The protection of civilians in armed conflict (what we have earlier termed the PoC doctrine) has become a policy of major importance in twenty-first-century global governance. Largely driven by the security council, PoC offers another example of global policy that can be understood as a bricolage of practices and values, with improvisation once again playing a key role. This improvisation is especially apparent in the permanent conflict between the desire to make PoC a more consistent global policy and the goal of avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. An operational challenge for PoC therefore consists in making continual trade-offs between the different visions of “protection,” as well as between the various conceptions of PoC’s proper place among UN priorities. Rather than following a rational design, the history of PoC has been determined by the shifting balance of global power relations and the vagaries of international circumstances. On one hand, PoC has become highly institutionalized thanks to the mobilization of enormous human and financial resources by the UN, member states, and the NGO community. But on the other hand, as a policy, PoC has developed as a succession of improvised or ad hoc decisions.

This chapter investigates how ‘society at large’ interacts with the world of international arbitration, now and for the foreseeable future. This broad topic can be made more manageable by breaking down the interaction through four focus groups within society: the media, academia, arbitration ‘clubs’, and civil society NGOs. These groups provide services to the world of international arbitration but are mostly instead what Emmanuel Gaillard terms ‘value providers’ – seeking to influence its normative structure. This chapter also touches on international and professional organisations, which are also significant value providers.

One key question is whether and how international arbitration may be expanding or at least becoming more visible through the four focus groups. A second is whether it may be becoming more diverse and indeed polarised. The chapter presents empirical evidence of ongoing ‘lawyerisation’, hence renewed concern about costs and delays. It also considers the impact of burgeoning investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases and coverage, especially in the general media. Analysis of newspapers in Australia and the United Kingdom as well as social media reports confirms that views about ISDS remain overwhelmingly negative – a new development that could increasingly shape the overall perceptions of international arbitration held within society at large.

This chapter is structured in seven parts: position of individual, human rights, international refugee law, nationality and statelessness, international terrorism, international health law and international criminal law. The second part covers the denial of a Ukrainian extradition request by a German court, and Germany’s concerns over human rights of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The fourth part assesses a decision by a German court that there is no Palestinian State and no Palestinian nationality. The fifth covers the Federal Prosecutor General accusing Russia of State-ordered murder. The seventh encompasses a German court’s sentence against a member of the Syrian opposition for war crimes against persons, the Federal Public Prosecutor General declining to bring charges against members of the Federal Government for aiding the killing of Iranian General Soleimani, a German court sentencing the handing over of a child to an ‘Islamic State’ training camp in Syria as a war crime of enlisting children, the conviction of an IS member by a German court for aiding and abetting a crime against humanity by enslavement and the conviction of an IS member of war crimes by a German court.

Chapter 2 positions the book within the interdisciplinary literature on international law and develops its theoretical framework and the concept of intersubjective legalism, borrowing insights from ‘practice’ studies. The research framework builds upon the works of Kratochwil, Brunnée and Toope, and Johnstone, situating the meaning of legal rules within the ‘community of practice’ of international law, which enforces a set of shared understandings about what constitutes sound legal reasoning. Next, Chapter 2 integrates insights from critical legal studies and sociological studies of the juridical field to elucidate the power inequalities shaping interactions inside the community of legal practice. The centrality of expert knowledge as a source of power inside the juridical field suggests a reordering of the traditional perception of international politics: Inside the community of international legal practice states lose their central position, and actors such as judges, legal scholars, and non-governmental organizations gain leverage. The framework presented in Chapter 2 enables the investigation of the politics of the legal field, which take the form of competition over the authority to determine the meaning of legal rules. Finally, this chapter discusses the methods of analysis, namely discourse analysis and interviews.

In this chapter Germany’s position on Antarctica, the law of the sea, as well as air and space law will be examined. Concerning the law of the sea, Germany’s critical position on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, expressed on many different occasions, will be addressed. Besides that, it will be addressed that Turkey accused Germany of illegally boarding its merchant vessel on the high seas in the Mediterranean. Yet, it will be concluded the boarding and search of the vessel even against the expressed will of Turkey was not illegal under international law. Regarding Turkey’s conduct of seismic surveys in the eastern Mediterranean, Germany’s calls on Turkey to respect international law will be criticised as lacking a legal basis. That Germany joined the UK-led Global Ocean Alliance, will be evaluated as a way for Germany to lobby for greater parts of the ocean being assigned Marine Protected Area status. In the last part, Germany opposing Russian initiatives on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space will be assessed a sign of its increasing frustration with the double standards displayed by Russia and the other major space powers.

This chapter deals with Germany’s position on State jurisdiction and immunities. The first part, Jurisdiction of the State, addresses Germany releasing an Iranian citizen in a prisoner swap, as well as Germany considering further US sanctions on Nord Stream 2, a pipeline project delivering gas from Russia to Germany, an encroachment on its sovereignty as it understands them to be extraterritorial in nature. The second part, State immunity, deals with the Federal Constitutional Court classifying Greek debt restructuring measures as acta iure imperii. While the chapter agrees with the decision, it criticizes the Federal Constitutional Court for missing the opportunity to advance the discussion of a contentious matter of public international law. Another article assesses Germany’s (non)participation in US court proceedings for alleged colonial genocide and enslavement of the Ovaherero and Nama in what was formerly known as South West Africa and is now Namibia. The chapter argues that Germany is not answerable and that Namibia’s position in its negotiations with the German government over a political declaration concerning atrocities committed during colonial rule was weakened.

The chapter covers Germany’s perspective on the use of force, armed conflict and international humanitarian law, and arms control and disarmament. The first part addresses Germany’s position on the US killing of Iranian General Soleimani, Germany condemning Iranian missile attacks on US bases in Iraq and Germany refining the right of sustainable self-defence. The second part shows the German Federal Court of Justice reaffirming that there is no justification in international law for attacks by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, the German government’s stand on foreign troop presence in Syria, Germany’s stand on the law of occupation regarding US forces in Syria, Germany considering Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories illegal, Germany’s view on drones, the Federal Constitutional Court affirming only States can claim compensation for violations of international humanitarian law, and the Federal Administrative Court ruling the US may continue to use its base in Germany. The third part covers Germany’s criticism of US anti-personnel landmine policy and Germany’s condemnation of North Korean missile tests.

This chapter is concerned with Germany’s stand on State responsibility and liability. It is found that Germany mistakenly attributed acts by the Houthi rebels to the State of Yemen and mistakenly assumed that the Houthi rebels are bound by Yemen’s international human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Further, Germany’s position that Russia is responsible for the use of a chemical weapon in the poisoning of Alexei Nawalny will be addressed. It will be argued that Germany should have cooperated directly with Russia rather than only calling the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Concerning the Federal Parliament’s Scientific Research Services’ assessment on claims against China for damages incurred due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, it will be argued that the only conclusion to be drawn from the report is that legal actions against China must be doomed to failure. Finally, the question will be raised whether Malta apologising for a Maltese ambassador who compared the German Chancellor to Hitler forms a rare example of a formal State apology.

This chapter deals with Germany’s perspective on and activities in the United Nations and other international organisations. The first part deals with Germany’s involvement in a UN Security Council reform, Germany failing to integrate climate security into the work of the Security Council and Germany’s position that the UN headquarters must be accessible to all member States. Germany’s take on Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020) will be criticised. It will be assessed why Germany opposes the US interpretation of Security Council Resolution 2331 (2015). Germany’s position on civil society briefers to the Security Council, Germany accusing Russia and China of obstructing the implementation of resolutions, Germany’s difficulties as chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee, Germany’s membership of the Economic and Social Council and criticism against Germany for its handling of the Afghanistan file in the UN General Assembly is also addressed. Russia’s and China’s criticism of the German Security Council membership and reviews of the German membership will also be examined. The second part encompasses Germany’s position on youth participation in international organisations.

This chapter is concerned with Germany’s perspective on the foundations and functions of international law. It is structured in two parts: international law in general and sources of international law. The second part examines Germany’s view of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) that sought to limit Iran’s nuclear programme. It is argued that the political aims of Germany do not justify the twisting of international law. The Federal Government portrayed the document as a binding international treaty. It did so by speaking of an ‘agreement’, from which the US had decided to ‘withdraw’ and by depicting the participants as ‘parties’. Further, Germany argued that Iran is bound by ‘obligations’ under the JCPoA. Germany also spoke of ‘Articles’ in the JCPoA and asserted that the document was ‘signed’. Moreover, Germany argued that the JCPoA became international law through the endorsement of the UN Security Council. However, the UN Security Council never marked its endorsement as a binding decision. Four and half years after the adoption of the JCPoA, Germany admitted that the JCPoA constitutes only a record of mutual political commitments and is therefore ‘soft law’.

The chapter covers inter-State political and economic relations and transactions. Five chapters span diplomatic and consular relations, diplomatic and consular protection, unilateral coercive measures short of the use of force, the law of treaties and international economic law. The first examines the closure of Germany’s Pyongyang embassy, Germany’s call to protect the US embassy in Iraq, Germany denouncing the arrest of the UK ambassador to Iran, the agrément of the German ambassador to Poland, the difference between summoning and inviting an ambassador, Iran condemning the German ambassador, the request of the German embassy in Bangkok for protection, co-locating diplomatic premises and Indonesia declaring a German diplomat a persona non grata. The third looks at the implementation of the Libyan arms embargo and Germany’s enforcement of sanctions against North Korea. The fourth addresses Germany appealing to Iran not to execute persons who were minors at the time of the crime and the German Chancellor’s remarks on breaching international law. The fifth comprises Germany’s proposals in the Vattenfall arbitration and Germany’s support of reforming the Energy Charter Treaty.

This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts; territorial sovereignty, political independence, Statehood and recognition, organs of the State and their status and State succession. The first part deals with the legal consequences of Germany’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea while distinguishing the same from sanctions policies, Germany’s position on the international legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany’s views on the presence of Thailand’s king in and his conduct of State affairs from Germany and Germany’s position on Israel’s annexation plans in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part addresses Germany’s response to the new Hong Kong national security law, and Germany’s position on Taiwan. The third part, statehood and recognition, encompasses Germany’s opinion on Palestine not being a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Germany’s non-recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, and Germany’s support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer.

The conclusion stresses the need for pragmatism and balance as responses to the grave threats to international peace and prosperity in the current world. It emphasizes that overly ambitious projects undermine international law, but pathways to cooperation and legal entrenchment still exist.

The conclusion situates the politics of legal pluralism within a comparative perspective by contrasting Chechnya with other Russian regions and other contexts of postcolonial and post-conflict political development. The concluding chapter discusses the broader implications of this study for our understanding of the “dark side” of legal pluralism as an instrument of domination and of state law as a “weapon of the weak.” It outlines a future research agenda on the role of international law in legally pluralist environments and legal pluralism in diasporas. Finally, the chapter reflects on the implications of the findings for post-Soviet Russian politics and asks why the Kremlin allows Kadyrov’s lawfare.

This chapter looks at the national security and public law aspects of the global crisis resulting from the rise of national populism and revisionist states challenging the global order. Threats include war, nuclear proliferation, erosion of human rights, and the pollution of cyberspace.

This chapter describes the various dimensions of the world crisis, how the crisis implicates international law, and how the knowledge economy has contributed to the crisis even as it accomplishes great wealth creation and technological mastery.

[31.1] Australia’s international obligations are not enforceable through legal action by a person in Australia unless those obligations are incorporated into domestic legislation. If a statute does incorporate all or part of an international agreement, then, subject to a contrary intention in the statute, it is a principle of interpretation that the words in the statute are presumed to bear the same meaning as they do in the international agreement. However, even where a statute does not incorporate text from an international agreement, Australia’s international obligations may still influence the interpretation of domestic legislation. A long-established common law principle provides that, in cases of ambiguity, a construction of a statute that is consistent with Australia’s international obligations should be preferred to a construction that is not. This refers to Australia’s obligations at the time of enactment of the domestic legislation.