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The depressive-realism effect refers to a phenomenon in which depressed individuals are more realistic at assessing the relationship between two events than non-depressed individuals. Recent evidence suggests that the depressive realism hypothesis is weaker than first thought. Thus, we sought evidence for depressive-realism under conditions that we hypothesised would maximise the effect. We tested a clinically depressed sample of participants who were administered a rumination induction. Twenty-eight clinically depressed and 39 non-depressed participants were randomly allocated to either a rumination condition (focused on the causes, consequences, and meaning of their mood) or a distraction condition (focused on external objects/events such as a classroom). Participants then completed a contingency task in which there was no relationship between their responses and an outcome, and they were asked to make a judgment of how much control they had over an outcome. Both groups and conditions did not differ in their judgments of control; participants in all conditions showed a non-normative judgment of control. The depressive-realism effect was not observed in this study, even when depressed participants were encouraged to ruminate. Rather, the present study clearly demonstrates the robustness of the illusion of control.
This article contends that Hannah Arendt’s writing can add value to current discussions on responsible leadership. Specifically, considering responsibility through an Arendtian lens offers insights that deepen our understanding of the interconnections among leadership, responsibility, and ethical action. Turning to Arendt can, therefore, increase our grasp of the complexities of leading responsibly. She shows how acting responsibly requires not only ethical forethought but also a willingness to judge for ourselves. Her emphasis on judgment enriches discussions on responsible leadership, encouraging us to think more deeply about what it might mean to act responsibly, and how such action connects with ethics. Examples of irresponsible action are explored as they concern individual and collective judgment in particular political and corporate contexts. Thus, it is by engaging with the messy realities of everyday life that an Arendtian turn can help us rethink leadership, ethics, and responsibility in new and productive ways.
Social judgments are often influenced by racism. Voluntary crimes against life, and in particular the crime of homicide, may be the most critical situations of the impact of racism in social judgments. We analyzed 114 homicide trials conducted by the 1st Jury Court, in a Brazilian judicial capital, concluded between 2003 and 2007, for the purpose of investigating the effects of skin color and the socioeconomic status of the defendant and the victim of homicides in the jury trial court’s decision. The results indicate that the social and economic profile of defendants and victims of homicide is identical. They are almost all poor (more than 70%), with low education (more than 73%) and frequently non-Whites (more than 88%). We found that judges assign longer sentences to black (β = .34, p = .01) and poor defendants (β = .23, p < .05). We even verified that the poorer the defendant, the higher was the corresponding conviction rate (Wald’s Test = 5.90, p < .05). The results are discussed based on theories of social psychology and criminological sociology, which consider the relationship between skin color and socioeconomic status in social judgments and in discrimination.
Neutral citation – the practice of giving each judgment of a court a
reference number or citation – has been in use in the senior courts
of England and Wales since 2001. The beginning of January 2016 saw the
introduction of a new system of neutral citation for English ecclesiastical
courts. The practice direction bringing this practice into force is reproduced
below and is preceded by an introductory essay by the Dean of Arches and
Rather than asking how what we are aware of in perceptual experience can give us knowledge of the independent world, this paper asks what conditions we as knowers must fulfill, what capacities we must have, and what the ‘objects of perception’ must be in the competent exercise those capacities, if we are to have any such knowledge. It is argued that we must be capable of perceiving that such-and-such is so and thereby knowing by perception alone what is so in the world as it is independently of us.
In the realm of electoral politics, a growing number of women, African Americans, and Latinos now serve at the highest levels of government. For many Americans, the bipartisan presence of representatives who are people of color and/or women is proof that we live in a “post-feminist” and “postracial” era in which institutions are now fundamentally fair and accessible. Rather than assuming that racial presence is synonymous with racial justice, this essay turns to aesthetic theory to advocate for a new understanding of presence—not as proof that racial or gender justice has been achieved but as a kind of beauty that is experienced as a form of visible certitude. Drawing on the work of Hannah Pitkin, alongside writings on descriptive representation for Latinos and African Americans, this essay stresses the importance of judgment, arguing that on questions of social justice, a racially diverse elite is simultaneously ethically valuable and politically indeterminate.
While the medical ethics literature has well explored the harm to patients, families, and the integrity of the profession in failing to disclose medical errors once they occur, less often addressed are the moral and professional obligations to take all available steps to prevent errors and harm in the first instance. As an expanding body of scholarship further elucidates the causes of medical error, including the considerable extent to which medical errors, particularly in diagnostics, may be attributable to cognitive sources, insufficient progress in systematically evaluating and implementing suggested strategies for improving critical thinking skills and medical judgment is of mounting concern. Continued failure to address pervasive thinking errors in medical decisionmaking imperils patient safety and professionalism, as well as beneficence and nonmaleficence, fairness and justice. We maintain that self-reflective and metacognitive refinement of critical thinking should not be construed as optional but rather should be considered an integral part of medical education, a codified tenet of professionalism, and by extension, a moral and professional duty.
To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of “landmark” results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.
Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.
In randomized clinical trials of aphasia treatment, a functional outcome measure like the Amsterdam-Nijmegen Everyday Language Test (ANELT), administered by speech-language therapists, is often used. However, the agreement between this expert rating and the judgment of the proxy about the quality of the daily life communication of the person with aphasia is largely unknown. We examined the association between ANELT scores by speech-language therapists and proxy judgments on the Partner Communication Questionnaire both at 3 and 6 months in 39 people with aphasia after stroke. We also determined which factors affected the level of agreement between expert and proxy judgment of the communicative ability at 6 months in 53 people with aphasia. We found moderate agreement (at 3 months r = .662; p = < .0001 and at 6 months r = .565; p = .0001), with proxies rating slightly higher than experts. Less severe aphasia, measured with the Aphasia Severity Rating Scale, was associated with better agreement. In conclusion, although proxies were slightly more positive than experts, we found moderate agreement between expert and proxy rating of verbal communicative ability of people with aphasia after stroke, especially in milder cases. (JINS, 2012, 18, 1064–1070)
The ability to appraise one's own ability has been found to have an important role in the recovery and quality of life of clinical populations. Examinee and task variables have been found to influence metacognition in healthy students; however the effect of these variables on the metacognitive accuracy of adults with neurological insult, such as traumatic brain injury (TBI), remains unknown. Twenty-two adults with moderate and severe TBI and a matched sample of healthy adults participated in this study examining the influence of item sequencing on metacognitive functioning. Retrospective confidence judgments were collected while participants completed a modified version of the Matrix Reasoning subtest. Significant influence of item sequence order was found, revealing better metacognitive abilities and performance when participants completed tasks where item difficulty progressed in order from easy to difficult. We interpret these findings to suggest that the sequencing of item difficulty offers “anchors” for gauging and adjusting to task demands. (JINS, 2012, 18, 379–383)
In recent work, we showed that the judgment of affective stimuli is influenced by the degree of congruence between apparently innate hemispheric dispositions (left hemisphere positive and approach, right hemisphere negative and avoidance), and the type of movement produced by the contralateral arm (flexion-approach; extension-avoidance). Incongruent movements (e.g., right arm extension) were associated with attenuation of affective valuations. In the present study, we replicated these results. We also assessed confidence in judgments as a function of stimulus valence and congruence and determined that confidence is maximal with congruent movements and highly positive or negative stimuli, suggesting that congruence effects on affective valuation could be mediated by confidence effects. However, in a second experiment, involving judgments regarding segmented lines, congruence effects were observed only for bisected lines, for which confidence was lowest. Thus, confidence does not provide a unifying explanation for congruence effects in the performance of these two tasks. (JINS, 2011, 17, 289–294)
This article has several and concurrent purposes. The first is to offer conceptual clarification about the notion of incommensurability and how it can be meaningfully understood in various contexts. Secondly, the purpose is to advance the substantive position that something important is lost when incommensurability is rejected in the law as a matter of principle. Third, the aim is to bring to fuller awareness the practical difficulties that a judge facing a potentially incommensurable conflict would encounter when judging it. Finally there is the claim, against the backdrop of contemporary theories of procedural democracy, that tragic incommensurability cannot be wholly neutralized by the procedures aimed at the generation of consensus, nor dissolved through the harmonic integration of all the values that law is supposed to protect.
This article develops some conceptual correlations between Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment and the common law tradition of legal judgment. The article argues that legal judgment, like aesthetic judgment, is best conceived in terms of intersubjective validity rather than objective truth. Understanding the parallel between aesthetic and legal judgment allows us to appreciate better the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the individual and the community, in the formulation and communication of judgments, which combine a personal response and a reasoned determination intended for a discrete audience. The article frames and pursues these themes in relation to four core concepts in Kant’s aesthetic theory: judgment, communication, community, and disinterestedness. Through sustained comparison and application of these concepts in aesthetic judgment and legal judgment, the article provides a conception of judging that more accurately captures the common law role and relationship of the individual judge and the institutional judiciary as integral parts of the broader legal and political community.
Rev 11.1–2 refers to the destruction of the temple in 70 ce. The measuring of the temple area does not signify that it will be protected, as is commonly thought, but symbolises that it falls under God's judgment. The underlying idea is that the destruction of the temple at the hands of the Gentiles has been possible only because it was preceded by God's judgment, a notion also found in contemporary apocalyptic literature. John argues that God has given the Gentiles the authority to ‘trample the holy city’, including the temple, for a limited period of time.
Long-distance dependencies have been the object of much theoretical interest in the Scandinavian languages and in general, but the empirical foundation for theorizing has been limited. The present paper investigates extraction from complement and adverbial clauses in Danish using acceptability judgment and reading-time measures. Extraction from adverbial clauses was found to be rated near the bottom of the scale and to be associated with a processing cost. This was also true of extraction in adverbial clauses in semantically cohesive sentences, which Jensen (2001a, b) has suggested is acceptable. It is concluded that under the conditions investigated extraction from adverbial clauses in Danish is associated with a processing cost and very low acceptability ratings, despite semantic cohesion.
The present study explores the construct and ecological validity of
the Biber Cognitive Estimation Test (BCET) in a traumatic brain injury
(TBI) sample. Participants completed the BCET in the course of a
neuropsychological evaluation at 1–15 years after injury. BCET
scores correlated moderately with other standard measures of executive
functioning, and contrary to our hypotheses, at least as high with
neuropsychological tests with minimal demands on executive functioning.
Moreover, partialing out the portion of BCET variance not attributable to
executive functioning markedly attenuated the former correlations. With
respect to ecological validity, BCET scores did not predict concurrent
functional status, as measured by the Disability Rating Scale. By
comparison, standard measures of executive functioning strongly correlated
with each other, correlated less strongly with nonexecutive functioning
measures, and predicted functional status. In conclusion, unlike standard
measures of executive functioning, the BCET demonstrated poor construct
and ecological validity in TBI patients.(JINS, 2007, 13,