In Australia and many other advanced economies, housing is playing a central role in accentuating and perpetuating inequality. This paper, drawing on primary and secondary data, discusses the various ways in which housing tenure in Australia contributes to wealth and income inequality. It argues that a neoliberal housing policy framework and accompanying financialisation of housing have facilitated a dramatic increase in house prices, the neglect of social housing, and a deepening wealth and income divide based on housing tenure. With respect to wealth, the key divide is between outright homeowners versus low-income private renters and low-income households in mortgage stress. The wealth of outright homeowners has grown substantially in recent decades and many have been able to acquire a holiday home and/or investment properties, thereby intensifying the wealth divide. Approximately a third of Australian households are now locked out of home ownership for an extended period or even lifelong. Housing tenure status also has an impact on the disposable income of households. For example, low-income outright homeowners are invariably in a far better position with respect to disposable income than their counterparts who have large mortgages or are private renters.

A number of reports have shown that workers with certain characteristics are disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since these characteristics are associated with vulnerable workers, we hypothesise that the income distribution in the pandemic era will be polarised compared to the pre-pandemic period. This article compares the pre-COVID income distribution (February 2020) with the one that prevailed just after the hard lockdown (April 2020). Consistent with the hypothesis, the result shows evidence of polarisation. Disaggregating the analysis by worker characteristics, we find that the polarisation was stronger in vulnerable groups. Our decomposition result suggests that, apart from job losses, returns to gender and job characteristics explain the location and shape differences in the COVID-19 era income distribution. Although this analysis only looks at the short-term effect of the pandemic on income distribution, the result suggests that the structure of labour markets in developing countries is not conducive to a future of work where disruptions (or pandemics) may become more frequent.

This note provides a nontechnical summary of a research paper (Bullard and DiCecio [2021, Classical policy benchmarks for economies with substantial inequality, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, unpublished manuscript]) that I presented as the NIESR 2021 Dow Lecture on 9 February 2021. In the paper, we construct a simple benchmark macroeconomic model with substantial heterogeneity among households, enough to generate empirically plausible Gini coefficients for the distributions of consumption, income and financial wealth. The model includes aggregate shocks as well as both permanent and temporary idiosyncratic uncertainties. Four policymakers—implementing monetary, fiscal, labour market and education policies—act in concert to achieve a first-best allocation of resources. We argue that the roles of these policymaker types are ‘classic’ and match up well with observed policymaker roles in OECD countries. We regard this simple economy as a benchmark for the study of other aspects of the interaction between policy and inequality.

The non-take-up of public services has the potential to undermine civil rights and deepen social inequality. Looking at the case of the Youth Community College Programme in China, an innovation in governance to facilitate community integration of the migrant population by providing free education, this study finds that the targeted disadvantaged groups are systematically excluded due to the disproportionate imposition of various administrative burdens on them. We propose that an interaction mechanism – which we term “selective affinity” – between the policy process and individuals’ human capital leads to this unintended outcome. The study contributes to a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying vulnerable people's non-take-up of public services, while highlighting an example of dysfunctional state–society interaction and a mechanism for the reproduction of social inequality under authoritarianism in China.

This review article seeks to build bridges between mainstream African history and the more historically oriented branch of the ‘new’ economic history of Africa. We survey four central topics of the new economic history of Africa — growth, trade, labor, and inequality — and argue that the increased use of quantitative methods and comparative perspectives have sharpened views on long-term trajectories of economic development within Africa and placed the region more firmly into debates of global economic development. The revival of African economic history opens new opportunities for Africanist historians to enrich the interdisciplinary approaches they have taken to study questions of demography, poverty, slavery, labor, inequality, migration, state formation, and colonialism. These fruits, however, can only be reaped if the institutional boundaries between the fields of history and economic history are softened and both sides engage in greater mutual engagement. Our paper aims to move closer to a shared vision on the benefits and limitations of varying quantitative methods, and how these approaches underpin both more and less convincing narratives of long-term African development.

The neglect of marginalized stakeholders is a colossal problem in both stakeholder and entrepreneurship streams of literature. To address this problem, we offer a theory of marginalized stakeholder-centric entrepreneurship. We conceptualize how firms can utilize marginalized stakeholder input actualization through which firms should process a variety of ideas, resources, and interactions with marginalized stakeholders and then filter, internalize, and, finally, realize important elements that improve a variety of related socioeconomic, ethical, racial, contextual, political, and identity issues. This input actualization process enables firms to innovate with marginalized stakeholders and develop marginalized stakeholder capabilities. To this end, firms fulfill both their moral and entrepreneurial claims to marginalized stakeholders.

The case of the early imperial small rural settlement of Marzuolo, in south-central Etruria, paints a micro-history of arrested developments: a couple of decades into the site's existence, an abandoned wine-production facility was converted into a blacksmithing workshop, which in turn burnt down and was abandoned soon after. But were both these endings failures? This article uses the concept of failure as an epistemic lens to examine inequality: who could fail in the Roman world, and for whom was failure not an option? It argues that failure was tied up with particular notions of the future, which were not equally distributed. Yet in contrast to modern paradigms, in the Roman world even the privileged seem not to have embraced failure as a stepping-stone towards growth.