly-accepted understanding of justice – and thus of just war – what answers can we find in the intellectual history of just war? Miller argues that just war thinking should be understood as unfolding in three traditions: the Augustinian, the Westphalian, and the Liberal, each resting on distinct understandings of natural law, justice, and sovereignty. The central ideas of the Augustinian tradition (sovereignty as responsibility for the common good) can and should be recovered and worked into the Liberal tradition, for which human rights serves the same function. In this reconstructed Augustinian Liberal vision, the violent disruption of ordered liberty is the injury in response to which force may be used and war may be justly waged. Justice requires the vindication and restoration of ordered liberty in, through, and after warfare.
The relationship between immigration and terrorism is an important public policy concern. Using bilateral migration data for 174 countries from 1995 to 2015, we estimate the relationship between levels of immigration and terrorism using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy based on the initial distribution of immigrants in destination countries. We specifically investigate rates of immigration from Muslim-majority Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries and countries engaged in conflicts. We find little evidence of a relationship between stocks of immigrants and terrorist attacks in destination countries.
This article provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between terrorism and migration. It discusses whether and how (1) migration may be a cause of terrorism, (2) terrorism may influence natives' attitudes towards immigration and their electoral preferences and (3) terrorism may lead to more restrictive migration policies and how these in turn may serve as effective counter-terrorism tools. A review of the empirical literature on the migration–terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as terrorism promotes anti-immigrant resentment and (3) the effectiveness of stricter migration policies in deterring terrorism is rather limited, while terrorist attacks lead to more restrictive migration policies.
Economic arguments favoring increased immigration restrictions suggest that immigrants undermine the culture, institutions, and productivity of destination countries. But is this actually true? Nowrasteh and Powell systematically analyze cross-country evidence of potential negative effects caused by immigration relating to economic freedom, corruption, culture, and terrorism. They analyze case studies of mass immigration to the United States, Israel, and Jordan. Their evidence does not support the idea that immigration destroys the institutions responsible for prosperity in the modern world. This nonideological volume makes a qualified case for free immigration and the accompanying prosperity.