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Chapter 2 recounts how social scientists were already fretting about the family early in the century. The institution, according to sociologists through the late interwar period, was especially vulnerable to the disorganization wrought by modern social change. Concern for the family's fate took on a new, international cast in the early Cold War period, in conjunction with the rise of demography as a cross-disciplinary field. In the contest with the Soviets, the drive to modernize the “new states” had, as its demographic dimension, a concern for large family size. The claim that economic development, and insulation from socialism, hinged on fertility control was advanced by demographers, many but not all housed in sociology. By the mid-1960s, a domestic-facing research landscape was gathering momentum, supported by government and foundation interest in the family's role as transmitter of inequality. The domain of family demography, a resource-intensive specialty clustered in cross-disciplinary centers, spread throughout the remainder of the century—dwarfing other claimants, including Gary Becker's economics of the family.
Does inequality affect outcomes? To answer, we use the microcosm of Olympic competitions by asking whether a country's level of inequality diminishes its performance. If it does, is it conditional on institutional factors? We argue that the ability of economically free societies to win medals will not be affected by inequality. In these societies, institutions generate incentives to invest in the talents of individuals at the bottom of the income distribution (potential athletes otherwise constrained in the ability to expend resources on training). These effects mitigate those of inequality. The incentives that promote investments in skills across the income distribution are weaker in unfree societies and they cannot mitigate the effects of inequality. Using the Olympics of 2016 in combination with the Economic Freedom data, we find that inequality only matters in determining medal numbers for unfree countries. We link these results to inequality and its effects on economic outcomes.
This article emerged as the human species collectively have been experiencing the worst global pandemic in a century. With a long view of the ecological, economic, social, and political factors that promote the emergence and spread of infectious disease, archaeologists are well positioned to examine the antecedents of the present crisis. In this article, we bring together a variety of perspectives on the issues surrounding the emergence, spread, and effects of disease in both the Americas and Afro-Eurasian contexts. Recognizing that human populations most severely impacted by COVID-19 are typically descendants of marginalized groups, we investigate pre- and postcontact disease vectors among Indigenous and Black communities in North America, outlining the systemic impacts of diseases and the conditions that exacerbate their spread. We look at how material culture both reflects and changes as a result of social transformations brought about by disease, the insights that paleopathology provides about the ancient human condition, and the impacts of ancient globalization on the spread of disease worldwide. By understanding the differential effects of past epidemics on diverse communities and contributing to more equitable sociopolitical agendas, archaeology can play a key role in helping to pursue a more just future.
This chapter explores what inequality looks like from the perspective of the capability approach. ‘Sideways’ inequality – that is, inequality between individuals and groups in their risk of experiencing disadvantage – has been central to the capability approach since its inception, and we have tools such as the Equality Measurement Framework with which to systematically assess multidimensional horizontal inequalities. This includes examining differences in outcomes, in how people are treated, and in the autonomy they enjoy. ‘Up and down’ inequality – that is, how people are distributed across the spectrum between advantage and disadvantage, has been much less thoroughly investigated within the capability approach, and there are normative, conceptual and empirical issues to be resolved. In comparison to an exclusive focus on income and other economic resources, analysis of multidimensional vertical inequality is likely to alter who is understood to be most advantaged, how much advantage they have (the degree of stretch), and the extent of concentration of advantage in the distribution as a whole. Finally, inequality ‘along’ the dimension of time has become an important component of research on income inequality, and there are analogous questions about both short- and long-run capability mobility that we are only just beginning to address.
This chapter argues that non-discrimination law can and should offer enhanced protection against legal ‘othering’ of foreign nationals in the EU. It starts from the premise that some states offer much better value, in terms of rights, resources, and ultimately life chances, than others. Once this unequal distribution is brought into the picture, it becomes clear that nationality functions as a mechanism of exclusion vis-à-vis nationals of ‘low value’ states (and stateless persons) whose access to rights and resources is limited both in countries of origin and in ‘high value’ states where they are not recognised as (full) members. Relying on recent theories of non-discrimination law that focus on stigmatisation as a root cause of discrimination, this chapter proposes to combine increased scrutiny of nationality as a stigma-carrying attribute with due regard for its legitimate function in maintaining viable political communities.
El presente trabajo pretende explorar un aspecto pasado por alto por la literatura de historia económica comparada entre Argentina, Australia y Canadá: el capital humano. Mediante la comparación con estos países en los años de la Primera Globalización, analiza los stocks de capital humano con los que contaba la Argentina durante fines del siglo XIX y la primera parte del XX, y realiza un aporte principal: la Argentina del período presenta un problema de desigualdad regional (y de persistencia de esa desigualdad) ausente en el resto de las “economías de reciente poblamiento”.
The Brandt Line is a way of visualising the world that highlights the disparities and inequalities between the wealthy North and the poorer Global South. Forty years after its popularisation as part of a call for global reform, is the Brandt Line now a misleading way of representing world politics? This article assesses whether the Global South has lost its distinctiveness and coherence relative to the North since 1980. Existing assessments of global inequality do not settle the question of whether the North–South divide remains relevant for international relations because they overlook the most politically significant measures of inequality. Drawing on power transition theory, this article provides a systematic assessment of the North–South divide in terms of levels of economic development, relative inequality, economic power, and political satisfaction. The evidence suggests that the Brandt Line is largely intact. Although the economic diversity of the South has increased and its collective economic power has risen, relative income rankings remain unaltered and the states of the Global South are as dissatisfied as they were four decades ago. Differential growth rates are reshaping world politics without eroding the North–South divide traced by the Brandt Line.
Chapter 6 elucidates why structural reform has remained off the table in São Paulo since Brazil’s transition to democracy. It focuses on three specific events since the 1980s, instances when reform seemed imminent but ultimately fell short. Two instances were selected due to being repeatedly identified in interviews as especially salient cases of egregious police violence that led to calls for reform; the third instance, meanwhile, was an ultimately failed effort by a sitting governor to enact police reform. Chapter 6 presents a comparative sequential analysis of these sets of events to demonstrate how the state’s Military Police exerted pressure to limit policy options and how fragmented preferences and the absence of political competition led political leaders to conclude that structural police reforms would not be electorally advantageous. Considering the cases as sequences of events that fail to bring about comprehensive structural reforms helps to elucidate the police’s remarkable continuity in São Paulo State. This comparative sequential analysis demonstrates how long-term institutional persistence has been driven by the absence of an electoral counterweight to the structural power of the police due to enduring fragmentation of societal preferences and weak political competition in the state.
Chapter 3 probes why São Paulo State’s police have yet to undergo comprehensive structural reform in the decades since Brazil’s democratic transition. Brazil’s transition entailed considerable military reforms in accordance with democratic principles but no comparable effort to reform the country’s police forces. I illustrate how the state’s Military Police leveraged its control over coercion to cultivate structural power vis-à-vis civilian political leaders, through both the selective provision of security in politically beneficial ways and the strategic withdrawal of service. The chapter describes how the Military Police succeeded in constraining policy options available to politicians, and how politicians benefited from accommodating the police. These conditions raised the threshold for police reform in São Paulo over the last three decades, favoring institutional persistence despite the prevalence of widespread extrajudicial killings. I show how the fragmentation of societal preferences over policing and security - rooted in differences in citizens’ experiences with police along lines of race, class, and geography - has yielded little electoral incentive for politicians to enact reform. Instead, a large segment of São Paulo’s citizens demanding weakened legal restrictions on the police’s use of coercion with little external accountability have provided a constituency for politicians favoring authoritarian coercion.
Between 1985 and 2018, Brazilian economic well-being stagnated, with lackluster growth and regressive public policies destroying citizens’ life opportunities. There is considerable consensus about the sources of this low-level economic equilibrium, including low savings, low investment, and modest human capital improvements. Despite this consensus, and despite decades of reform, however, the overall institutional equilibrium changed only marginally. Drawing on the study of varieties of capitalism, this chapter describes how institutional complementarities drove actors’ incentives toward a collectively suboptimal equilibrium. Complementarities within and across five domains sustained the equilibrium: 1) the macroeconomy of a middle-income developmental state, 2) the microeconomy of firm organization; 3) the coalitional presidential political system; 4) the weak control mechanisms this political system set in place; and 5) an autonomous bureaucracy that permitted incremental reform but in consequence, may have moderated demands for more dramatic reforms while deepening fiscal constraints and impelling policymakers to preserve the tool kit of the developmental state.
Chapter 5 explores the prolonged institutional decay of the Colombian National Police, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s, and considers the factors that impeded comprehensive structural reform. Following a period of generalized loss of legitimacy across the Colombian state resulting from widespread political and criminal violence, the early 1990s saw a range of transformative policy reforms – from health and education to fiscal policy – and an institutional overhaul in the form of an ambitious new Constitution. Reform of the National Police, however, did not gain much traction, despite widespread authoritarian coercive structures and practices, weak institutional capacity, and inefficiency in fighting crime. I demonstrate how the National Police leveraged its structural power – flowing from its primary role in fighting the country’s war against drug cartels and its institutional and financial ties to the United States – to constrain the policy agenda and thwart reform attempts, even in a political environment that was highly conducive to a range of institutional and policy reforms. I then show how fragmented societal preferences over policing and security, often divided along class lines, generated conflicting demands and provided little electoral incentive for politicians to push for police reform, reinforcing institutional persistence.
Chapter 4 traces the development of the Police of Buenos Aires Province since Argentina’s transition to democracy and accounts for its institutional persistence in the face of extensive extralegal violence and predation of the citizenry. Despite the integral role of police in the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s, the transition to democracy in 1983 did not entail efforts to reform the country’s police institutions in accordance with democratic principles, as occurred with the military. As crime rates and societal demands for improved security increased, structural police reform was not on the agenda, and countless short-term efforts to root out corruption largely floundered. While other provincial institutions, such as the judiciary, underwent structural reform, the police strategically used its control over coercion to raise the cost to politicians of constraining police authority. The resulting accommodation between police and politicians largely kept police reform off the public agenda and allowed the provincial police to thwart external accountability efforts. I demonstrate that societal demands regarding policing and security were largely fragmented and often contradictory, such that politicians saw little electoral incentive to address police violence, corruption, and poor performance.
Sustainable finance has a key role to play in achieving a just transition - in other words accelerating the shift to a net zero and resilient economy in ways that are fair and inclusive. This chapter sets out why a just transition is essential for the scaling up climate action and achieving wider progress on sustainable development. There is also a compelling rationale for action within the financial system to support a just transition. Institutional investors have been leading the way and over 150 institutions with $10 trillion in assets have now committed to take action. Their aim is to avoid systemic risk and deliver on their fiduciary duties. Policy action is aso needed which mobilises both public and private finance, particularly for place-based action. The chapter closes with a set of priority actions for the European Union.
The concluding chapter explores the often-contradictory relationship between democracy and enduring state violence and the intervening role of inequality. It builds on the book’s key findings to further elucidate the problem that policing poses for democracy, in theory and in practice. The repertoires and distribution of protection and repression in the cases analyzed in this book – and indeed, in many other democracies – are antithetical to what some scholars view as the substantive principles and outcomes of democracy. Yet, these practices are often reinforced by the electoral and participatory processes other scholars have identified as constitutive of democracy. This book’s analysis of three police forces therefore lays bare a tension between procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy. In order to elucidate this tension, the concluding chapter disaggregates democracy and considers how these two dimensions may come to be at odds with one another. The chapter considers how the input of democracy – citizens’ preferences and demands – is channeled through democratic processes such as elections and participatory institutions to produce substantive outcomes that are antithetical to democratic principles. Key to understanding how quintessentially democratic processes result in authoritarian policing practices and structures is the distortions introduced by inequality to each dimension of democracy.
This Element focuses on Latin American fossil fuel producer countries and how they are dealing with the transition towards a greener energy matrix. The challenges involved are multiple and ethical in substance. In particular, a worldwide expansion in clean energies would reduce climate change, physical risks. A rapid transition, however, induces the irruption of a new (financial) risk. The energy transition, in addition, could be thought of as a new arena for political disputes. Finally, it evaluates the relevance of monetary policy and financial regulation to tackle the issue from a macro perspective. Energy transition, however, have also long-term but uncertain consequences on the national economy. Henceforth, and in order to minimize risks, a long-term, strategic vision of the challenge confronted by the region becomes mandatory. To tackle all these problems, this Element profits from contributions of different disciplines.
Online care platforms have become major brokers of informal paid caregiving in the U.S., alongside a patchwork of agencies, informal networks, and online job boards. While domestic carework has been considered a paradigmatic example of “invisible” work, platforms like Care.com emphasize workers’ online visibility – through self-branding and online identity management – as key to a successful job search. Based on interviews with careworkers and a content analysis of company materials, we find that careworkers negotiate overlapping and conflicting “visibility regimes,” which are constructed by platforms, and other social institutions that shape their job searches. While some leverage the individualized visibility of platforms as a vehicle for building a “caring brand,” others find themselves lost in a sea of search results that flatten important professional distinctions. We argue that this complicates policy assumptions that pose increased visibility as a solution for invisible or undervalued work. Instead, these new forms of online scrutiny serve platforms’ interests in making workers legible to clients. As careworkers’ livelihoods become more closely intertwined with the decisions, design, and policies enacted by platform companies, more attention should be paid to their legal and ethical responsibilities for working against entrenched inequalities within the industry.
Public support for the welfare state – and the policies constituting it – has long been a topic of research. Previous research on support for redistribution has tended to focus on how either country-level characteristics (particularly those relating to the macro-economy such as levels of economic development or income inequality) or individual-level political factors (such as left-right political orientation and sociodemographic factors) shape support for redistribution. To date, empirical research has insufficiently tested how macroeconomic context and individual political orientations interact. Research has also obscured whether the effects of macroeconomic context hold cross-sectionally (across country contexts) or longitudinally (within countries over time). Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), this article examines the cross-sectional (between-country) and longitudinal (within-country) interactive relationships involving economic development and income inequality (on one hand) and left–right political orientations (on the other) in shaping preferences for redistribution. Results indicate that there are larger left–right cleavages in attitudes in wealthier countries, more unequal countries, and countries where inequality is increasing. These findings challenge the dominant practice of focusing exclusively on additive effects of individual-level or country-level factors by showing the importance of paying attention to cross-level interactions.
This chapter focuses on the emotional virtue of gratitude in society and education. First, it explores major understandings of gratitude prevalent in philosophy and psychology that elaborate what gratitude is, and why it is called for. The practices encouraged for cultivating feelings of gratitude by psychologists and educators will also be discussed. Then the chapter will turn to critical views of gratitude that question its moral value, its psychological utility, and its place in education. While teaching feelings of gratitude in the classroom may not necessarily be harmful, there are risks and challenges that should not be overlooked by educators interested in the moral and social development of their students.
American political observers express increasing concern about affective polarization, i.e., partisans' resentment toward political opponents. We advance debates about America's partisan divisions by comparing affective polarization in the US over the past 25 years with affective polarization in 19 other western publics. We conclude that American affective polarization is not extreme in comparative perspective, although Americans' dislike of partisan opponents has increased more rapidly since the mid-1990s than in most other Western publics. We then show that affective polarization is more intense when unemployment and inequality are high; when political elites clash over cultural issues such as immigration and national identity; and in countries with majoritarian electoral institutions. Our findings situate American partisan resentment and hostility in comparative perspective, and illuminate correlates of affective polarization that are difficult to detect when examining the American case in isolation.
This article revisits the origins of internationalism in the field of health and shows how the cholera epidemics of the nineteenth century, much like the current coronavirus crisis, brought global differences such as social inequalities, political hierarchies, and scientific conflicts to the fore. Beyond drawing parallels between the cholera epidemics and the current crisis, the article argues for combining imperial and social histories in order to write richer and more grounded histories of internationalism. It explores this historiographical and methodological challenge by analysing the boardrooms of the international sanitary conferences, Middle Eastern quarantine stations catering for Mecca pilgrims, and ocean steamships aiming to move without delay during a worldwide health crisis.